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ABSTRACT 
 
Posthumanist rhetoric is informed by developments in the sciences and the 
humanities which suggest that mind and body are not distinct from each other and, 
therefore, claims of humans’ superiority over other animals based on cognitive 
differences may not be justified. Posthumanist rhetoric, then, seeks to re-imagine the 
human and its relationship to the world. Though “post-” implies after, like other “post-” 
terms, posthumanism also coexists with humanism. This dissertation develops a concept 
of posthumanist rhetoric as questioning humanist assumptions about subjectivity while 
remaining entangled in them.  
The destabilization of the human subject means that new identifications between 
humans and nonhumans are possible, and the ethical implications of the rhetorical 
strategies used to build them have yet to be worked out. Identification, a key aim of 
rhetoric in the theory of Kenneth Burke and others, can persuade an audience to value 
others. However, it can also obscure the realities of who does and does not benefit from 
particular arguments, particularly when animal suffering is framed as human-like trauma 
with psychological and cultural as well as physical effects. I argue that a posthumanist 
practice of rhetoric demonstrates ways of circumventing this problem by persuading 
readers not only to care about others, but also to understand that our ability to 
comprehend another’s subjectivity is limited and that acknowledging these limitations is 
a method of caring.  
 iii 
 
This dissertation locates instances of resistance to and/or deployment of 
posthumanist critique in recent works of literature; identifies language commonly used 
in appeals that create identifications between humans and animals; and analyzes the 
implications of these rhetorical strategies. To that end, I have selected texts about human 
and animal suffering that engage particular themes of identification that recur in 
posthumanist rhetoric. The chapters pair texts that develop each theme differently. Most 
undermine human superiority as a species, but many reify the importance of certain 
qualities of the liberal humanist subject by granting them to nonhumans. The points of 
identification created between humans and nonhumans will inform how we re-imagine 
the human subject to account for our connections, and therefore our responsibilities, to 
other beings. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
In J.M. Coetzee’s novella The Lives of Animals, the fictional novelist Elizabeth 
Costello delivers a lecture to a university audience and introduces a comparison between 
the “horrors” of the meat industry and those of the Holocaust by telling her audience “I 
will take it that you will concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and 
bring them home to you with adequate force” (19). The character Abraham Stern refuses 
to concede to this rhetorical move and claims the analogy is offensive. The use of the 
Holocaust to endow animal suffering with moral relevance recurs in animal rights 
discourse, but the strategy risks alienating listeners who perceive how the animalization 
of certain humans has led to their victimization. Costello’s audience is unified in 
rejecting her rhetoric, with various characters bringing up objections to her claims that 
identify humans with nonhumans. However, Costello’s arguments have resonated with 
the audience of the literary text. The Lives of Animals is published with four essays of 
commentary, and in Philosophy and Animal Life (Cavell et. al.), five distinguished 
philosophers reflect on the implications that the novella’s literary representations of 
philosophical arguments have for the discipline. 
The Lives of Animals incites such commentary because it engages critiques of 
liberal humanist subjectivity that are current in both academic and popular discourses. 
Costello rejects the Cartesian split between mind and body that allows for the 
enthymeme asserting we can do whatever we want to nonhumans, including people we 
have dehumanized, because they lack a mind. The premise supporting this abuse, that 
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differences in cognition make objectification acceptable, is brought to light by 
developments in the sciences and the humanities which suggest that mind and body are 
not so distinct after all. Posthumanism seeks to re-imagine the human and its relationship 
to the world. For example, N. Katharine Hayles goes beyond contesting the mind-body 
split to argue that human cognition is “distributed” among the mind, body, and technical 
and natural environments. Donna Haraway finds promise in our “entangled” 
relationships, seeing the diffused subject not as devoid of agency, but as more able to 
perceive and perform its duties to others (When Species Meet 5). 
The destabilization of the human subject means that new identifications between 
humans and nonhumans are possible, and the ethical implications of the rhetorical 
strategies used to build them have yet to be worked out. Identification, a key aim of 
rhetoric in the theory of Kenneth Burke and others, can persuade an audience to value 
others. However, it can also obscure the realities of who does and does not benefit from 
particular arguments. I argue that a posthumanist practice of rhetoric demonstrates ways 
of circumventing this problem by persuading readers not only to care about others, but 
also to understand that our ability to comprehend another’s subjectivity is limited and 
that acknowledging these limitations is a method of caring. This project develops a 
concept of posthumanist rhetoric as questioning humanist assumptions about subjectivity 
while remaining entangled in them. For example, texts aimed at popular audiences often 
affirm humanist notions about individual agency by extending it to nonhumans. While 
rhetoric that bestows “human” qualities on animals can increase identification between 
humans and animals, it can also reaffirm misconceptions about human superiority.  
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 The objectives of this dissertation, as a work of rhetorical criticism and theory, 
are to  
 locate instances of resistance to and/or deployment of posthumanist critique in 
recent works of literature and popular nonfiction; 
 identify language commonly used to convince an audience to “concede to” the 
appeals, analogies, and tropes that are most often used to “bring home” 
identifications between humans and animals;  
  analyze the political implications of these rhetorical strategies. 
I have selected texts about human and animal suffering that engage particular 
places of identification that recur in posthumanist rhetoric, such as the perceived 
connection between the Holocaust and factory farming. Animals’ ability to suffer is 
repeatedly invoked in discourse surrounding their treatment, from arguments by Jeremy 
Bentham to PETA. When this suffering is coded as trauma, as it is in Costello’s 
Holocaust analogy, it is used to increase the moral relevance of nonhumans. Whereas 
descriptions of suffering generate empathy, descriptions of trauma make a stronger call 
for action by arguing that nonhumans experience long-term physical and psychological 
effects that have implications that, like human trauma, extend beyond the individual and 
his or her “kind.” The chapters compare texts that develop points of identifications 
differently, some affirming the liberal humanist subject and others undermining it. Each 
text also takes a different approach to persuasion. Though the distance between writer, 
text, and reader is always a factor in persuasion, texts that have looser arguments and 
more ambiguity value this distance by drawing attention to the distributed cognition of 
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the reader. In contrast, more straightforward texts operate as though this distance either 
does not exist or is bridgeable and imagines the writer, subject, and reader as unified 
subjects rather than posthumanist, distributed ones. 
 How these texts create identification between writer, subject, and reader affects 
who benefits from textual engagements with posthumanist critiques. This dissertation is 
concerned with what the term identification has come to mean for rhetorical studies’ and 
trauma studies’ conceptualizations of the human and how these models relate to the ones 
proposed in posthumanist theory. According to Burke’s theory of rhetoric, all persuasion 
happens with identification by the speaker and the audience with each other’s interests. 
Therefore, “there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of persuasion, 
identification (‘consubstantiality’) and communication (the nature of rhetoric as 
‘addressed’)” (Rhetoric 46). Because identification entails a form of persuasion, texts 
that do not fit within the traditional purview of rhetoric can be analyzed for attempts at 
identification or consubstantiality. Even if texts are not persuading the audience to make 
a specific decision or take a specific action, they do introduce their audience to new 
concepts and use identification to make these ideas comprehensible and perhaps 
convincing.  
 Burkean identification allows for two individuals to be identified with each other 
yet not completely persuaded to share a course of action or adopt the other’s beliefs 
wholesale because identification does not actually erase an individual’s uniqueness. This 
relationship is expressed in the term consubstantiality because an individual becomes 
“substantially one” with the other with whom she identifies, but “substance” is not an 
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intrinsic quality (21). “Substance” etymologically refers to “something that stands 
beneath or supports the person or thing,” that is, its context (Grammar 22). These 
foundations are inherently unsteady because to define a thing by its context is to define it 
by what it is not. For example, Jacques Derrida explains that man “follows” the animal 
(17). Humans did not exist as such until they named the animal and thereby separated 
humanity, or at least “man,” from what was now its Other. Rhetoric can transform 
substances to build or break consubstantiality.  
 Consubstantiality can be used to create identifications between humans and other 
species, which destabilizes the Human/Animal categorization that Derrida argues 
undergirds Humanism by creating the appearance of human exceptionalism. This 
illusion is being undermined more and more frequently in western thought by what Cary 
Wolfe calls the present “decentering” of the human by recent trends in philosophy and 
the life sciences (What is Posthumanism? xv). Antihumanists and animal liberationists 
critique the human in philosophy’s continental and analytic traditions. Developments in 
primatology undermined human exceptionalism in popular consciousness as did the 
rhetoric of molecular biology that described DNA as a universal “code” for life that can 
be translated into digital code. Posthumanism is also informed by technoscience, and 
Hayles and Haraway consider cybernetic research on machine consciousness as well as 
science fiction that explores the implications of a world in which machines and humans 
are inseparable or indistinguishable. 
 Though “post-” implies after, like other “post-” terms, posthumanism also 
coexists with humanism. Rather than making claims about what comes “after” the 
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human, posthumanism joins or resists the critique of humanism, which may be informed 
by popular or scientific decenterings of the human. It seeks to understand the conditions 
in which humanism emerged and those in which it has been contested, its consequences 
for a variety of life forms, and how other systems of thought with different consequences 
can be developed. While not all posthumanist thinkers engage all three topics, a 
consistent point of identification among them is a definition of the human that 
recognizes its biological embodiment as well as its embodiment in various technological 
and cultural networks (Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? xv). Sylvia Wynter calls such a 
being the “human system-ensemble” because it institutes itself through autopoiesis. 
Although the system-ensemble auto-institutes itself as a unique subject, it also identifies 
with a group or groups and adjusts to match the “normative mode of the Subject” as 
defined by the group (22). 
 Trauma studies implies a model of the human that is a system-ensemble, shaped 
by interactions with her community, those she defines as “Other,” and by her own 
memories.  At the same time, trauma studies recognizes that an overly diffuse sense of 
self can make operating in the world and relating to others difficult.  For example, Judith 
Herman and James Pennebaker argue that a coherent self-narrative is part of healing and 
leads to better relationships between survivor and community (Herman 68, Pennebaker 
“Telling Stories” 5-7). Herman theorizes that “commonality,” in which a survivor sees 
her experiences as part of “the human condition,” is key to recovery (235).  There is 
likewise room to recognize connections in posthumanist theory. Wolfe, like Wynter, 
conceptualizes the relationship between self and the world through systems theory. The 
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principle of “openness from closure” envisions the subject as self-referential, but 
explains that this autopoietic closure actually is “generative of openness to the 
environment” because self-referentiality results in more complexity in the system and, 
therefore, more possible contacts with and dependencies on the environment (What is 
Posthumanism? xxi). 
 The uniqueness of each individual is also central to Burke’s understanding of 
consubstantiality because identification is not the discovery of an essential sameness, but 
the building of common ground between differences. However, Krista Ratcliffe critiques 
consubstantiality for promoting compromise over difference without examining the 
“coercive function of common ground” that occurs when an empowered party decides 
not only what differences need to be resolved, but also the terms of consubstantiality, 
which can result in the marginalized party losing differences important to them (58). 
While Burkean identification often happens unconsciously, Ratcliffe recommends that 
we practice “rhetorical listening.” This conscious practice entails listening to others’ 
desires for disidentifications and respecting these points in order to make limited 
identifications that are not exploitative.  
Trauma studies also encounters problems with identification between victims and 
those who, when writing or reading about them, experience empathy for the victims that 
sometimes overwhelms victims’ experiences and drowns out the voices of survivors. 
Dominick LaCapra provides an alternative to the totalizing identification that happens 
when one projects oneself onto a victim: empathetic unsettlement. This form of empathy 
results from the “virtual” not “vicarious” experience of trauma in which one imagines 
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oneself in the victim’s position “while respecting the difference between self and other 
and recognizing that one cannot take the victim’s place or speak in the victim’s voice” 
(125). According to LaCapra, identification without empathetic unsettlement restricts the 
“ethics and politics to the horizon of the disempowered witness to abjection” (142). Such 
identification may also “conceal the ways survivors are not simply victims but may 
themselves become effective political and ethical agents” (142). 
 While LaCapra is suggesting that unsettled empathy be deployed in the 
relationship between trauma victim and the historian, writer, or filmmaker who attempts 
to tell their story, I believe the term can be applied more broadly to situations in which 
one feels compelled to speak about and/or on behalf of another for various reasons, be it 
because the other is dead or living without access to particular institutions or discourses. 
Incorporating empathic unsettlement into the process of identification not only provides 
a way to correct for some of the imbalances in power between two parties, but also to 
extend consubstantiality beyond the human species. Acknowledging symbolic and 
material differences among species, while realizing that these differences do not make 
humans superior, enables one to envision compromises that are not exploitative. 
Haraway claims that recognizing connections to others is what makes us “worldly” 
(When Species Meet 287).  We develop new responsibilities to those with whom we are 
connected and how we shape those relations is how we shape worlds. Posthumanist 
rhetoric suggests that its audience become worldly by creating identifications between 
humans and other species, though it does not always spell out what our new 
responsibilities are.   
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 In rhetoric, posthumanism can be practiced by creating limited identifications. 
Using examples of consubstantiality (be it illusory and coercive or more attuned to 
difference) and empathetic unsettlement, I consider what is gained or lost by the texts’ 
attempts at identification. I selected texts about human and animal suffering because 
trauma narratives have the potential to undermine or reaffirm the humanist subject and to 
encourage or limit empathy. Each chapter therefore analyzes texts that build and limit 
identification through appeals to empathy, arguments about extending moral concern to 
animals, and analogies between human and nonhuman suffering. Because identification 
is central to persuasion, the texts reflect varied models of persuasion, from 
straightforward arguments to more ambiguous constructs that draw attention to how 
language and other symbolic forms create realities. 
  To outline what posthumanist rhetoric is, I build on the criteria that Wolfe argues 
qualifies academic work and other nonfiction texts as posthumanist and that which 
Ursula K. Heise and Hayles use for fiction. Wolfe defines posthumanism as a practice 
that can be applied to a discipline (What is Posthumanism? 123). He develops a two-
dimensional graph where “external relations” are charted on the y-axis and “internal 
disciplinarity” on the x-axis to explain different applications of posthumanism. Someone 
who works in a field typically concerned with the human, such as history, and theorizes 
about animals produces posthumanist thought in their external relations because they are 
insisting their discipline respond to discourses outside their field that argue we should 
take nonhuman subjects seriously. However, this person may retain much of the 
humanist methodology and assumptions internal to their discipline, in which case they 
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practice “humanist posthumanism.” Diagonal to this quadrant is “posthumanist 
humanism” in which disciplinary practice is posthumanist and the external relations 
accept a human/animal hierarchy by, for example, excluding nonhuman animals from 
the questions of subjectivity (What is Posthumanism? 124). Wolfe places Foucault here 
for his critiques of disciplinarity and his archaeology of humanism  (xx, 125) .  Atterton 
and Calarco would likely agree that most work by Continental philosophers fits in this 
category as they state that the Continental tradition “still has some way to go” in 
questioning human privilege and have attempted to spur it on with readings of selections 
from Continental philosophy that do address “the animal question” (xvii). Wolfe’s 
posthumanist posthumanism quadrant contains thinkers such as Derrida and Haraway 
who take a posthumanist approach to their disciplines and to the external world about 
which they theorize (What is Posthumanism? 125). 
 Wolfe uses academics as the examples in his graph, though he does state that 
these two dimensions can be applied to other types of discourse. Bradshaw’s Elephants 
on the Edge, as a nonfiction work that uses some humanist strategies to make an 
argument about elephants fits onto this graph fairly easily in the “humanist 
posthumanism” quadrant. Though Bradshaw sees herself as building a new discipline, 
trans-species psychology, rather than adhering to the conventions of an already 
established one, this text applies human psychological analyses to elephants rather than 
critiquing these methods. It is more difficult to apply this graph to memoirs and fictional 
texts because they do not have the same structures of internal disciplinarity as academic 
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writing, though they do have generic conventions. Therefore, I develop my own criteria 
for these kinds of texts in relation to those defined by Heise and Hayles. 
 Fiction and memoir are traditionally concerned with humans, but animals play 
significant roles in several of the books I am analyzing. For example, a large portion of 
The Lives of Animals is made of Costello’s lectures about animal consciousness, but 
Costello’s and her son’s strained relationships to humans make up another significant 
part. Cora Diamond argues that Costello’s lectures should be read as part of a literary 
exploration of the character’s distress when faced with human indifference to animal 
suffering, rather than as stand-alone philosophical arguments about the relationships 
between humans and animals. The book both follows in the humanist vein of fiction 
about humans and makes a posthumanist intervention by combining genres. Diamond 
emphasizes it is a literary work, and Ian Hacking describes it as both a “philosophical 
dialogue” and a text about “philosophical writing” (142). The Lives of Animals also 
defies Heise’s categorization of posthumanism.  
 Heise provides an overview of several novels and films that “portray posthuman 
contexts in the sense that they approach questions of species identity in a field of widely 
varying forms of technological and biological consciousness,” but determines that the 
majority of them are not “genuinely” posthumanist (505). For her, a posthumanist text 
must portray human consciousness as just “one mode of being among others” without 
making any claims of human uniqueness (505-6). This phrasing echoes Wynter’s, who 
charts the major shifts in the West’s “mode of being of human,” from one mode that 
defined the human through Christian theology to another that centered on secular 
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rationality, and the current crisis of this mode brought on by cultural studies 
(“Ceremony” 22). Wynter articulates the importance of literature when she explains 
“we,” autopoietic subjects who are also sensitive to norming influences from our social 
environments, are the “function” of literature as it is through literature’s “great feats of 
rhetorical engineering that we come to imagine/experience ourselves, our modes of 
being” (Ceremony 50). 
The Lives of Animals presents the crisis in the rational mode of being in the 
debate between Costello and a philosophy professor as well as in Costello’s daughter-in-
law’s private criticisms of her. The novel does not “affirm,” to use Heise’s term, that 
human consciousness is or is not unique nor does it affirm that consciousness is or is not 
central to being human. Costello claims that it is not, but other characters bring up 
counterpoints, leaving the readers to decide for themselves. Heise’s one dimensional 
“graph” means that she exiles many texts from posthumanism and makes the rather 
humanist move of valuing consciousness over all other qualities. While Heise does show 
that some texts are not as posthumanist as they might at first seem, her brief 
interpretations of them gloss over the ways in which they do undermine human 
uniqueness. 
 Her first reading is of one of the earliest science fiction texts to heavily focus on 
the android animal: Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Heise argues that this text 
affirms human uniqueness through human affection for nonhuman animals, both real and 
electronic. In contrast, “replicants” (androids) are cruel to animals. However, Heise 
dismisses the significance of both the fictional context of the novel, a post-apocalyptic 
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world, and the literal one, a world in which animals, even domestic ones, have little 
value and are often treated cruelly by humans. Humans’ affection for animals in this 
novel is clearly a cultural product, not something innate, and is a manifestation of the 
book’s larger interest in empathy. Empathy for animals is important to this fictional 
society only because earlier generations did not value animals or each other, which is 
why “World War Terminus” occurred and destroyed the planet. Moreover, the novel 
contains examples of humans who lack empathy or do not practice it enough and 
suggests that androids can experience empathy. 
 Hayles claims that the android Rachael manifests empathy for her fellow 
androids and perhaps for the human android-hunter Deckard. Hayles even reads 
Rachael’s cold-blooded killing of Deckard’s pet goat as evidence of her ability to care 
about others, claiming Rachael may have destroyed the goat because she jealously 
believed Deckard loved it more than he did her (173). While Rachael’s motives are 
ambiguous, I agree with Hayles that the novel explores how cybernetics “radically 
destabilizes” the human rather than affirming it (24). However, more importantly to this 
project’s methodology, Hayles recognizes that works of speculative fiction “embody 
assumptions similar to those that permeated the scientific theories at critical points” (21). 
Thus, rather than dismissing texts that have hints of humanism, she makes arguments 
about why these assumptions existed at a particular moment and how they gradually 
shifted to new sets of assumptions. While Heise discounts texts that support humanist 
ideas, Hayles argues that “older ideas are reinscribed as well as contested” in literary 
texts about the posthuman just as they are in the field of cybernetics (24).   
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 According to Hayles, “change occurs in a seriated pattern of overlapping 
innovation and replication” (24). She applies the seriation chart, used in archeological 
anthropology to map the evolution of an artifact, to the conceptual evolution of 
cybernetics. This chart illustrates how certain ideas coexist because the old ones wane 
while the new wax and spark ever newer ideas (14-15). This model is more nuanced and 
realistic than Heise’s because it acknowledges that multiple versions of the human and 
of human/animal relationships can exist simultaneously in a society and in a single text. 
Similarly, Wolfe’s graph allows for three different ways to practice posthumanism and 
does not privilege one over the other. 
 I consider Heise’s criterion that human consciousness be treated as “one mode of 
being among others” in determining if a text is using posthumanist rhetoric, but do not 
immediately exclude texts that do not fit her definition. Texts that address both the 
similarities and differences between human and nonhuman consciousness, even if they 
may ultimately affirm human consciousness is unique and/or superior raise the question 
of posthumanism with their audience. Similarly, texts that credit nonhuman species with 
qualities normally reserved for human consciousness encourage posthumanist thought. 
Because all posthumanist rhetoric remains entwined with humanist thought, each chapter 
compares two or more texts that make appeals to humanist values and undermine 
humanism. In comparing and contrasting the texts, I focus on their attempts to encourage 
or limit identification with the audience and any examples of communication in the texts 
that model limited identification. Although I do, like Heise, focus on one quality, 
identification, I do not exclude a text from posthumanism if it uses humanism to achieve 
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identification. Instead, like Wolfe, who points out that “humanist posthumanism” in the 
style of Tom Regan and Peter Singer would be a better choice for a newspaper editorial 
than a Derridean posthumanist posthumanism, I recognize that humanist moves also 
have value and may be the most effective rhetorical strategy for a text’s context of use.   
 The texts that most thoroughly undermine humanism do significant work in 
introducing the reader to new ideas, but often do not show the reader how to translate 
ideas into behavior. Some uses of humanism productively increase the audience’s 
identification with the human or nonhuman subjects of the text and provide guidelines 
for incorporating posthumanist thought into their everyday behavior, though there is the 
risk of merely reiterating humanist thought. Texts that rely most heavily on humanism 
share the goal of changing the way their readers operate in the more “humanist” realms 
of the world such as democratic governments and humanitarian or conservationist 
organizations.  They encourage their audience to change their behavior based on their 
acceptance of some posthumanist ideas, but not to question the value of democracy, 
humanitarianism, and conservation. The other texts do question these larger structures 
and therefore provide fewer, if any, guidelines for behavior. 
Texts that investigate the relationship between humans and animals, particularly 
human and animal suffering, deploy and limit identifications with the effect of both 
undermining human superiority as a species and reifying the importance of certain 
qualities of the liberal humanist subject by granting them to nonhumans. The points of 
identification created between humans and nonhumans will inform how we re-imagine 
the human subject to account for our connections, and therefore our responsibilities, to 
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other beings. While rhetorical listening, and the limited identifications and empathetic 
unsettlements that arise from it, can help us identify responsibilities to others in an 
ethical way, neither humanism nor posthumanism is necessarily predisposed to this 
practice.  
Chapter Descriptions   
 Chapter II, “Expanding the Reach of Humanist Morality through Empathetic 
Identification,” develops a rhetorical model that relates a texts’ approach to persuasion to 
its understanding of human and nonhuman subjectivity. It proposes that texts which are 
more “posthumanist” in their approach to subjectivity value the ambiguity that results 
from the distance between writer, text, and reader. In contrast, texts that retain many 
characteristics of the humanist subject, as described by Hayles, minimize these distances 
by creating identifications between human readers, nonhuman subjects, and the writer. 
When these texts display rhetorical listening to their animal subjects and limit 
identifications by explaining a unique need of the animal, they show readers that moral 
consideration is not formulaic and that rhetorical listening is vital for determining what 
actions one should or should not take. 
The chapter discusses how G.A. Bradshaw’s Elephants on the Edge, Jane 
Goodall’s Reason for Hope, and Frans De Waal’s The Age of Empathy claim certain 
animals fit the criteria of the humanist subject in order to generate empathy for them. 
These writers bring elephants, chimps, and other primates into the realm of moral 
concern by arguing that they possess qualities traditionally seen as unique to our species 
and describing them anthropomorphically. The chapter concludes by relating these 
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approaches to identification to those found in Coetzee’s novella The Lives of Animals. 
As a fictional work, this text does not share the other threes’ goal of directing readers to 
take specific actions, and therefore makes fewer humanist appeals. Instead of arguing 
that certain species should be valued because they have “human” qualities, the fictional 
Elizabeth Costello states that the human/animal split is based on unimportant qualities 
and empathy can be extended to all species. While The Lives of Animals introduces its 
readers to posthumanist thought, the nonfiction texts depend on humanist thought to 
promote specific actions to ease the suffering of some species.  
 Chapter III, “Analogies Between Humans’ Instrumentalization and 
Extermination of Animals and the Abuse of Humans,” analyzes these rhetorical 
strategies.  These analogies can add moral weight to a struggle the public would 
otherwise deem insignificant, but also risk appropriating others’ suffering and offending, 
rather than persuading, an audience. Ratcliffe’s theory of rhetorical listening is central to 
this chapter as both those who make these analogies and those who respond to them may 
succeed or fail at this practice. The chapter identifies the major risks of these 
analogies—1) they may exploit a group of victimized people and reiterate dehumanizing 
discourse similar to the kind used to justify the mistreatment of these people, 2) viewers 
may be alienated by controversial analogies 3) the analogy may obscure perpetrators’ 
culpability and victims’ agency—and argues that rhetorical listening is a way to 
circumvent them.   
 This chapter first considers the use of the Holocaust by PETA, identifies 
successes and failures of rhetorical listening in responses to this campaign, and compares 
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them to Costello’s Holocaust analogy and her audience’s responses in The Lives of 
Animals. It continues by contrasting PETA’s appropriative use of racism with the more 
productive ones made in Elephants on the Edge. The essay collections Sistah Vegan and 
Sister Species also make analogies between speciesism and racism or sexism. In all these 
analogies, limited identification is crucial to avoid appropriation. The chapter concludes 
by analyzing how two illustrated narratives, Maus and The Rabbits, which intend to 
critique racial discrimination also draw attention to speciesism. Maus models an 
acknowledgement of the limitations of these analogies. 
 Chapter IV, “Dehumanization and Rehumanization in Two Graphic Novels about 
the Rwandan Genocide,” compares Rupert Bazambanza’s Smile through the Tears with 
J.P. Stassen’s Deogratias: A Tale of Rwanda. To some extent, these two graphic novels 
have the same exigence: to educate the West about the Rwandan Genocide. They also 
both use associations between humans and other animals to make arguments about 
dehumanization. However, the texts present starkly different views about the 
relationships between humans and nonhuman animals. Smile makes a political argument 
that the West did not intervene in the genocide because they did not and do not see 
Africans as of human value; therefore, it seeks to “humanize” Tutsis for its readers. 
While Deogratias also attempts to generate empathy for genocide victims, it complicates 
concepts of guilt and innocence rather than assigning blame. 
As in the first chapter, the text that makes a stronger call to action, Smile through 
the Tears, is more “humanist” than the other. Smile’s structure is that of a conventional 
narrative and its content promotes a humanist view of the world in which individual 
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agency is clear and history is comprehensible. By outlining the causes of the genocide, 
Smile is able to call for individuals to take actions that will prevent similar atrocities. 
Deogratias lacks this persuasive force and presents the genocide as an incomprehensible 
trauma for which responsibility cannot be clearly assigned. Like The Lives of Animals, 
Deogratias introduces a critique of humanism without endorsing this critique. Smile 
affirms humanism, but the solution it offers to end racial tension may not be sufficient as 
it places all responsibility on the individual without explaining what they can do to affect 
social change. 
 Chapter V, “Rhetorics of Trauma in Memoirs about Life after War,” compares 
Doug Peacock’s memoirs about life after the Vietnam War, Grizzly Years and Walking it 
Off, to Jay Kopelman’s memoir about his return from Iraq, From Baghdad to America: 
Life Lessons from a Dog Named Lava. These texts use the writers’ experiences with 
trauma to both seek and resist identification. Writing, and the consubstantiality that it 
entails in these books that make calls for social action, is a means of recovery because 
the writer engages with their own past, present, and future and also considers his or her 
relationships with others. While both authors use this interplay of identification and 
disidentification with themselves and their readers, their political aims differ, and the 
depth of the change they seek affects how their texts create identification.  
Peacock makes connections between individual trauma, the destruction of 
people, and the destruction of wild animals and their habitats. He criticizes government, 
war, and conservationist efforts that put human convenience over animal lives. In 
contrast, Kopelman insists that there are “bad guys”; therefore, he trusts that war has a 
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positive effect that outweighs the destruction he witnessed. He criticizes government 
policies about military pets and military culture that make it difficult for soldiers to seek 
psychological counseling, but does not question the government and military in general.  
Thus, Kopelman’s text takes a relatively humanist approach to activism and 
creates humanist depictions of human/animal relationships. The book values pets 
because they can improve soldiers’ mental health, not because animal lives are valuable 
in themselves. It builds identification with readers by affirming the humanist 
relationships with pets that both civilians and soldiers experience through Kopelman’s 
description of his relationship with Lava and the inclusion of letters from several 
veterans who adopted dogs during wars. In these relationships, the humans purport to 
have a clear understanding of the dogs. Peacock’s books critique humanist relationships 
to animals, so identification is sought in different ways, such as a narrative structure that 
evokes traumatic flashbacks and analogies between public memories of the Vietnam 
War and his own memories. Rather than trying to bring humans and animals close 
together in a material sense, like From Baghdad to America, these memoirs encourage 
humans to leave animals alone. To make that argument, identification with grizzly bears 
is kept in the realm of empathetic unsettlement; the bears are shown to be capable of 
some communication with humans but are never fully understandable.  
 Chapter VI, “Conclusion,” reviews the posthumanist rhetoric used in the texts in 
the preceding chapters and describes strategies for limiting identification while also 
being persuasive. It outlines how the context of use affects the degree to which a text 
pursues posthumanism to consider how both humanism and posthumanism can be used 
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to move an audience. It suggests that where and how posthumanist rhetoric locates 
agency, and therefore, responsibility may be an area for continued research.  
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CHAPTER II  
EXPANDING THE REACH OF HUMANIST MORALITY THROUGH 
EMPATHETIC IDENTIFICATION 
This chapter locates instances of resistance to and deployment of posthumanist 
critiques in three works of nonfiction written for popular audiences and one novel. 
Rather than considering the scientific justification for the writers’ depictions of animal 
subjectivity, it develops a rhetorical model that accounts for how the subjectivity of 
nonhumans is considered in these texts and how this attitude towards nonhumans relates 
to the identification created in the text between the three positions of subject, audience, 
and writer. Texts that identify human readers with nonhuman subjects aim to increase 
empathy for those subjects. However, disidentifications are also important because they 
allow writers to be specific about the needs of the nonhuman species and respect certain 
readers’ resistance to a wholesale identification with nonhumans at the expense of 
human uniqueness. 
The nonfiction works analyzed here claim that individuals of certain species 
deserve moral consideration because they are capable of not only suffering, but also 
sophisticated cognition and reciprocity. Bradshaw develops “trans-species psychology” 
in Elephants on the Edge to argue that human action has traumatized many elephants 
and, therefore, humans should change their behaviors. Goodall’s Reason for Hope and 
de Waal’s The Age of Empathy state that both humans and chimpanzees have resources 
for anti- and pro-social behavior. For Goodall, this means readers should foster their pro-
social tendencies by purchasing eco-friendly products and supporting her youth 
 23 
 
organization. De Waal similarly claims that humans should respect their empathetic 
urges more because, for example, they will be happier in societies with a more equal 
distribution of wealth.  
As I will argue, when the nonfiction texts develop a subject that corresponds to 
the liberal humanist one for both their readers and some animals, their calls for action 
seem clear and plausible.  I use Hayles’ definition of the liberal humanist subject as a 
“coherent, rational self” with a right to autonomy, a sense of agency, and a belief in 
enlightened self-interest (85-6). Depicting readers as subjects capable of rational thought 
and agency is a method of encouraging action. As a point of contrast, J. M. Coetzee’s 
novel The Lives of Animals also considers empathy in the relationships among its 
characters and in the treatment of animals, but it imagines the subject as more diffuse 
than the nonfiction works and rejects express political aims. Instead, it encourages 
readers to theorize on their own about ideas the fictional novelist Elizabeth Costello 
presents and her interactions with other characters. While the novel does not advocate 
specific actions, it does seem to aim at effecting an attitudinal shift. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that one approach to the subject is 
better or worse than the other, but to develop a rhetorical model that includes how these 
texts account for nonhuman subjectivity and consider the implications of how 
subjectivity is imagined in each text. Because these texts argue that a certain nonhuman 
subject has agency and deserves moral consideration, they should recognize these 
qualities in their treatment of nonhumans. They can do so by creating limited 
identifications among the three positions of subject, audience, and writer. The rhetorical 
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model that emerges from my analysis of these texts modifies the sender-receiver model. 
This model has been described in various ways throughout the history of rhetoric and 
communication studies. The principle that a sender transmits a message and a receiver 
accepts it has already been productively unsettled in rhetorical studies with critiques that 
account for the interaction between sender, message, receiver, and their context.1  This 
chapter further revises this model by introducing a third party, the subject about whom 
information is being communicated, and making all three positions, sender , subject, and 
receiver, mobile. The writer, audience, and subject can be drawn together when the text 
calls for identification and pushed apart when it draws attention to differences.  
Ratcliffe calls the consideration of difference “rhetorical listening” because the 
listener consciously limits identification. She identifies two forms of identification: 
metaphorical and metonymic. Metaphorical identification is unlimited, which prevents 
listening because it imposes identification without concern for differences that may be 
important to the other side. In contrast, metonymic identification allows for a variety of 
identifications and disidentifications. The argument that there are no significant 
differences among humans or between humans and other species is an example of 
metaphorical identification. Metonymic arguments may define particular qualities, such 
as the capacity for suffering, as significant to both humans and other animals; however, 
they also acknowledge species differ. Writers can also seek metonymic identification 
with their readers by acknowledging and accepting that readers’ definitions of the 
                                               
1 Jenny Edbauer explains how the consideration of context in Bitzer’s development of the rhetorical 
situation and the responses of his critics both productively and “permanently troubles sender-receiver 
models” (3). 
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relationship between humans and nonhumans may differ from the writer’s in important 
ways through the use of remonstrative language. 
Texts that argue for metaphorical identification between humans and nonhumans 
risk alienating readers who perceive this move as too radical. The potential damage to 
the writer’s ethos that can occur if readers perceive them as extremists can be mitigated 
through the deflection of emotion, by professing a humanist devotion to moral codes 
based on logic. However, arguments that ignore the role of empathy in morality may not 
critique the assumption that morality is universal. Instead, they tacitly accept the idea 
that morality follows a logical code that can be applied across all situations and cultures. 
Texts that create metonymic identification are not guaranteed to critique universality, but 
they do lead readers to consider specifics by investigating what moral consideration 
entails for a particular group of nonhumans. The risk of this strategy is that the audience 
may not be asked to reconsider many humanist ideas about species differences. Texts 
that demonstrate rhetorical listening to both the audience and animal subject perhaps do 
the most to prevent over or under identification to determine which differences matter 
and which might be glossed over to create limited identification. 
Humanist Morality and Modern Ethics 
In Elephants on the Edge: What Animals Teach Us about Humanity, Bradshaw 
argues that the elephant psyche is like the human one; therefore, they deserve moral 
consideration. By psyche, Bradshaw primarily means elephants’ recognition of 
themselves as unique individuals. She depicts elephants as liberal humanist subjects who 
possess self-consciousness, agency, and the ability to experience and act on moral 
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impulses. Bradshaw also depicts her readers and herself as such a subject by 
constructing both scientific and emotional appeals with the explicit aim of awakening a 
moral impulse in readers that leads them to aid elephants. Therefore, the three positions 
of writer, audience, and nonhuman subject largely overlap in this book. Bradshaw 
unsettles the identifications between them in order to establish her authority as a scientist 
in contrast to lay readers and to provide specifics about what moral consideration for 
elephants as elephants entails. 
In the first chapter, Bradshaw establishes her specialized credibility as a 
psychologist while also bringing together elephant and human species for her readers. 
Bradshaw supports her claim that elephants are self-aware by describing the four stages 
of the Mirror Self-Recognition (MSR) test and explains that the MSR test is accepted 
among psychologists as indicating “self-awareness” in humans who demonstrate that 
they recognize their reflections, typically around the age of eighteen to twenty-four 
months (2). Then, she describes the studies in which elephants have passed some or all 
of the MSR stages. According to Bradshaw, all elephants that were tested at the Bronx 
Zoo passed stage 3, recognizing their reflection and using the mirror to investigate 
themselves, which means they should be considered self-aware according to this metric.  
For readers who are not convinced the MSR sufficiently demonstrates elephant 
subjectivity, Bradshaw compiles qualitative evidence to argue that elephants meet all of 
psychologist William James four criteria of the self, which he calls the “I.” James 
identified the necessary features of the “I” as agency, a feeling of coherence and 
embodiment, the ability to “feel and show” emotions, and the “possession of one’s 
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sequence of experiences, a history and sense of continuity” (Bradshaw 8-14). Bradshaw 
brings up examples from elephant ethology, such as their use of tools, mourning 
behaviors, and long memories to argue that elephants fulfill all four of James’s criteria.  
Though Bradshaw extends liberal humanist subjectivity to the elephants by 
insisting they are self-conscious, she productively unsettles the identification between 
her human readers and elephants by being specific about what moral consideration for 
elephants as elephants entails. LaCapra proposes the technique of unsettled identification 
for relating to other humans. He explains that even well-intentioned identification with a 
victimized person can overwhelm that person’s voice. This can result in an over-
simplification of their suffering which then limits the possibilities for activism (History 
in Transit 142). An example of humans considering the specificity of elephants’ 
experiences with beneficial results for those elephants is the Sheldrick Trust. According 
to Bradshaw, keepers raise orphaned elephants according to the social mores of herds, 
then transition the orphans into the wild herds in Tsavo National Park. The keepers sleep 
next to their charges each night, teach them what vegetation is edible, and instruct them 
in elephant behavior. In short, they become allomothers (140). Though “allomother” is a 
term sanctioned by elephant ethologists, not a term coined by Bradshaw, it enhances her 
efforts to anthropomorphize the elephants. When used by ethologists, it implies adult 
female elephants’ behavior is “mothering,” and when used by Bradshaw to describe the 
male keepers’ learned behavior, it implies a method of mothering that is cultural and 
learnable, rather than purely instinctual.  
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According to Bradshaw’s description, the trust assumes the truth of the liberal 
humanist subject and extends it to the elephant, treating each one as an individual who 
must learn to be “self-sufficient” (141). Yet, this extension of humanist moral standing 
to elephants does not lead to a harmful projection of the human’s desires onto the 
Sheldrick elephants by, for example, allowing humans to “adopt” the orphans as 
domesticated workers, zoo animals, or circus animals. Instead, it results in a limited 
empathetic identification with the elephants that also encourages a respect for the 
elephants’ own way of life as shown by the trust’s success with raising orphans by 
mimicking allomothers and integrating those elephants into wild herds. 
 The section on the Sheldrick Trust paints elephants as capable of suffering and 
response to others’ acts of communication, which positions them within the humanist 
moral community by making the controversial claim that they are capable of empathy 
for others and can reciprocate kind actions. Bradshaw writes that some elephants who 
have integrated into wild herds visit their old keepers to introduce their offspring. She 
describes these events as “family reunions” that are “joyous” and blurs the lines between 
human and elephant expressions of  joy by referring to the reunions as an event full of 
“trunk caresses, smiles, embraces, and laughter of old friends and family” (141). Even 
the elephants that never return are depicted as displaying gratitude, giving “one final 
gesture of love and appreciation” when released into the wild, though Bradshaw does not 
specify what this gesture looks like (141). While a display of appreciation is not identical 
to reciprocating an action in kind, Bradshaw’s work is significant for its depiction of 
elephants as capable of both compassion and reciprocity. She quotes Daphne Sheldrick 
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who says, “[Elephants] have a sense of compassion that projects beyond their own kind 
and sometimes extends to others in distress. They help one another in adversity . . .” 
(24). Bradshaw also notes elephants’ long memories to claim that they facilitate 
elephants’ ability to take revenge as well as return kindnesses.2 
 Because psychological trauma, and more specifically, elephants’ recovery from 
that trauma by establishing caring relationships,  is the focus of Bradshaw’s book, the 
text combines two questions about the Animal that Derrida identifies as significant in the 
history of philosophy. He identifies these questions as “Can they respond?,” rather than 
only react on an instinctual level, and “Can they suffer?” Bradshaw’s book implicitly 
asks “Can they respond to another’s suffering?” when she seeks to convince readers that 
elephants can heal from trauma through their relationships with humans and other 
elephants.  Derrida credits a dramatic shift in philosophical argumentation about the 
animal to Bentham. Whereas the question had been “[Can] the animal think, reason, or 
speak?” Bentham said the primary question should be “Can they suffer?” (Derrida 27). 
This question turns the conversation from logos and the capability to take a particular 
action to the experience of powerlessness.3 However, questions about logos remain 
popular.  Derrida lists similar questions that have been used to define the relationship 
between humans and animals: “‘Does the animal think?’ ‘Does the animal produce 
                                               
2  According to Bradshaw, elephants can conceive of revenge and enact it. She cites researchers who have 
called elephants’ killing of cattle owned by the Maasai people as “revenge” on this tribe that kills 
elephants. She also states that the elephant Black Diamond acted out of revenge when he attacked his 
abusive trainer. She is less certain that revenge is historically part of elephant society and states that it 
could be a response to human pressures (9, 15, 144-5). 
3 While the experience of suffering is not always only about powerlessness, a momentary loss of power is 
involved. For example, while athletic training is done to gain strength, exercises that are done to the point 
of muscle failure result in a temporary loss of power. Suffering that is taken on voluntarily may still 
involve such a loss of power. 
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representations?’ . . . Does the animal have not only signs but a language . . . Does it 
play? Does it offer hospitality? Does it offer? Does it give? . . .” (63). This line of 
questioning is based on the assumption that “the animal” is a legitimate category, so 
Derrida introduces the term animot to disrupt it. This portmanteau of animaux and mot 
evokes the “extreme diversity of animals that ‘the animal’ erases, and which, when 
written, makes it plain that this word [mot] ‘the animal’ is precisely only a word” (Mallet 
x). Bradshaw, Goodall, and de Waal are highly aware of the multiplicity of animals. 
However, instead of rethinking the previous line of questioning, these three writers 
merely apply it with restraint by seeking these abilities in cognitively sophisticated 
species with complex social systems. The writers remain invested in proving that some 
nonhuman species can reason and respond, while also stressing that these animals can 
suffer.  
Although this approach to nonhumans does not forget suffering, it becomes 
simply one more quality in the list instead of the first, unique question. Of the three 
nonfiction writers discussed in this chapter, Bradshaw gives the most weight to suffering 
because she devotes much of her book to proving that elephants can experience trauma. 
However, she also argues that they possess many other capacities Derrida lists. Goodall 
and de Waal spend no more time discussing suffering than they do other abilities. All 
three writers argue that the species with which they are concerned can respond to other’s 
suffering, or experience empathy and act on it. Their arguments bring the members of a 
species into the realm of humanist moral consideration because it implies that they are 
capable of individuality and sophisticated cognition that includes a long enough sense of 
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history to reciprocate both kind and cruel acts well after they have immediately 
occurred. While The Lives of Animals poses critiques of some forms of ethical 
philosophy, with Elizabeth Costello urging her audience to read poetry and walk with 
animals through a slaughterhouse rather than read philosophy, the nonfiction texts do not 
suggest we need to investigate or restructure our ethical codes (Coetzee 65). They are 
more concerned with how these ethics translate to behavior and affect readers’ stance on 
specific moral issues.   
According to Hayles, the pursuit of liberal humanist values, including 
enlightened self-interest  and the rights of autonomy and freedom, can benefit others 
(85-6). For example, they led one of the founders of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, to 
oppose lobotomy and nuclear weapons. However, this version of the subject undoes 
itself. As Hayles explains, because the liberal humanist subject is defined as “self-
regulating,” the concept of this subject undermines human superiority when we imagine 
machines that are capable of sophisticated enough self-regulating processes to become 
conscious and rational (86). She refers to the now classic novel, Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep, in which human society “solves” this problem by changing the defining 
human trait from rationality to empathy. The humans in the novel assume that because 
androids cannot feel empathy toward others, humans should not feel empathy towards 
them.4  
                                               
4 The humans’ lack of empathy for androids is motivated by both selfishness and fear. They benefit from 
android slaves, who are given to humans as an incentive for moving to space colonies, and justify 
enslaving them because they are afraid of what intelligent beings can accomplish when they do not feel 
empathy. 
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Such reciprocity as an aspect of empathy, along with rationality and 
individuality, is fundamental to some forms of modern ethics. In the three nonfiction 
works discussed in this chapter, arguments for humanist morality are based in what 
Zygmunt Bauman identifies as modern ethics because of their belief in a universal 
morality that transcends even some species lines, as long as these Others are capable of 
reciprocity. Bauman’s definitions of modern moral philosophy and the postmodern 
approach to ethics he proposes hinge on his distinction between morality and ethics. He 
calls ethics “a moral code, wishing to be the moral code, the one and only set of 
mutually coherent precepts that ought to be obeyed by any moral person” (21). Bauman 
believes that a universalizable moral code is not achievable, so his postmodern morality 
is a morality without set ethical rules.  
Bauman states that the conviction that a universal ethical code could be 
determined “drew its animus from the faith in the feasibility and ultimate triumph of the 
humanist project” because it assumed that there was a formula for a harmonious, stable 
world which humans were capable of discovering (9). “Reciprocity” is one of the 
attributes that Bauman identifies which “morality should have possessed in order to be 
universalizable—but which it does not” (54). That is, a decision could be labeled 
universally moral if it promises to benefit the actor, either by direct reciprocity from the 
recipient or in a more diffuse, delayed way. However, for Bauman, moral decisions are 
not ones that result from calculating costs and benefits to oneself. 5  
                                               
5 Bauman does no describe how utilitarianism fits into his definition of modern ethics as this approach is 
concerned with the greatest good, rather than individual benefit. 
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Bauman’s “postmodern ethics” rejects the belief in a universal ethics to declare 
that morality cannot be imposed and following one standard too strictly always leads to 
immoral ends (11). Postmodern ethics does not depend on rationality because Bauman’s 
definition of the Self is Levinasian rather than in accordance with liberal humanist 
subject identified by Hayles. For Emmanuel Levinas, responsibility to the Other 
precedes self-consciousness; therefore, the moral impulse exists before socially codified 
morality. Suffering is important to Levinas’s conceptualization of the Other, and the 
opposition to suffering is central to his ethics. He writes that the Other “calls to me and 
orders me from the depths of his defenseless nakedness, his misery, his mortality” (202). 
All suffering is “useless” for the sufferer; however, suffering for another’s suffering has 
meaning because this compassion shows that one recognizes one’s duty to relieve the 
Other’s suffering (100). 
Though Bauman and Levinas argue that the ethical relationship exists prior to the 
social and to “being” respectively, it remains in the realm of human beings for both of 
them. Therefore, Wolfe critiques Bauman’s postmodern ethics and Levinasian ethics for 
retaining reciprocity at the same time that they deny it. Both claim that the rejection of 
the expectation of reciprocity is fundamental to an ethical relationship, but this rejection 
implies the Other has the capability to reciprocate and limits the moral community to 
beings who possess it (What is Posthumanism? 141). Coetzee addresses the difficulties 
of an ethical relationship with those who lack the ability to reciprocate in The Lives of 
Animals, but arguments about more cognitively sophisticated species in the nonfiction 
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texts sidestep these difficulties by granting the ability to reciprocate to certain 
nonhumans.  
In the three nonfiction works, arguments for humanist morality are based in what 
Bauman calls modern ethics because of their belief in a universal morality that even 
transcends species. They are not concerned with Others that are incapable of reciprocity. 
The texts extend moral consideration to certain animals by showing how well they fit the 
requirements of the liberal humanist subject. Even though humanist morality as it is 
practiced in these texts does not absolutely depend on morality as rational and 
calculated, the ability to reciprocate is fundamental. The nonfiction texts  discussed in 
this chapter extend the reaches of morality by arguing that specific animals deserve 
moral treatment because they are capable of practicing moral behavior to both others of 
their species and humans. Wolfe would classify such works as “humanist 
posthumanism” because though they discuss the animal subject, they do not question 
humanist disciplinary norms (What is Posthumanism? 125). Because they take their 
readers to be liberal humanist subjects, they assume they can be persuaded according to 
modern ethics along with some description of animal suffering to stir the empathy that is 
established by depicting animals as humanist subjects.  
While Bauman and Levinas place the moral impulse before other “human” 
qualities such as rationality, Goodall and de Waal insist on locating pro-social 
relationships that include empathy, reciprocity, and altruism biologically prior to the 
human, in our primate ancestry. In doing so, they argue for a human nature that includes 
pro-sociality instead of imagining that humans have a “beastly” nature they are 
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constantly struggling to repress through the devices of civilization. These writers 
collapse the distinction between pro-social and moral behavior by arguing that specific 
actions, such as sharing food, are a demonstration of conscious choice rather than 
instinct. Furthermore, Goodall and de Waal use anthropomorphic language to describe 
such actions. For example, de Waal states that capuchin monkeys “barter” with 
researchers when they submit plastic tokens to feed either only themselves or both 
themselves and their favored companions (112). 
 In this way these texts seemingly differ from modern ethics because they reject 
the idea that the human can “emancipate itself from . . . the ‘animal’ or not-sufficiently-
human, ignorant, dependent, ‘other side’ of their selves” (Bauman 23). However, their 
politics benefit from retaining vestiges of modern ethics and Cartesian dualism when the 
works direct their audience toward moral choices. For example, Goodall supports human 
uniqueness and the ability of the mind to control selfish desires when she claims that 
humans are capable of self-directed “moral evolution” that can lead to a more just world. 
De Waal also believes empathy can be consciously encouraged by both personal efforts 
and social institutions. Bradshaw’s stories of elephants’ who “reach out” to humans 
establish this empathy project as one that species can work on together (247). In contrast 
to much other animal rights discourse that paints nonhumans as passively suffering 
victims, like PETA’s analogy between concentration camp prisoners and farm animals in 
its “Holocaust on Your Plate” campaign, these three authors create empathetic 
identification between humans and nonhuman by positioning their readers as empathetic 
individuals who can help other empathetic individuals.   
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Empathetic Identification in Elephants on the Edge 
This section defines empathetic identification and its relationship to rhetorical 
theory and trauma studies using Elephants on the Edge. The following one analyzes 
examples of empathetic identification and empathetic unsettlement in texts about 
primates by Goodall, the popular press, and de Waal that attempt to bring nonhumans 
into the realm of humanist morality by presenting them as self-aware, emotional, and 
rational subjects but also, at times, support a belief in human uniqueness. While empathy 
has been defined in multitude of ways, for this analysis I will consider the empathy felt 
by the reader for the nonhuman subject or the writer apart from every day 
“mindreading,” in which one understands the thoughts and emotions of another (Stueber 
5.1). The thoughts and emotions of the writer, particularly in Goodall’s memoir, are 
sometimes spelled out clearly in the texts; likewise, the internal life of the animals is 
often stated as a matter of fact rather than something the readers must deduce. Rather, 
empathy as it is discussed here entails that the reader either consider how she would feel 
if she were in a similar situation to the nonhuman (or writer) or share in the nonhuman’s 
(or writer’s) experience of joy, distress, or other emotional state as it is depicted in the 
text. For me to claim that a nonhuman is depicted as displaying empathy, the text must 
imply that the nonhuman differentiates between itself and the other, has performed some 
act of mindreading, and as a result shares the other animal’s joy, distress, etc.      
Empathetic identification is created primarily through emotional appeals that 
present the other as experiencing the same feelings that the reader would under 
circumstances that the text presents as similar, as Bradshaw does when she describes the 
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joyful “family reunions” at Sheldrick. In texts about nonhumans, it is built through 
language that could be considered anthropomorphic. For example, Bradshaw repeatedly 
calls the elephants at Sheldrick “orphans,” “babies,” and “infants,” but rarely uses the 
animalizing term “calf.” She also describes them as experiencing PTSD, writing that one 
named Ndume “had difficulty sleeping and often we would wake to hear his screaming 
and shrill trumpeting—a distress signal of a baby—obviously reliving the traumatic 
events in his dreams” (139). By characterizing his trumpeting, the one exclusively 
nonhuman act in the sentence, as that of a “baby” she explains it as part of his human-
like reaction to the deadly attack on his herd. 
The claim that Ndume and other elephants are traumatized also humanizes them. 
While the ability to suffer would be enough for an animal to qualify for moral 
consideration  under Derrida’s interpretation of Bentham, Bradshaw is writing for an 
audience who may not believe all forms of suffering are equal (Derrida 27). By showing 
that the elephants experience psychic as well as physical suffering, Bradshaw creates 
identification for them with readers who put little value on nonhumans’ physical pain. 
Her use of names also increases the elephants’ human status. Unlike Goodall, who 
describes her process of naming the wild chimps she observes at Gombe, Bradshaw does 
not mention that Ndume was named by Sheldrick keepers. Instead, she refers to him as 
Ndume even when imagining his life before Sheldrick, implying that his status as a 
unique and important individual is not dependent on humans recognizing him as such. 
Although Bradshaw makes arguments for identification that are supported with scientific 
research, she also makes many subtle attempts to create identification.  
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In Rhetoric of Motives, Burke argued that identification, which is synonymous 
with persuasion, can be conscious, unconscious, or somewhere in between. De Waal 
makes a similar argument about empathy. He cites research from primatologists and 
psychologists who indicate that empathy is “involuntary” and instantaneous, rather than 
a cognitive decision based on our recall of previous experiences that we then apply to 
another’s current experience (66).6 He also argues that humans can learn to extend their 
empathetic responses to those we have Othered. In rhetorical studies, Jean Nienkamp 
and Ratcliffe explain how we can learn to use and restrict identification to improve 
relationships within ourselves and to others. Nienkamp claims that although unconscious 
identifications shape us, we exert agency through conscious identification (134). 
Ratcliffe focuses on conscious acts of identification as well as the intentional limiting of 
identification with her theory of “rhetorical listening,” in which one tries to discern what 
is important to an Other in order to respect these values. 
Nienkamp’s concept of the subject as shaped both by its milieu and its internal 
reflections on these relationships meshes well with Ratcliffe’s theory because a subject 
that practices rhetorical listening will have more resources for experiencing empathy and 
demonstrating behavior to others that is based in this empathy. According to Nienkamp, 
an individual absorbs discourses from multiple sources which then come into conflict 
with each other, so the individual tries to reconcile them or determines that one is 
preferable to another. Thus, agency arises from our ability to put different voices into 
                                               
6 Recent neuroscience research into “mirror neurons” supports de Waal’s theory that some forms of 
empathy operate on a very basic level. The same “mirror neurons” are activated when we see a person 
expressing an emotion as when we express that emotion ourselves. However, more complex mindreading, 
which takes into account social context, involves other parts of the brain (Stueber 4). 
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conversation with one another, even though the types of voices we have are limited by 
our experiences (Nienkamp 134).  
Nienkamp’s model of the subject is in accordance with the posthumanist ones 
envisioned by Wynter and later by Wolfe. Wynter names her model “the human system-
ensemble.” The human is shaped by both material and symbolic systems. It exists in and 
is influenced by a larger autopoietic system, but retains some agency through its own 
internal autopoiesis, which Wynter calls self-troping. That is, though the subject is 
shaped by its environment, it also repeats what it has internalized in unique and 
complicated ways. Therefore, this subject can be critical of dominant discourses, even 
though it cannot effect epistemic change. Like Wynter, Wolfe describes the subject as 
autopoietic, but explicitly bases his model in systems theory. He theorizes the subject’s 
relationship to its environment as “openness from closure.” The subject is a “closed” 
system because it does not have direct access to anything outside of it; however, it is 
sensitive to its environment. The more autopoietic, or self-referential, it is, the more 
complex and therefore more open to environmental influences it is. Thus, the more 
varied one’s internal rhetorics are, the more sensitive one is to new rhetorics.  A subject 
with many internal rhetorics is not more “vulnerable” to persuasion, but is more able to 
understand another’s position.  
A more complicated set of internal rhetorics can give people more resources for 
practicing rhetorical listening. They can consciously practice or limit self-persuasion, 
then apply methods used for internal deliberation to their interactions with others. 
Ratcliffe defines rhetorical listening as a “stance of openness” that a person chooses to 
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take in “cross-cultural exchanges” or “in relation to any person, text, or culture” (1). It is 
a conscious choice, which means that a person can use it to discern when another person 
wishes to build identification with them and when he or she wishes to limit it. Ratcliffe 
explains that the individual or group in power is usually the one who gets to outline the 
terms of identification by deciding what differences the other side gets to keep and what 
they must give up. Although the less powerful side is vulnerable to losing differences 
that are important to them, rhetorical listening can guide the other side away from 
forcing such a loss. Ratcliffe stresses that identification should be “metonymic” rather 
than “metaphorical,” that is, bound by association rather than total identification.  
Daphne Sheldrick demonstrates how metonymic identification can be practiced across 
species. Bradshaw writes that “Vital to elephant salvation has been her ability to raise 
them like elephants” (25). The trust’s model is to learn about elephant society to adapt 
its own practices accordingly. While the people who work at the trust do their best to 
simulate elephant society, they understand they cannot fully recreate this environment. 
Therefore, they let orphans visit wild herds to increase their socialization and eventually 
release them.  
Rhetorical listening helps us be aware of where the Other draws the line between 
identification and appropriation. LaCapra’s “empathetic unsettlement” serves a similar 
end, though the method is different. In contrast to rhetorical listening, which is actively 
practiced by the listener/reader of any text, empathetic unsettlement is encouraged by the 
author. For example, someone writing about a historical atrocity can direct the audience 
to empathize with the victims by describing their suffering in terms with which the 
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audience can identify, but can also unsettle this empathy by describing the historical 
context that allowed for their specific position as victims, a position that the readers do 
not share. Context may even be used to show readers their similarities to perpetrators or 
by-standers by, for example, describing their nation’s passivity toward or complicity 
with genocide. Though rhetorical listening can be applied to any text, ones that make 
explicit use of empathetic unsettlement make a call for rhetorical listening by both 
encouraging and discouraging identification.  
Narrative is a common way to create empathy and can also be used to unsettle it, 
as in Bradshaw’s chapter “Elephant on the Couch: Case Study, E.M.,” a work of creative 
nonfiction in which she narrates facts about an elephant’s life in the form of a 
psychological case study. Booth explains that narratives are rhetorical by directing 
readers’ sympathy and judgment for characters. When the story is narrated through the 
eyes of a character we become more sympathetic to him or her. Bradshaw’s “case study” 
includes E.M.’s “history,” which, though it narrates her life in the third person, does 
recount it from her point of view rather than that of her keepers. For example, we are 
told that E.M. was brought to the United States and  “kept in confinement by a man who 
had a previous history of using welding torches, chemically treated metal prods on 
sensitive parts of the body, including the genitals, ropes, deprivation of water and food, 
beatings, and other forms of torture” (96-7). While some of these practices are more 
abusive than the usual treatment of captive elephants in the contemporary United States, 
they are common enough that the man inflicting them may not have perceived his 
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actions as “torture.”7  Rather than siding with this man, who perceived E.M. as a 
dangerous animal he needed to control, readers perceive E.M. as an abused person. The 
overall thrust of Bradshaw’s book, that elephant and human psyches are very similar and 
therefore equally vulnerable to trauma, encourages a large amount of identification. 
There are a few moves to unsettle this, such as the physical descriptions of the elephants 
which make identificatory appeals to the body through the description of pain and 
simultaneously unsettle this identification by highlighting the physical differences 
between the species. “Elephant on the Couch” makes particular note of the damage done 
to elephants’ feet and joints in captivity.  
The case study is “framed” by its title; after all, no psychologist would invite an 
elephant to literally sit on their couch.  Such “carefully framed” sections of experimental 
writing are one of LaCapra’s suggestions for creating empathetic unsettlement.  
Bradshaw further frames the case study with an explanation of why she wrote it and 
what she hopes the readers learned from it. She sent the study to several psychologists 
who diagnosed E.M. with PTSD, not knowing she is an elephant. Bradshaw hopes these 
experts’ diagnoses will convince readers that elephants can develop this disorder. Thus, 
while Bradshaw’s attempts at identification in the case study are totalizing, by which I 
mean they construct a metaphorical or identical relationship between the human and 
elephant psyche, the case study itself is contextualized in a book that draws a more 
                                               
7 Bradshaw describes the contemporary treatment of elephants in many circuses and zoos on pp 100-4. 
Beatings and deprivation of food and water are common. Metal prods, known as ankuses or bull hooks, are 
used, though they are not usually chemically treated. Welding torches are not common. 
 43 
 
metonymic comparison by noting physical differences and admitting that we do not 
know everything about elephant psyches.  
Elephants on the Edge also uses narrative when recounting quantitative data. For 
example, the motives and feelings of both the researchers who conducted experiments 
and the elephants who participated in them are described. Likewise, statistics on 
elephant population, poaching, elephants in captivity, etc. are always personalized with a 
narrative. Bradshaw introduces the chapter on poaching with a brief first person 
narrative of an elephant who remembers an attack when she was younger and, therefore, 
is able to lead some in her herd to safety when they are attacked years later. Then, this 
narrative is contextualized with statistics about the ivory trade and other violence. The 
book thus combines traditional academic argument with explicitly emotional appeals.  
Empathetic Identification in Reason for Hope and The Age of Empathy 
Goodall relies more heavily on empathy, and thus narrative, than academic ethos 
and argument in Reason for Hope. Because her celebrity has already cemented her 
primatology expertise in the public imagination, she is able to draw on this credibility to 
create a book that is more in line with memoir than argument.  Reason for Hope 
describes Goodall’s spiritual journey from Catholicism to a theosophical synthesis of 
various religious and philosophical traditions with modern science. She explains how the 
Holocaust, her work with chimpanzees, and the illnesses and of her loved ones have 
affected the way she views the world. Goodall depicts herself, her readers, and her 
nonhuman subjects in ways that coincide with the liberal humanist subject. All have 
agency and are capable of rational thought. However, because of her interest in 
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spirituality, she does not insist on as much overlap between these three positions as 
Bradshaw does. Though Goodall does not claim humans are unique from  nonhumans, 
she does not insist that human consciousness is merely “one mode of being among 
others” as Heise requires of posthumanist fiction (505-6). Instead, Goodall leaves room 
for her readers to hold a belief in human uniqueness because she accepts that some 
readers object to evolution in favor of divine creation.  
In the introduction, Goodall claims that she wrote this book in response to 
questions from friends, acquaintances, and strangers who ask her how she remains 
hopeful “in the face of so much environmental destruction and human suffering” (xviii). 
She frames the book as a guide for others who are struggling with hopelessness, stating 
that, “If you reader, find some aspect of my own personal philosophy and faith that is at 
all useful or enlightening to you as you travel your own unique path, then my labor will 
not have been in vain” (xvii). While Goodall does make a few explicit claims about 
actions readers should take to help both humans and nonhumans, her aims are much 
more diffuse than Bradshaw’s. She presents her spiritual discoveries and the actions she 
has taken as resources for her readers, only making a few explicit suggestions to them.  
Goodall’s rhetorical approach may be informed by her interest in theosophy, a 
Western synthesis of Eastern philosophies and religions with Western traditions in 
pursuit of “divine wisdom.” Though British theosophy is most heavily informed by 
Buddhism, the founder did consider Confucius a “great sage” (Algeo), and Goodall’s 
rhetoric is akin to the Confucian tradition of remonstration as defined by Arabella Lyon 
in which the speaker presents a point of view without actively trying to persuade the 
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audience to adopt it. According to a theosophical worldview, all religious, philosophical, 
and scientific interpretations of the world are manifestations of the same “Ancient 
Wisdom.” Thus, theosophy encourages tolerance by decreasing the significance of 
difference. While Ratcliffe might criticize such a worldview for imposing compromise, 
Goodall presents theosophical tenents such as “there [is] but one God with different 
names: Allah, Tao, the Creator, and so on” in the same way she presents evolution: as 
her own personal beliefs, not doctrine that readers must adopt in order to experience 
hope (xiv). The result is a text that displays Goodall’s efforts at rhetorical listening 
because she maintains a degree of respect for her readers’ spiritual worldviews. That is, 
though she ignores some readers’ belief that their religion is the only “true” one, she 
does not explicitly tell them their religion is “wrong” for denying other religions or tell 
these readers they should abandon this principle and take up her belief that all the major 
religions are equally valid.  
Goodall’s willingness to let readers retain many of their religious values shows 
evidence of rhetorical listening. Ratcliffe places rhetorical listening in the first of the five 
canons of classical rhetoric: invention. If rhetorical listening is practiced during 
invention, then the rhetoric produced through the other stages and ultimately delivered to 
an audience may be less likely to be coercive. Thus, rhetorical listening is more likely to 
lead to remonstration than classical argumentation. According to Lyon, persuasion has a 
goal—the audience is persuaded—and the speaker is in control. In contrast, 
remonstration merely shows something and “[t]hose who see it are free to interpret it, 
heed it, repeat it, or ignore it” (140). The benefits of remonstration are that it places 
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limits on judging others and emphasizes respect for relationships over the law. I would 
argue that persuasion in the Western tradition can be understood as more complicated 
than Lyon describes. For example, the goal of rhetorical education for Quintilian was to 
create a “good man speaking well” (12.1.1). Persuasion was hoped for, but Quintilian 
would not consider an eloquent, but immoral man an excellent orator because goodness 
is an equally central trait for him (12.1.23). For Burke and Killingsworth, both parties 
are imagined as moving to create identification, rather than the speaker dragging the 
audience to his or her own position. However, Lyon’s analysis of remonstration is 
valuable not only for modern Chinese rhetoric, but also for Western practices because it 
provides a model for texts born of rhetorical listening that do not force 
identification/persuasion.  
Perhaps the most dramatic example of remonstration in Reason for Hope is 
Goodall’s treatment of evolution. Though she is a primatologist and made controversial 
discoveries about chimpanzees’ similarity to humans, Goodall deemphasizes the 
importance of identification between species in her discussion of evolution. Goodall 
frames belief in evolution as a matter of choice, rather than a question of scientific 
theory, by emphasizing her emotional connection to chimps over data that links our two 
species. She presents the topic as a personal issue unrelated to her larger message when 
she writes: 
I do not want to discuss evolution in such depth, however, only touch on it from 
my own perspective: from the moment when I stood on the Serengeti plains 
holding the fossilized bones of ancient creatures in my hands to the moment 
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when, staring into the eyes of a chimpanzee, I saw a thinking, reasoning 
personality looking back. You may not believe in evolution, and that is all right. 
How we humans came to be the way we are is far less important than how we 
should act now to get out of the mess we have made for ourselves. (2) 
 Goodall is open about her belief in chimps and humans’ shared ancestry in this 
quotation and many other times in the book. However, she continually states that this 
conviction is not a prerequisite for wildlife conservation and turns the focus to 
“ourselves,” explaining how helping others helps us through the diffuse reciprocity that 
supposedly results from making the world “a better place.” 
Goodall’s remonstration does not ask her religious readers to transform their 
understanding of human “substance.” According to Burke, “substance” etymologically 
refers to “something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing,” that is, its 
context (Grammar 22). These foundations are inherently unsteady because to define a 
thing by its context is to define it by what it is not. Therefore, a rhetor can transform 
substance to create “consubstantiality,” or identification, between two groups. Burke 
calls “familial definition” all strategies of definition that rely on the idea of biological 
descent “with the substance of the offspring being derived from the substance of the 
parents or family” (26). Whereas de Waal depicts a mammalian family in which many 
species share biologically rooted empathetic tendencies, Goodall realizes that some 
readers would be alienated by such a drastic attempt to destabilize what they imagine the 
human to be. Therefore, she claims that they do not need a familial definition to identify 
with and care about chimpanzees. 
 48 
 
 One of the major ways Goodall encourages her readers, both theistic and non, to 
identify across the species line is by describing her work with the chimps. She explains 
that she was unwittingly doing something revolutionary when she gave the ones at 
Gombe names, rather than numbers. In doing so, she makes herself an appealing figure: 
the self-taught amateur who had more insight into chimpanzees than professionals did. 
Such an ethos creates identification with an audience who is also not in the profession of 
primatology. It encourages the audience to identify with the chimps because Goodall 
does so in opposition to her discipline. Though many of the chimps’ names are similar to 
those of domestic pets (e.g. Goblin and Gremlin), Goodall grants them subjectivity in 
other ways. She carefully explains their biological relationships, friendships, and 
biographies. She also intersperses their photos with those of herself and her family. Each 
chapter begins with a black and white photo of chimp. Many are cropped at the 
shoulders, like a school year-book portrait, which gives a sense of the chimpanzees as 
individuals as well as a social group. Unfortunately, one photo of a chimp appears twice 
and is labeled as both “Fifi” and “Faustino.” Though this mistake could also happen with 
photographs of people, it unfortunately undermines the text’s efforts to portray chimps 
as possessing unique personalities rather than as interchangeable, biologically 
programmed animal machines. 
 Goodall mentions traits such as tool use and tool making that rocked not only 
primatology, but also popular, philosophical, and theological understandings of the 
relationship between humans and other primates. However, her main method of creating 
identification between humans and chimpanzees is not through the number of 
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similarities between the species, but narrative and visual arguments that show empathy is 
instinctual in both chimps and humans. For example, the photograph that begins the 
chapter “Compassion and Love” is the mother chimp Fannie cradling her child Fax. She 
looks down at him adoringly, while he stares wide-eyed at the camera. The image is 
cropped so that they fill the frame, making the composition reminiscent of posed 
portraits of new moms. 
 Goodall claims that chimpanzees are capable of empathy and reciprocity when 
she writes that those observing chimp communities “see frequent expressions of caring, 
helping, compassion, altruism, and most definitely a form of love” (137). The “most 
definitely” and “a form of” undercut each other. However, the expression goes further 
than academic writing, which would replace the term love with something like 
“bonding,” though, as de Waal points out, popular discourse has adopted this term to 
describe human-human relationships (12). The qualifier “a form of” retains a difference 
between humans and chimps, allowing for readers to believe that humans’ love for each 
other is somehow more sophisticated or spiritual than chimpanzees’ love. Yet, Goodall 
narrates her examples of chimp love in ways that make them seem the same as humans’.  
Her description of the adult male Spindle who took care of a young, unrelated 
orphan named Mel depicts Spindle as capable of not only reciprocating empathetic 
gestures, but also transferring appreciation when the original benefactor is no longer 
present. Spindle and Mel’s mother died in the same epidemic, making Goodall ask “Is it 
possible that Spindle’s loss of his mother left an empty space in his life? And that the 
close contact with a small dependent youngster helped to fill that space? Or did Spindle 
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experience an emotion similar to that which we call compassion? Perhaps he felt a 
mixture of both” (140). The rhetorical questions and terms like “possible” and “perhaps” 
are typical of Goodall’s remonstrative style. Of course, Goodall is not simply laying out 
information for her audience to adopt or reject as they please. She gives the readers only 
three options, and all options require that they accept chimpanzees as cognitively and 
emotionally sophisticated.  
 The first option, that Spindle took care of Mel because this filled a hole in his life 
after the loss of his mother, implies that Spindle was able to reciprocate his mother’s 
affection, mourn her, then displace the loss of a relationship in which he was the one 
taken care of not with a parallel relationship, but with one in which he is the benefactor. 
Interestingly, Goodall presents this as the simplest option even though such behavior in a 
human would probably be seen as an excellent example of “working through” one’s 
trauma by reintegrating into the community. Herman, a psychiatrist, writes that this 
reconnection is vital to recovery; a survivor “must develop new relationships” in order to 
“reclaim” her world (196). She suggests one effective way to do this is by bonding with 
other survivors in group therapy and aiding other victims through activism (73, 207, and 
214). When Spindle helps Mel, he shows a willingness to act against the norm for the 
good of a community member by following female behavior in the way he carried Mel.  
Though Goodall avoids words like “love” and “mourn” when describing 
Spindle’s relationship to his mother, she uses “empty space in his life” which is 
popularly used to express an emotional void. The second option explicitly attributes 
emotion to Spindle, though, as she did with “a form of love,” Goodall qualifies her 
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statement as “an emotion similar to that which we call compassion” (140). The third 
option, that Spindle was both trying to fill an empty space in his life and felt compassion 
for Mel, attributes an even more complex psyche to Spindle. All three options could be 
suggested for a human who loses a parent and starts taking care of a child. For Goodall, 
the suggestion that Spindle is operating through an instinct as mechanical as that of 
Descartes’ “animal-machines” is not possible (44). It is not even a question that can be 
asked. Whether or not nonhumans experience emotions remains an open question in 
scientific and popular discourses, but Goodall forecloses it in an effort to redefine 
possible relationships between the human and nonhuman.  
 The article by Katherine A. Cronin, et.al. “Behavioral Response of a Chimpanzee 
Mother Toward Her Dead Infant,” was published in February 2011 in The American 
Journal of Primatology, and both the academic article and the popular reaction to it 
show how whether or not chimpanzee’s experience emotion remains a controversial 
topic outside of Goodall’s text. Cronin’s team filmed a mother whose infant died. They 
conclude “the behavior of the mother toward her dead infant not only highlights the 
maternal contribution to the mother–infant relationship but also elucidates the 
opportunities chimpanzees have to learn about the sensory cues associated with death, 
and the implications of death for the social environment.” This article does not contain 
the word “mourn”; it sticks to academic language that describes chimp behavior without 
anthropomorphism and therefore resists any identification between chimpanzees and the 
researchers or their scholarly audience. However, the press release from the Max Planck 
Institute for Psycholinguistics introduces the word with the headline that asks “Do 
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chimpanzees mourn their dead infants?” News outlets picked up on the theme of 
chimpanzee mourning with headlines like the Daily Mail’s “A Mother's Grief: The 
Startling Images Which Show How Chimpanzees Mourn Their Dead Just Like 
Humans,” which uses sensationalism to appeal its tabloid readership, and the Scientific 
American’s more skeptical “Do Chimpanzees Understand Death?” (Harmon).  
 When Cronin’s team released another video of chimps responding to a 
community member’s death in May 2011, National Geographic asks/states “Chimps 
‘Mourn’ Nine-year-old’s Death?” The headline puts “mourn” in quotation marks, which 
is usually used to indicate a news story is adopting the language of an individual or 
institution, but not endorsing it themselves. It is unclear where “mourn” comes from in 
this case, but perhaps National Geographic took it from the February press release. By 
putting only mourn into quotation marks and presenting the question mark as their own, 
National Geographic transforms the press release’s question into claim. However, none 
of the researchers interviewed for the press release or the National Geographic story 
called the behavior mourning. Instead, the journalist brings up the topic and provides 
sound bites in which the scientists give a soft denial, with phrases such as “I am reluctant 
to use that word . . . because it doesn’t give any extra explanatory information.” and 
“Whether we can call that ‘mourning’ or what that entails exactly based on what we 
know in humans as mourning is difficult to say for anybody, I would say.” The 
researchers thus indicate that it is not their job to determine whether or not chimps can 
mourn. Though the question lurks in their research, they speak as if the question is not 
conceivable within the bounds of their discipline.  
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The National Geographic story itself leads the audience to conclude that the 
animals are mourning, but, like the researchers, refuses to explicitly say this. Similarly, 
the Telegraph headline “Chimps ‘mourn their dead infants’” looks as if it is citing a 
scientist associated with the project, but the quotation is actually a manipulated fragment 
of the press release’s title that also transforms that question into a claim. Though all 
these news outlets have different reputations to uphold, as a general science magazine, 
newspaper, or tabloid, all manifest a desire to declare that chimpanzees mourn, but also 
show deference to scientific discourse that does not allow such for such claims it deems 
anthropomorphic. Hinting at identification between human and chimp responses to death 
in the headline draws in readers, but by limiting the degree of identification and 
professing skepticism, the publications make themselves and the researchers appear 
credible. However, while this distance between humans and chimps and between 
professionals (journalists and scientists) and laypeople (the readers), is meant to convey 
credibility, some readers react negatively to it and express a desire for a closer 
identification between humans and animals than is professed in these articles. 
 Based on reader comments, the response to the articles is surprisingly similar 
over such a diverse range of publications. Many commenters claim that they already 
knew chimpanzees, or animals in general, have emotions and can mourn. Some provide 
anecdotal evidence of pets who mourned for dead companions and/or scoff at the 
researchers for being slow to “discover” something they perceive as common sense. 
However, other commenters insist that the chimps are not mourning, claiming the 
chimps return to the corpse because they do not realize the individual is dead and are 
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curious as to why he or she is not reacting. Cronin herself leaves the possibility open as 
she never says “mourn” in her article. The press release quotes her as saying “Whether a 
viewer ultimately decides that the chimpanzee is mourning, or simply curious about the 
corpse, is not nearly as important as people taking a moment to consider the 
possibilities.” While some news outlets included this quotation, even those that did not 
had commenters who suggested the chimps were not capable of mourning, which shows 
that chimpanzee emotion remains a contested topic outside of the academic community 
as well. 
 While the majority of commenters describe chimps as compassionate creatures 
only, Goodall describes them as both compassionate and intentionally hurtful to others. 
However, she uses chimpanzee violence not to unsettle identification between her 
human readers and chimps, but to increase it.  In the chapter “The Roots of Evil” she 
uses remonstrative language to state that the Gombe chimpanzees “were heavily engaged 
in what amounted to a sort of primitive warfare” (115). After describing the violence at 
Gombe in anthropomorphic terms, she shifts to a more authoritative tone to declare that 
chimpanzees, “. . . like us, had a dark side to their nature” (117). This metonymic 
identification ends up affirming human superiority because Goodall concludes that 
humans’ more complex brains can liberate us from our aggressive genes. She asks the 
rhetorical questions “Surely we, more than any other creatures, are able, if we so wish, to 
control our biological nature? And are not the caring and altruistic aspects of human 
nature equally part of our primate heredity?” to transition to the next chapter on 
compassion in chimp societies, including the story of Spindle and Mel.  
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De Waal makes this same argument—that both our ability to empathize and 
commit violence come from primate ancestry—in The Age of Empathy. Like Goodall, he 
theorizes that we can foster empathy to lead humans to take more moral actions. De 
Waal states that if he could change one thing about humankind, he would “expand the 
range of fellow feeling” so that we could empathize with people we have identified as 
outsiders (203). Where de Waal differs from Goodall is in his depiction of the subject. 
Despite her insistence that empathy and violence are rooted in all primate bodies, 
Goodall generally depicts the human subject as transparent to itself because she clearly 
articulates what her feelings and thoughts were at each moment in her life. However, de 
Waal’s version of the human subject is influenced by its environment in ways of which it 
is not aware, and it also lacks complete access to its own mind and body. For example, 
he claims that income gaps and social gaps increase violence among individuals and 
“[induce] anxieties that compromise the immune system of both the rich and the poor” 
(198). As a result, his calls for change are more focused on the institutional level than 
the personal. Goodall and Bradshaw’s use of the more traditional liberal humanist 
subject enables them to encourage readers to take immediate actions in their personal 
lives; however, de Waal’s version of the subject is useful for illuminating systemic 
issues.  
While de Waal genuinely believes empathy is innate, his argument itself works to 
spark the change he desires. We can encourage empathy on a cultural level by promoting 
the idea that it is natural. Though de Waal cannot state this rhetorical aim because it 
would undermine the objective tone he uses to give the argument its authority, he does 
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briefly imply this use. He states that “fostering empathy isn’t made easier by the 
entrenched opinion in law schools, business schools, and political corridors that we are 
essentially competitive animals. Social Darwinism may be dismissed as old hat, a 
leftover of the Victorian era, but it’s still very much with us” (204). He also states that 
conservatives “love” to think “nature is filled with competition and conflicts of interest” 
(205). By showing how this definition of the human is promoted by a culture that claims 
it is natural, he implies that the other definition can be popularized by the same 
argument. 
 Like Goodall, de Waal uses identification to convince his audience that empathy 
is innate.  He names all of the primates he writes about; however, he does not mention 
that this was once a revolutionary act. Instead, as Bradshaw does with elephants, he 
forecloses the possibility of identifying the primates any other way by not drawing 
attention to how the animals received their names. He also increases identification by 
describing their empathetic behavior in elevated language. The passage in which he 
describes chimps who attempt to rescue their compatriots from drowning despite their 
own fear of water is dense with such language. One chimpanzee “lost his life” trying to 
save another; another fell into the water with the victim, “whereupon” they “drowned 
together”; and the rescuers “abandon all caution” to practice “heroism” (106). He 
compares these exploits to a story of a woman who unthinkingly jumped into a pond to 
save her son, adding moral weight to the ape’s action while simultaneously showing that 
human acts of empathy are at least in part instinctual (107). By claiming altruism is 
uncalculated, de Waal extends Bauman’s concept of the moral impulse to nonhumans. 
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 Another way he encourages identification between readers and nonhumans is 
through the criticism made in the popular response to chimpanzee mourning: scientists 
ignore “common sense” and let their devotion to objectivity get in the way of their 
research. Though de Waal positions himself as a scientist who has the authority to 
interpret ape behavior for us, he also positions himself outside the scientific community. 
He writes that if “we” see a dog wagging its tail and another growling, “[w]e call the 
first dog ‘happy’ and the second ‘angry,’ even though many scientists scoff at the 
implication of mental states. They prefer terms such as ‘playful’ or ‘aggressive.’ The 
poor dogs are doing everything to make their feelings known, yet science throws itself 
into linguistic knots to avoid mentioning them” (206). Here, de Waal makes accusations 
similar to those made by the readers of primatology news articles and aligns himself 
with his lay readers in opposition to scientists. He uses the very in-group/out-group 
divide that he wishes we would learn to empathize across to dissociate himself and his 
audience from scientists. The result is that scientists’ cautious methods of description are 
reduced to either poor style or intentional deception.  De Waal leads the audience to 
identify with the “poor dogs” by convincing the audience they are able to understand the 
dogs’ feelings. This claim also flatters the readers by imbuing them with more authority 
than the scientists.  
 De Waal establishes identification between his readers and other animals by 
showing that nonhumans are capable of reciprocity. For example, he describes a study 
his team conducted that found chimps are more likely to share food with those who 
groomed them earlier in the day. This pattern was less consistent for chimps who were 
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“good friends” because pairs that groomed and shared food regularly did not keep a 
careful account of favors. The phrase “good friends” sets the reader up for de Waal’s 
subsequent claim that “The same distinction [between close and distant relationships] is 
found in human society” (174). He then tells two anecdotes about men who deviated 
from the reciprocity pattern. One kept too close of an account of reciprocity with his 
wife, while the other neglected to reciprocate to a more distant acquaintance. He 
concludes that “stories like this make us uncomfortable,” again aligning himself with the 
audience through pronoun use. This group identity also reinforces his claim that pro-
social behaviors are innate in humans because “we” all share the same response to these 
men who are presented as aberrations.  
It is rare that de Waal tries to unsettle empathy. However, he does sacrifice 
empathy with apes for humor when this increases the audience’s trust in him. He 
describes being “shower[ed]” with chimp feces after a hunt, a tactic that makes him 
appear humble while also establishing his credibility by reinforcing his dedication to his 
work with claims like “I am not complaining about the smelly state I found myself in, 
because it was a real thrill to watch all of this and follow the division of meat” (173). 
This scene, in which chimps hunt a fellow primate, the red colobus monkey; dismember 
it; and devour it raw, certainly has the potential to unsettle the reader’s empathy for 
them. De Waal’s description is brief, but words like “carcass,” “prey,” and “fertile 
females” remind the reader of the “animal” side of the chimps by evoking the scientific 
discourse associated with objectivity rather than the metaphorical, anthropomorphizing 
language de Waal usually favors. The result is that readers are reminded of differences 
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between chimpanzees and humans, but retain their trust in de Waal and, therefore, in his 
general argument that all primates share the capacity for empathy. 
De Waal’s argument about empathy relies on evolution. Unlike Goodall, he does 
not discuss the ramification evolution might have on his readers’ spiritual beliefs or even 
entertain the idea that they might not accept it. Rather, his imagined readers agree with 
evolutionary theory and have a fairly good grasp of it. His purpose is to persuade them 
that what he calls the Social Darwinist perspective, in which competition, hierarchy, and 
violence are a natural part of human nature, is not accurate. For example, while Goodall 
is dismissive of Richard Dawkins’s controversial The Selfish Gene, de Waal explains the 
book’s thesis to show readers that, despite the sensationalist title, it is not arguing that 
altruistic behavior is essentially selfish. De Waal argues that though empathy, and the 
altruism that often accompanies it, “serves the actors” by promoting a peaceful society, it 
is not technically selfish because it is not a calculated behavior (184).  
De Waal argues that apes and monkeys understand reciprocity, which extends the 
circle of humanist morality to them. He differs from what Bauman describes as humanist 
ethics because de Waal does not argue that reciprocity is inherent to empathy. Rather, he 
argues that empathy grew out of more primitive behaviors like mimicry. Such behaviors 
would have been present in species that had not yet evolved the ability to remember 
favors in order to rationally reciprocate them. De Waal would, on a surface level, agree 
with Bauman’s claim that “I am moral before I think,” but not for the same reasons 
Bauman proposes it. He treats empathy as a quality that exists on a continuum of 
sophistication among a variety of species, with simplistic acts like mimicry on one end 
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and altruistic behavior on the other. When De Waal claims “We may not be able to 
create a New Man, but we’re remarkably good at modifying the old one,” he is 
referencing humans’ ability to create social change (210). However, the statement also 
resonates with Hayles’s posthumanist argument that the metaphors that we call “human” 
change (290). Arguments that position empathy as a mammalian quality rather than a 
specifically human one redefine our relationships to others of our own species as well as 
other animals. 
Creating Moral Change through Humanist Appeals 
Bradshaw, Goodall, and de Waal seek to change behavior by extending the moral 
community, not by redefining the subject. Therefore, they can identify actions their 
readers should take based on what is defined as appropriate treatment of human beings. 
They believe that moral behavior can be identified and fostered because they assume 
their readers are liberal humanist subjects. Goodall calls this increased inclusivity “moral 
evolution,” though it does not entail a development in what is considered morally 
relevant, only the recognitions that some species have qualities already considered 
morally relevant in humans. Goodall names social movements and individual do-gooders 
in order to convince her audience the phenomenon of moral evolution exists and can be 
fostered by individual actions. All three writers explain what actions their readers can 
take. Goodall has a few pages of suggestions and promotes her youth organization Roots 
and Shoots, Bradshaw includes an appendix of “Ten Things You Can Do to Help 
Elephants,” and de Waal suggests that we work to decrease economic disparity.  
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Like de Waal and Goodall, Bradshaw believes humans have a “built-in” 
empathetic instinct and that we can control it. In her conclusion, she tells readers that 
they participate in the same “doubling” practice that Nazis did in which they separate 
their “humane self” from their “Auschwitz self” (246). She refrains from further 
accusatory language, however, and blames the media for encouraging this partition due 
to its short attention span for ecological issues. She also provides a way out, stating that 
“To feel too much endangers the doubling partition” and encourages readers to identify 
with animals whose suffering they see represented in the media. However, unlike 
Goodall and de Waal, Bradshaw does not portray the next step as small. Whereas 
Goodall stresses that readers can incorporate easy actions into their life, Bradshaw 
claims that “The breach of Adam’s Wall demands not only a reimagination of human 
identity but the relinquishment of the psychological, and hence, practical mechanisms 
and abilities considered necessary for survival in modern society” (247). Therefore, 
Bradshaw shifts from accepting the humanist subject for readers and elephants in the 
majority of the book, to a calling for readers to re-imagine the human and restructure 
human societies by learning about animal ones (251).   
Her list of “Ten Things You Can Do to Help Elephants” shows the difficulties of 
promoting both action and posthumanism effectively. The first of the ten steps is to live 
a “transspecies life,” which involves learning from animals and not harming them. By 
suddenly extending her argument from elephants to almost all nonhumans and requiring 
a “reimagination” of the human, Bradshaw asks much more of her readers in the final 
ten pages than the rest of the text suggested. Many of the actions on the list are not 
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directly tied to elephants, so following all ten would entail a thorough rethinking of the 
relationship between humans and other animals because readers must do more than 
merely accept one more sophisticated species into the moral community.  
Bradshaw proposes a “trans-species mind” which is not only shared by mammals 
such elephants, chimpanzees, dolphins, etc., but also animals to whom it is more difficult 
to relate, such as the octopus (246). For Bradshaw, the trans-species mind does not have 
to be the same across species (though she argues it is very similar for humans and 
elephants) for it to be important. Rather, what matters is that many species have 
“psychological vulnerability to human violence” (246). This language evokes Bentham’s 
concern with animal suffering, which Derrida defined as a turning point in how we think 
about animals (Derrida 27). While most of Bradshaw’s book is concerned with proving 
elephants’ capacity for human-like self-awareness and agency, the conclusion focuses on 
their vulnerability. Because this trait is shared by much less sophisticated species, 
Bradshaw’s conclusion deprivileges human consciousness (or human-like 
consciousness) and claims that it is not required for moral consideration. This concern 
for the trans-species mind would be served well by Bauman’s postmodern ethics, which 
requires us to approach moral situations on their own terms. This is because, while 
Bradshaw seems to propose that respecting psychological vulnerabilities is a general 
ethical principle, it would be difficult to create a detailed guide for behavior that would 
function well across diverse species.  
I doubt many readers would take the non-elephant related actions based on 
Bradshaw’s arguments alone. The majority of the text is about showing the parallels 
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between human and elephant psyches, so it does little to convince readers to be 
concerned about other species. For readers who are already familiar with arguments 
about the instrumental use of animals, the list might have more resonance. However, 
because the book so thoroughly uses identification based on the liberal humanist subject 
to encourage empathy for elephants, its request that readers help all animals has less 
impact. The reader must assume the liberal humanist subject for Bradshaw’s 
identifications between humans and elephants to work then drop it to identify with all 
other animals. 
Unlike Bradshaw, whose goal is to persuade her readers to take specific actions 
to help elephants, Goodall does not need to unsettle empathy by drawing attention to 
important differences between humans and chimpanzees. Because she does not directly 
ask the audience to aid them, the specifics of their lives are not relevant. Instead, her 
goal is to persuade her readers to take positive actions towards all humans, some 
nonhumans, and the environment. She does so by depending on the liberal humanist 
subject, but in ways that discourage political activism at the same time that they purport 
to motivate it. Whereas Bradshaw provides a list of ten actions readers can take to help 
elephants, Goodall lists four reasons readers should hope. The first, “the human brain,” 
and the last, “the indomitable human spirit,” rely on humanist notions of human 
uniqueness and the ability of rationality to arrive at a universal morality.  
The reasons also envision the subject as a consumer rather than a citizen and so 
place the ethical burden on the individual instead of encouraging collective political 
action. Goodall writes, “Let us remember, always, that we are the consumers. By 
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exercising free choice, by choosing what to buy, what not to buy, we have the power, 
collectively, to change the ethics of business, of industry” (240). However, Goodall does 
not explicitly encourage organized collective action, such as boycotts that are part of a 
vocal call for change. Rather, she depicts readers as individual consumers whose 
shopping decisions do not need to be joined to public criticisms of businesses to be more 
effective.8 Moreover, buying green to increase the amount of green products available 
actually reaffirms the ethics of business; it accepts neo-capitalist arguments that business 
should be driven by market forces rather than moral considerations. While a system of 
business ethics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I would like to point out that 
Goodall’s point of view is not the only one in circulation. For example, Duska critiques 
the philosophy that “good ethics is good business” for retaining the “bottom line 
myopia” endorsed by Friedman’s claim that business’s only responsibility is to its 
shareholders and a “good” business is a profitable one. He proposes the tautology “good 
business is ethical” as a new maxim with a more expansive definition of “good.” He then 
claims that the law should enforce the business practices its society considers ethical 
(62). 
Whereas Duska places ethical responsibility on business and government, 
Goodall places it on consumers when she states that “British Petroleum has committed 
millions of pounds to developing a whole line of products that utilize solar energy” and 
that “unless you and I support [the most ethical] companies, by purchasing their 
                                               
8 What Goodall is proposing is different from the boycotts organized against South Africa in prostest of 
apartheid. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) focused not just on consumer boycotts, but also 
removing South Africa from the Common Wealth and campaigning for economic sanctions (Action for 
Southern Africa). 
 65 
 
products, they will never survive in the competitive marketplace” (235). Since Reason 
for Hope was published, BP solar has continued to manufacture panels, but has not 
imbued its parent company with a green ethic. When BP closed their solar panel plant in 
Maryland, CEO Tony Hayward said “we believe there are real business opportunities” in 
solar energy, but BP would “be pursuing them in a far more business-like way than we 
did when everyone thought we were ‘beyond petroleum’” (qtd. in Mufson). Less than a 
month later, BP made the “business-like” decision to save time and money by rushing 
completion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling site. Perhaps BP had no choice because 
stingy consumers were not supporting them. However, it is more likely that prioritizing a 
company’s responsibility to maximize shareholders profits does not sufficiently promote 
ethical behavior.  
Goodall’s other suggestion for readers, that they spend “a few extra pennies” on 
organic food “to buy the future for our children,” also privileges individual over 
collective action and is a moment in which she fails to practice rhetorical listening to 
some (240). While purchasing organic food may be feasible for many in her largely 
middleclass readership, their actions would do little to nothing to improve the lives of 
individuals outside of their families, such as those living in food deserts or without the 
means and access to purchase green products. Goodall is right that increased demand 
would create a slight decrease in price, but only as more and more large companies buy 
into the organic sector and apply more techniques from conventional agriculture. Even 
then, the price will remain prohibitive for many people. Goodall’s complaint is that we 
suffer from “just me-ism”: we feel that our actions do not matter because it’s “just me.” 
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However, her solutions promote another form of “just me-ism”: we take easy actions 
that make us feel better, rather than experiencing empathy for those who do not have 
access to these actions and considering how we might more effectively help people 
beyond ourselves. 
De Waal, in contrast, is invested in convincing his readers to think about others 
across not only income levels, but all differences. De Waal does not provide a numbered 
list or a paragraph-form list of specific actions like Bradshaw and Goodall. However, he 
does include political arguments about economic structure, stating that income gaps 
“tear societies apart” (197-8). He believes that empathy is an instinct, but that it can be 
expanded according to the principles of modern ethics, specifically a rational 
understanding of reciprocity. According to de Waal, “the firmest support for the 
common good comes from enlightened self-interest: the realization that we’re all better 
off if we work together. If we don’t benefit from our contributions now, then at least we 
will in the future, and if not personally, then at least via improved conditions around us” 
(223). For de Waal, empathy is important because it perpetuates what is rationally good 
by “attach[ing] emotional value” to the more diffuse collective benefits such as lower 
anxiety and a better immune system, making us more likely to help others even when we 
cannot see a direct benefit to ourselves (223). Thus, though de Waal does not describe 
the subject as transparent to itself, he does perceive his readers in accordance with a 
version of the liberal humanist subject who can be convinced to behave morally through 
rationality in circumstances when empathy does not occur instantaneously.  
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Though de Waal argues for consciously increasing the range of our empathy to 
include people with whom we do not strongly identify, he does not consistently model 
this behavior in The Age of Empathy because he occasionally makes snide comments 
about political conservatives and stereotypes scientists as myopic in order to strengthen 
his identification with the group of readers he imagines as holding progressive political 
views and being suspicious of science’s claims to objectivity. Goodall’s evolution-lite 
appeals that she makes to religious conservatives display more concern for rhetorical 
listening. These appeals work to establish identification across groups rather than 
strengthen in-group identification by criticizing outsiders. 
Analytic philosophers interested in animal rights movements also contemplate 
how moral change can be created. Singer bases his argument on logic, specifically 
analogies between animals and disenfranchised humans. He argues that if we think we 
should avoid actions that cause human suffering and/or we try to reduce it, then we 
should act in the same way towards similar suffering in nonhumans or be considered 
“speciesist.” Analogies depend on identification, and, though Singer states that moral 
consideration of animals is “demanded by reason, not emotion,” both logical and 
emotional means of persuasion are always present (iii). For example, Singer compares 
the use/abuse of animals to that of children, and disabled adults to create empathetic 
identification between readers and animals that are used in laboratories. When he writes 
that “The LD50 tests, the Draize eye tests, the radiation experiments, the heatstroke 
experiments, and many others described earlier in this chapter could have told us more 
about human reactions to the experimental situation if they had been carried out on 
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severely brain-damaged humans instead of dogs or rabbits,” he is not entertaining the 
suggestion that we use such people for these tests (82). Likewise, he mentions that R.G. 
Frey justifies animal experimentation only by also accepting the possibility of 
experimentation on certain humans whose “quality of life” is no better than other 
animals, but does not engage this possibility (242). Instead, he validates the audience’s 
emotional repulsion to using people, brain-damaged or not, as test subjects. The 
speciesism argument works not only because of the logic of the analogy, but also 
because it relies on an instantaneous emotional reaction, a sensation of empathy, that it 
then claims the audience must consciously apply to nonhumans to be consistent. 
Empathetic Identification in The Lives of Animals 
By not openly addressing the emotional component of our relationships to others, 
Singer engages in what Diamond calls the “deflection” of “the difficulty of reality” in 
her essay for Cavell’s Philosophy and Animal Life. The difficulty of reality can be any 
experience one cannot comprehend and analyze. The deflection of it happens when one 
attempts to analyze a moral problem that is related to that difficulty. Diamond sees The 
Lives of Animals as doing valuable work by both acknowledging the difficulty of reality 
that is our instrumental relationships with nonhumans and privileging an emotional 
response to this difficulty. For the character Elizabeth Costello, humans’ instrumental 
use of other animals, particularly slaughtering them for food, is a difficulty of reality. 
When she lectures on this difficulty at a university, other characters attempt to engage 
her on the question of eating animals, which is a deflection of that difficulty. 
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Costello is an examination of what happens when one confronts the difficulty of 
a reality in which humans cause animal suffering without regret. She is a novelist who is 
invited to lecture at the university where her son teaches. Instead of speaking about her 
novels, she speaks about animals. She tells her audience that their community, with 
slaughterhouses on its outskirts, reminds her of towns that had concentration camps 
outside of them during World War II. She compares her listeners to complicit citizens 
who ignored the Holocaust. Costello feels alienated from her fellow humans because she 
associates them with Nazis, or, at the very least, bystanders to the Holocaust. In return, 
her family and colleagues find her off-putting and irrational. She is criticized for 
trivializing human suffering in her Holocaust analogy. 
Diamond points out that Costello’s emotional reaction to these two “difficulties 
of reality,” the Holocaust and the meat industry, is similar; therefore, she compares 
them. The analogy indicates not that she is dismissive of the Holocaust, but that she 
finds the use of animals and their resulting suffering equally difficult to comprehend. 
The incomprehensibility of human suffering is important to Levinas’s model of Self and 
Other. According to Morgan’s analysis of his work, “We become or should become 
humble before such suffering, so that the only possible and sensitive response becomes 
opposition and any kind of acceptance or complacency becomes impossible, 
inconceivable” (33). While Levinas insists upon the uniqueness and the unknowability 
of the Other, he also acknowledges that witnessing suffering causes suffering (94, 100).  
Cathy Caruth calls such a phenomenon trauma’s “contagion” (Trauma 10). Costello’s 
Holocaust analogy is valuable for showing she refuses to be complacent in the face of 
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human-caused suffering for animals and that she is “wounded” by witnessing this 
suffering.  
  When Costello makes this comparison at the university, it does not have a 
persuasive effect on her audience. Many listeners find her lectures over the course of her 
visit to their school confusing, vague, illogical, and/or offensive because Costello is not 
interested in giving principles for behavior. Instead, she critiques the principle of reason. 
In her concluding remarks at a scheduled debate she states, “I am not sure I want to 
share reason with my opponent. . . If the last common ground I have with him is reason, 
and if reason is what sets me apart from the veal calf, then thank you but no thank you, 
I’ll talk to someone else” (66-7). Costello further distances her values from those 
associated with the liberal humanst subject when she dismisses all differences between 
species as unimportant when compared to their “fullness of being,” which can be loosely 
defined as a bodily experience of joy. While Costello presents herself, her audience, and 
nonhumans as completely overlapping in her lectures because all experience a fullness 
of being regardless of their other, varied capacities, other characters do object to 
Costello’s claims. Therefore, The Lives of Animals itself does not endorse one particular 
view of the subject or value specific points of identification among species.  
Unlike the other three texts discussed in this chapter, neither Costello’s lectures 
nor The Lives of Animals itself present suggestions that will, supposedly, lead to a better, 
more ethical world. Instead, the novel introduces readers to posthumanist ideas. One way 
that theorizing can occur is through reading fiction because the reader is given 
permission to entertain unusual, perhaps even threatening ideas because it is not “real” 
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and there is no authority explicitly endorsing them. Instead, the narration encourages the 
reader to consider these ideas by directing identification. The Lives of Animals guides 
readers to sympathize with Costello and her son John, who have conflicting points of 
view. We sympathize with John when his mother’s vegetarianism makes his family life 
uncomfortable because his wife disagrees with animal liberation. He also worries about 
how Costello’s decision to discuss animals, rather than the novels that made her 
reputation, will affect his professional life at the university that invited her to speak. Yet, 
the narration from Costello’s point of view creates sympathy for her because it shows 
she is deeply disturbed by human use of other animals. Her analogy between this 
instrumentalization and the Holocaust is not only a rhetorical move she deploys in her 
lectures, but also a thought that arises in her mind unbidden. It gives her great distress to 
wonder if her loved ones are really equivalent to complicit Germans citizens during 
WWII or if she is over-reacting. The novel shows both the difficulty of having an 
unacceptable compassion and of witnessing a loved one struggle with this feeling. 
Booth criticizes works of fiction that leave moral questions unresolved. He 
claims those without “a strong didactic effect” are not successful art because they do not 
order values (293). He does grant that these books can successfully convey values if they 
retain the message that such a nihilist existence is unpleasant (298). However, texts that 
refuse to order values are more useful for the ways in which they encourage readers to 
theorize in academic and/or nonacademic language. Though Wolfe’s chart of the three 
types of posthumanism is created for nonfiction work, it can be applied to The Lives of 
Animals because of the ways in which the novel reflects on academic argument and its 
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relationship to literature. As already noted, according to Wolfe, a work can be 
posthumanist in its discipline, its content, or both.  
The content of Costello’s lectures is posthumanist because its main focus is 
nonhumans and she only brings up humans in ways that reinforce their similarity to 
other animals. Her lectures set the tone for other characters’ conversation, so even those 
that do not embrace posthumanist ideas discuss them. The novel is also posthumanist in 
form. As Diamond points out, the novel raises a critique of philosophy through 
Costello’s lectures. Hacking describes it as both a “philosophical dialogue” and a text 
about “philosophical writing” (Cavell 142). The book also experiments with form; 
Coetzee originally delivered the story in place of a lecture, and most of the text is made 
up of lectures and a debate rather than a narrative. When the unusual form is combined 
with characters’ conversations about the relative values of poetry and philosophy, the 
book also performs a posthumanist critique of literary narrative. 
The fictional story is more than just a frame for a philosophical argument. As a 
work of literature, The Lives of Animals also critiques rhetoric by placing Costello’s 
lectures in context, encouraging readers to critique her arguments as well as other 
characters’ insensitive responses instead of simply trying to persuade readers to a 
particular thought or action. The other characters provide varied responses to her 
arguments. The Lives of Animals values readers’ distributed cognition by drawing 
attention to the various conflicting voices they put into conversation to make decisions 
about morality. The text refuses to identify what makes an ethical relationship between 
humans and between humans and nonhumans. Its approach to ethics is postmodern in 
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that it implies that a universal morality cannot be found, but even this is unclear as some 
characters do express a belief in ethical codes. For example, the poet Abraham Stern 
objects to Costello’s Holocaust analogy as “blasphemy” (50), and though her daughter-
in-law does not endorse a particular ethics, she does express a need for all moral 
positions to be based on reason.   
Costello expresses concern for the suffering the other but differs from Levinasian 
ethics when she insists that Other is not ultimately unknowable. She claims “[T]here is 
no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another” (35) 
because all creatures, even oysters, experience a “fullness being.” Though she never 
clearly defines this term, she associates it with joy that results from the connection to 
one’s body. Whereas Nietzsche wrote “But if we could communicate with the gnat, we 
would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity” as humans go 
about their intellectual work in order to devalue the human, Costello makes similar 
arguments to give value to nonhumans, or, as she sees it, to draw attention to their 
inherent value. Thus, Costello introduces an even more dramatic shift in the question of 
the animal than those of suffering and reciprocity. She claims that all animals, from 
gnats and salmon to mammals such as bats and humans deserve empathy not because 
they suffer, but because they are “full of being.” The assumption that we can fully access 
the “being of another,” be it through mind or heart, extends the moral community far 
beyond species with whom we share cognitive and social similarities. 
For Nietzsche, humans can only have anthropocentric understandings of the 
world. However, Costello implies that we can escape anthropocentrism by trading our 
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intellectual approach to animals for one based on an empathetic understanding of the 
fullness of being. She admits that we cannot experience the sensory life of a bat as a bat; 
however, she proposes that “being fully a bat is like being fully human, which is also full 
of being. Bat-being in the first case, human-being in the second, maybe; but those are 
secondary considerations. To be full of being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the 
experience of full being is joy” (33). Whereas Bentham made a shift from response to 
suffering, a new shift to joy is occurring in writing about the animal.9  
 Haraway acknowledges the question of suffering is an important one, but asks 
“how much more promise is in the questions, Can animals play? Or work? And even, 
can I learn to play with this cat?” (When Species Meet 22). The three nonfiction writers 
in this chapter all provide examples of animal joy and play, from Bradshaw’s “family 
reunions,” to Goodall’s descriptions of chimpanzee children playing and de Waal’s 
examples of “good friends” grooming each other. However, these constructions of joy 
return questions about nonhumans to the realm of response. As Derrida described, “Can 
the animal play?” is analogous to “Can the animal respond?” because it is active rather 
than passive. In contrast to these other writers, Costello frames joy as a solitary 
experience that can be empathetically shared, but does not have to result from an 
interaction with another being. 
Though Costello’s rhetoric undermines some humanist assumptions, particularly 
the value placed on rationality, it also risks an unethical projection of our own wants and 
                                               
9 While Utilitarianism is also interested in nonhuman happiness, it was suffering that gained the most 
traction in animal activism discourses, perhaps because the mistreatment of animals is the focus of 
organizations such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Humane Society.  
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needs with the belief that we can ultimately think our way into the being of the Other. 
Not only objectification but also over-identification has risks. Joanna Zylinska theorizes 
an alternative ethics that depends on limited identifications, which she calls 
“nonhumanist bioethics.” While Levinas and Foucault are only concerned with 
relationships among humans, she uses their work to approach our relationships to 
animals and machines. Her version of bioethics “takes the form of a conceptual 
framework or a set of nonnormative ideas which can only be considered and enacted in 
specific instances. Its driving force comes from a content-free obligation toward other 
beings and forms of life, some of which we do not even notice, do not comprehend, or 
are unable to name” (175). According to Zylinska, most of our moral decisions are made 
instantaneously and semi-intuitively, but ethical quandaries introduce a break in our 
systems of thought (178). Bioethical events remind us of our obligation to the Other, the 
Levinasian obligation that Zylinska extends to all forms of life, and therefore we should 
do our best to remain open to the Other as we struggle towards our ethical decisions. 
Rhetorical listening, adapted for trans-species communication, would be a useful 
technique to limit identification when making bioethical decisions. Zylinska’s bioethics 
is appealing because it is context-specific. It is also exhausting.  
This practice is important, but it is not the only type of moral work that is 
acceptable, and it may lead to non-listening if a person feels overwhelmed by the task. 
Analytic approaches, such as those modeled by Singer, and emotional appeals that are 
designed to spark instantaneous empathy rather than contemplation are also useful 
because more people are able to engage in them more frequently. In Singer’s 
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introduction to Atterton and Calarco’s Animal Philosophy, he states that analytic 
philosophy has much more impact on animal liberation as a political and social 
movement than the continental tradition has. What makes these analytical arguments so 
influential is not that they are “more posthumanist” than the tradition that Zylinska is 
working out of, but that they use a different form of posthumanism in which they change 
the focus from humans to animals, but retain humanist disciplinary conventions such as 
a focus on logical argument.  
When Singer’s Animal Liberation ignores the role of empathy in morality, it does 
not critique humanist assumptions about the universality of morality because it seeks to 
establish a logical moral code.  In contrast, Costello’s rhetoric in The Lives of Animals 
introduces a posthumanist critique of moral philosophy to both the fictional audience 
and the novel’s readers. Arguments such as those by Bradshaw, Goodall, and de Waal 
introduce nonhumans into the moral community by arguing that they have abilities such 
as empathy and reciprocity, which preserve the humanist notion that a rational, universal 
morality can be discovered and taught. It is because these texts do not ask people to 
rethink their entire understanding of human substance that they can be clear about what 
actions people can take. However, when these texts use metonymic rather than 
metaphorical identification, they show an attention to context that evokes Zylinska’s 
nonhumanist bioethics. By explaining to the reader what a particular species or 
nonhuman individual needs, they show that moral consideration is not completely 
formulaic. When these texts model rhetorical listening to their animal subjects, they 
encourage their audience to do the same. Therefore, they not only give specific 
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directions for their readers to follow, but also show them how to listen to both humans 
and nonhumans to determine what other actions they should or should not take.  
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CHAPTER III  
ANALOGIES BETWEEN HUMANS’ INSTRUMENTALIZATION AND 
EXTERMINATION OF ANIMALS AND THE ABUSE OF HUMANS 
As the Holocaust became positioned in Western memory as the supreme atrocity 
of the twentieth century, it became common to compare it to other, lesser known 
events.10 These analogies can add moral weight to a struggle the public would otherwise 
deem insignificant, but also risk appropriating others’ suffering and offending, rather 
than persuading, an audience. While Burkean identification provides a theory about how 
individuals and groups can work together to build common ground by identifying 
similarities among them, Ratcliffe has explained that identification also comes with risks 
if it is forced. Analogies between the abuse of nonhuman animals and humans risk 
reiterating dehumanizing discourses, such as those that fostered Nazi anti-Semitism, at 
the same time that they attempt to extend “humane” moral consideration to animals. 
However, the animal rights movement is a hotbed for such controversial and risky 
identifications because of the liberationist philosophy that drives some factions. While 
some of these analogies are nuanced, others make totalizing identifications between 
animal and human victims that often distract from perpetrators’ culpability, disregard 
agency exerted by victims, and do not specify how an audience can alleviate suffering 
caused by a particular situation. In this chapter’s study of the rhetorical appropriation of 
                                               
10 In Davis’s etymology of “Holocaust,” she note that though the term “is used in the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence on May 15, 1948 in reference to the Jewish genocide under Hitler, and in scattered other 
places…” this usage “did not spread in the United States until the early 1960s” (14). In the 1970s, the term 
was increasingly used only in reference to this Jewish genocide, “although from the 1980s to the present 
the word has sometimes been expanded to include the Nazi persecution and murder of both Jewish and 
non-Jewish people” (15).  
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human traumas in advocacy on behalf of nonhuman subjects, I argue that 
disidentifications and the recognition of the limits of analogy are crucial to making these 
analogies non-exploitative. Specifically, animal advocacy rhetoric should be considerate 
of the concerns voiced by various human rights activists so that it does not reinforce 
racism, sexism, etc. in its efforts to undo speciesism.  
In the following pages, I begin by examining why analogies to human trauma 
may be desirable to animal rights activists and why the analogy made in the People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals’ (PETA) “Holocaust on Your Plate” was deemed 
offensive and appropriative by some viewers. Then, I discuss analogies to racism (as 
manifested in colonialism and slavery) and sexism that, though they are not as popular or 
as controversial as Holocaust analogies, are fairly frequently deployed in animal 
advocacy. In the final section, I analyze how two illustrated narratives that intend to 
critique racial discrimination also draw attention to speciesism. The intent of the last 
section is not an exhaustive summary of the graphic novels or their use of the animal 
figure, but to use these works of literature to reinforce something less obvious in the 
nonfiction examples: the acknowledgment of the limitations of these analogies. 
 Rhetorical Listening to Trauma Analogies 
While I argue that some animal rights discourse neglects rhetorical listening, I 
seek to practice it myself by considering what values lead these activists to use 
Holocaust analogies and other controversial comparisons. Analogies between acts of 
violence that are acceptable, whether because we do not know many details about them 
or because we do not sympathize with victims, and infamous ones can draw attention to 
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the lesser known victim and frame that victim as worthy of assistance. Michael Rothberg 
describes how Holocaust analogies are used to bring more obscure events into public 
memory. He calls the use of analogies and allusions “multidirectional memory.” While 
public memory is sometimes perceived as a finite space that groups might fight over to 
make sure their histories are considered relevant, Rothberg argues that this is a 
misperception because no memory is the exclusive property of a group, “nor are groups 
‘owned’ by memories. Rather, the borders of memory and identity are jagged; what 
looks at first like my own property often turns out to be a borrowing or adaption from a 
history that initially might seem foreign or distant” (5). The Holocaust is used by many 
groups because it is often understood as “the watershed of our times” (Felman xiv) in 
Western memory as a defining trauma not only for Jews, but also human kind as a 
whole. 
  Although Rothberg points out that trauma should not be “a category that 
confirms [the] moral value” of a person or his/her actions because both perpetrators and 
victims can experience its symptoms (90), we do often make trauma serve this function 
by framing victims as martyrs in an effort to memorialize them. Therefore, comparing 
nonhuman suffering to the Holocaust transforms that suffering into trauma, and thus, 
seemingly increases the moral relevance of nonhumans by indicating they experience not 
only temporary pain, but also long-term physical and psychological effects that have 
implications that extend beyond the individual and his or her “kind.”  Framing animal 
suffering as trauma also has the potential to lead to activism on behalf of individuals and 
the creation of large-scale changes. Ann Cvetkovich describes how trauma can be used 
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to create a “hinge” between individual suffering and its systemic causes (12). The hinge 
can be discovered through the comparative analysis of experiences in a single life and 
across those of others.  
 Though the Holocaust is probably the most controversial analogy used in animal 
liberation discourse, it is not the only controversial one. There is a history of slavery 
analogies in animal advocacy that extends from the early 1800s to the present (Kim 
314). The most notable historical example would be British Parliamentarian William 
Wilberforce who not only worked to abolish the slave trade, but also founded the 
world’s first national-level animal welfare organisation, the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (Garner 43).  
According to Rob Boddice, the SPCA and other early organizations based their 
activism against animal cruelty not so much in a concern for animals’ experiences or 
innate rights as in the belief that animal abuse would “bring about the demoralization of 
civilization” and corrupt the character of the person who inflicted it (466). However, this 
has not stopped modern activists from locating the roots of animal rights abolitionist 
philosophy in the work of eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers, regardless of these 
people’s historical beliefs (459). Presumably, PETA would be steeped in this 
historiographical account that traces abolitionist thought towards animals back to the 
beginning of organized animal welfare efforts and provides a supposedly historically 
justified ground for making analogies between human rights abuses and animal rights 
abuses. While Boddice brings up legitimate objections to using a misinterpretation of 
history to support animal rights activism, it is also important to understand that this 
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version is currently central to activists’ understanding of their identity. In recent years, 
Marjorie Spiegel has supported this analogy in her book The Dreaded Comparison: 
Human and Animal Slavery (1996). While there is not a similarly significant historical 
overlap between animal activists and groups that counter anti-Semitism, Charles 
Patterson has argued that the Holocaust has played a significant role in some individuals’ 
paths to animal activism in Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the 
Holocaust (2002).11  
  Claire Jean Kim divides animal activists into two main camps, abolitionists and 
welfarists, to explain this phenomenon (315). While in practice there is overlap between 
these two movements, the differences in their ideologies inform their discourse in 
significant ways. Welfarist organizations, such as the Human e Society, do not use 
Holocaust analogies because these organizations seek to reduce animal suffering without 
transforming the ethical status of nonhumans. In contrast, abolitionist organizations 
perceive animals as having an inherent value and therefore seek to end all instrumental 
use of nonhuman animals, from fur to meat to laboratory experimentation. The 
abolitionist wing therefore uses Holocaust and slavery analogies as well as some 
analogies to sexism. These analogies are important to the “self-understanding” of rights 
activists (Kim 316).12 Therefore, they should not be considered a purely sensationalist 
move that the groups ought to avoid in order to make their cause more palatable to 
                                               
11 See Patterson’s “We Were Like That Too” in Eternal Treblinka. 
12 Angi Buettner claims that when Steven Wise, who advocates for great apes’ legal personhood, evokes 
the Holocaust, he does so because he sincerely sees their mistreatment and path towards extinction as 
genocide (33). 
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mainstream audiences. However, the analogies can be made in ways that consciously try 
to avoid appropriation of human suffering. 
 The more recent analogies to racism and sexism involve the term “speciesism.” 
“Speciesism” analogizes attitudes of human superiority to racism and sexism as attitudes 
that lead to oppression and may also result in direct or insidious trauma. While the 
Holocaust and slavery have both been characterized as traumatic extended events, 
racism and sexism can be understood as “insidious trauma.” Psychologist Maria Root 
conceptualizes this form of trauma not as a temporally discrete event, but an on-going 
experience that, like more direct traumas, results in insecurity and confusion about one’s 
identity, relationships, and purpose and position in society (Root 241).Richard D. Ryder 
coined “speciesism” in 1970 and noted that speciesists “fail to ‘extend our concern about 
elementary rights to the nonhuman animals’” (Dunayer 1). Peter Singer popularized the 
term with Animal Liberation (1975), in which he defined it as analogous to racism and 
sexism. This idea that nonhumans are victims of immoral discrimination galvanized 
what had been a small movement in the seventies and transformed it into the extensive 
and vocal animal liberation movement that exists today. The term speciesism and the 
belief that it must be overcome in order to achieve animal liberation continue to be 
influential within the movement and informed PETA’s Holocaust analogy.13  
In Burkean terms, abolitionist groups such as PETA perceive that abuses of 
nonhumans are the result of a speciesist terministic screen that is similar to ones such as 
                                               
13 However, as Zamir argues in 2007, speciesism-based arguments can alienate a moderate audience who, 
though they may otherwise be inclined to some liberationist actions because of their opposition to 
suffering, do believe humans to be more important than nonhumans. 
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anti-Semitism that led to the abuse of dehumanized people. For Burke, the terms we use 
to describe reality filter it like a screen, and “terministic screen” evokes both 
“terminology” and “terminus.” Thus, it indicates that the particular language we use to 
filter reality can lead us to a particular “end,” specifically, a particular interpretation of 
reality that excludes other interpretations. As Burke writes, “A given terminology 
contains various implications, and there is a corresponding ‘perfectionist’ tendency for 
men to attempt carrying out those implications. . . In so far as any of these terminologies 
happen also to contain the risks of destroying the world, that’s just too bad” (Language 
19). Potentially, people may pursue any terministic screen so far that they commit 
atrocities. Thus, acts of violence such as genocide can be seen as logical and morally 
justified by those who adhere to certain screens. Once a different terministic screen 
becomes dominant, these acts become incomprehensible atrocities. Holocaust and 
slavery analogies reinforce abolitionists’ belief that one day contemporary treatment of 
animals will be remembered with similar horror.  
Because language affects our interpretation of reality, terministic screens are 
always a part of how we understand the world. Therefore, despite abolitionists’ intention 
to criticize both anti-Semitic and speciesist screens, these activists also operate under a 
particular selection of reality. Under an abolitionist screen, Holocaust analogies may not 
be perceived as offensive because this screen focuses on similarities and filters out 
differences. Such analogies between the abuse of nonhumans and the abuse of humans 
often evoke sympathy for nonhumans in an anti-speciesist audience, but may offend an 
audience that privileges human suffering. This audience may feel that the speaker is 
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exploiting a historically victimized people to make a point about nonhumans, and the 
audience may be right. While the speaker might not intend to take advantage of human 
victims, she is citing their suffering for her own ends. When she does so without regard 
for how they may respond to this use, she may use their suffering in harmful ways.  
Analogies between nonhuman and human suffering are not inherently 
appropriative, even though they are often received as offensive, because not all of these 
analogies disregard the context in which that suffering occurred. In order to further 
understand why animal activism rhetoric might draw on these analogies between human 
trauma and animal suffering and how they can do so in ways that consciously try to 
avoid appropriation of human suffering, it is helpful to look at theoretical discussions 
about the importance of analogies in constructing human understanding. To invoke some 
well-known examples, Burke describes language as both a reflection and selection, and, 
therefore, a deflection of reality (Grammar 59). Nietzsche claims that a process of 
selection means that our views of the world are “anthropomorphic,” and argues that all 
our truths are metaphors that have been naturalized (1172) Richards sees metaphor as 
“omnipresent” in language due to its central role in our thought processes (92, 94). Of 
course, metaphors work not only through resemblances, but also disparities and direct us 
to compare only some aspects of the two parts of the metaphor while also realizing their 
differences (107-8). Hayles likewise believes that cognition and metaphor are 
“indistinguishable” (275).14 Her analysis of how human and posthuman bodies have 
been interpreted over and over “through metaphors resonant with cultural meanings” 
                                               
14 Hayles credits this idea to Mary Catherine Bateson, an anthropologist interested in the cybernetics 
movement, who makes a similar point in her 1972 book Our Own Metaphor. 
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(284) shows that metaphors not only create what we know as truth, but also enable us to 
change it. 
 PETA sought to change the public’s understanding of “human” and “animal” 
with their Holocaust analogy, and Burke’s explanation of “substance” shows how a 
seemingly true concept is changeable through rhetoric. He gives the etymological 
meaning of substance as that which stands under, and explains that we can only define 
something by its context, not what it is. Thus, the substance associated with a word can 
be “transformed” because the relationship to the context can be reformulated, and 
analogy or metaphor is one way to do this. Transforming substance is not always easy 
because people have a tendency to create “terministic screens.” These screens regulate 
what can or cannot be validated as true or good, but there are coexisting, sometimes 
competing, screens (such as capitalist and socialist manifestations of economic 
discourse). Though people tend to follow one terministic screen at the expense of others, 
the fact that there are always multiple screens creates the potential for agency and 
transformations of substance. Nienkamp explains how conflicts between multiple 
discourses produces individual agency. Although we internalize some of these 
discourses unconsciously, we are consciously aware of some of the contradictions within 
and among them, so we work to reconcile them (Nienkamp 134). There is no guarantee 
that exposure to varied discourses will result in  well thought out values; however, these 
conflicts do provide the opportunity for rhetorical listening, which may encourage one to 
think critically about the version of reality selected by a terministic screen. 
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Analogies can invite us to think about our values in new terms. By presenting a 
new context, they might transform the substance of a term or make us reconsider the 
truth of our favored terministic screen. Rothberg argues that analogies between the 
Holocaust and other atrocities can benefit groups whose victimization is not as well-
known as the Jews and others in Nazi Germany. Memory, then, is a source of social 
change for Rothberg. He writes that “Memory’s anachronistic quality—its bringing 
together of now and then, here and there—is actually the source of its powerful 
creativity, its ability to build new worlds out of the material of older ones” (5). Whereas 
Nienkamp describes how bringing past and present voices into conversation with one 
another creates agency in the individual, multidirectional memory indicates how 
individual agency and social change might be linked through public discourses that 
deploy analogies between memories. 
Though these analogies may be productive for an anti-speciesist audience, they 
risk appropriation if they engage with other discourses about suffering without listening 
to the groups who have been influential in shaping them. Appropriation happens when 
analogies do not acknowledge difference along with similarity. For example, they focus 
on generating empathy for the nonhuman victims, but often neglect to unsettle it by 
acknowledging species differences. This has the effect of ignoring the agency of human 
victims who resisted in ways nonhumans cannot and de-emphasizes the cruelty and 
responsibility of perpetrators.  
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“It’s Like the Holocaust of Analogies!”: Analysis of PETA’s “Holocaust on Your 
Plate”  
Comedian Larry Wilmore criticized the right-wing comparison of abortion and 
slavery on The Daily Show, stating “I know these guys want to make a point, but you 
don’t do it by appropriating the worst thing that happened to other people. Equating 
anything you don’t like to slavery trivializes centuries of suffering. It’s like the 
Holocaust of analogies!” Wilmore’s ironic appropriation of the Holocaust mocks the 
hyperbole of the rather faulty slavery analogy as well as the lack of consideration for 
others displayed by this faction of social conservatives and the shallow thinking 
displayed by television newscasters. Yet, Wilmore’s analogy also does some sincere 
work by highlighting the cruelty of the comparison of abortion and slavery. Though the 
right-wing analogy is nowhere near as destructive as the Holocaust, which enables 
Wilmore to mock the hyperbole, it is harmful because it seeks to erase a history of racial 
oppression and distract from contemporary racism by trivializing black suffering. 
So, what makes the analogy between abortion and slavery wrong and the one 
between this conservative analogy and the Holocaust right, or, at least, generally 
acceptable to The Daily Show’s left-leaning audience? My answer is that the second 
analogy works because it acknowledges that it is only partial. Wilmore’s ironic delivery 
reveals to us that, in fact, the right-wing analogy is not the Holocaust of analogies 
because such a comparison is ridiculous; however, his analogy simultaneously suggests 
that the right-wing analogy is a dangerous display of racism that should be taken 
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seriously. The acknowledgement that an analogy is limited is key to making analogies 
between the abuse of humans and animals ethically by avoiding exploitation. 
Though a multitude of individuals and organizations have made these 
comparisons, this section will focus on PETA’s 2003 “Holocaust on Your Plate” 
campaign because it reached a large number of people beyond animal advocacy circles. 
According to Kim, this campaign “[went] public” with an analogy that, though it had 
been common in animal liberation discourse for many years was generally used only 
with a sympathetic audience (318). The campaign serves as a case study of totalizing 
identification that appropriated suffering and therefore received a largely negative 
response. Many viewers were offended by PETA’s traveling exhibit consisting of eight 
large panels that juxtaposed images of concentration camp prisoners with those of 
factory-farmed animals.15 
“Holocaust on Your Plate” traveled to over 100 US cities, in which it was set up 
in public spaces. While the campaign is not present on PETA’s website, at least four of 
the images have been reproduced in news stories and blogs. The title panel features an 
image of a naked, starving man on the left and a starving cow on the right; it states, 
“During the seven years between 1938 and 1945, 12 million people perished in the 
Holocaust. The same number of animals is killed EVERY FOUR HOURS for food in 
the U.S. alone.” Subsequent panels pair men in barracks with caged hens, Jews in train 
cars with cows headed toward slaughter, naked Jews entering a gas chamber with 
turkeys, children behind barbed wire with piglets behind bars, and a pile of human 
                                               
15 See Foxman, CNN, Kalechofsky, and Smith.  
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corpses with those of pigs. The closing panel includes a quotation from Polish Jewish 
American author and Nobel prize winner Isaac Bashevis Singer, which states that, “Our 
grandchildren will ask us one day: Where were you during the holocaust of the animals? 
What did you do against these horrifying crimes? We won’t be able to offer the same 
excuse for the second time, that we didn’t know” (Kim 322-3). 
PETA spokespersons later explained they intended to compare the mind-sets of 
perpetrators, a fairly limited analogy, instead of equating Holocaust victims and animals. 
When the audience is led to identify with victims, historical context and species 
differences are likely to be blurred. However, if the audience is led to identify with 
perpetrators, who are human in both examples of abuse, the differences between human 
and nonhuman victims may be less actively obscured because the audience is given the 
freedom to create as many or few identifications between the victims as they see fit. 
Perpetrator analogies aim to create discomfort in audience members’ understandings of 
their selves which might lead them to change their behavior.  
However, other than the use of the second person in the title “Holocaust on Your 
Plate,” the campaign does little to draw attention to perpetrator mind-sets. Instead, the 
visual rhetoric equates the victims. The panels each feature a photo of concentration 
camp victims on the left and a visually similar photo of  factory farmed animals of the 
right, with a red label connecting the two with language such as  “Baby Butchers” or 
“Walking Skeletons” (Sharp). The analogy between prisoners and farm animals is 
supported visually because the two photos are the exact same size and have no gutter 
separating them, which implies that they are of equal importance and not distinct from 
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each other. Also, the selected photographs mirror each other. For example, the panel 
“Baby Butchers” depicts children behind barbed wire and piglets behind bars. The one 
labeled “To Animals, All People Are Nazis” sets a photograph of men in concentration 
camp bunks next to one of laying hens in cages in such a way that the lines of 
perspective meet in the middle of the panel, where the images are juxtaposed. Though 
the farm photographs are in color, they have been desaturated to more closely resemble 
the black and white ones. However, the color red remains relatively strong. In 
emphasizing red, which links the farm photos more closely to the verbal label, and only 
providing contextual information about the Holocaust that makes it seem less 
devastating than factory farming by contrasting the numbers killed, the project 
diminishes the uniqueness and significance of the Holocaust.  
While the PETA campaign relies on an understanding of the Holocaust as a true 
and horrible event in which millions of people died, it unintentionally evokes some 
tropes of Holocaust denial. Because the campaign sincerely equates the “worth” of 
Jewish and nonhuman individuals (with the apparent assumption that viewers will see 
Jewish people metonymically standing in for all humans and, therefore, not be offended 
this group has been singled out), it presents the number of people killed as relatively 
minor when compared with the number of animals killed for food. This brings to mind 
the Holocaust denials that minimize the number of people killed. Referring to these 12 
million victims without specifying that at least 6 million were Jewish or referencing that 
the Holocaust was an organized genocide against Jewish people likewise diminishes the 
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important role anti-Semitism played in the Holocaust and the practical difference in 
intent behind genocide and animal agriculture.16 
Responses to “Holocaust on Your Plate” and other Holocaust Analogies 
“Holocaust on Your Plate” failed at rhetorical listening to many of the survivors 
of the Holocaust and those who sympathize with them who believe that certain 
differences between humans and nonhumans are important. However, some critics 
unfairly dismiss the very category of the Holocaust analogy and do not consider it may 
be important to some animal rights activists. In doing so, they also neglect to listen to 
why this analogy is important to some animal advocates’ understanding of themselves 
and their work. Some responses, however, provide a more nuanced take on the analogy 
by creating limited identifications. This section first analyzes a negative response by a 
blogger who fails to thoughtfully listen to animal advocates. Then, it analyzes two 
responses that do display an understanding of this analogy’s importance while still 
condemning its use. Abraham H. Foxman, spokesperson for the Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL), released a short statement soon after “Holocaust on Your Plate” opened, 
and animal advocate Roberta Kalechofsky released a book-length essay on the general 
use of the Holocaust analogy in animal rights discourse a few months later. This section 
also considers Ingrid Newkirk’s apology for the campaign, which attempts to limit the 
Holocaust analogy. 
The context surrounding both the Holocaust’s position in public memory and 
PETA’s reputation made rhetorical listening difficult for viewers, and even a campaign 
                                               
16 This difference is not recognized by Davis who claims that factory farming  meets the definition of 
cultural genocide in which the identity of a group is destroyed (56-9). 
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based on a limited analogy would have likely offended many people. The same cultural 
attitudes toward the Holocaust that make it a desirable comparison from the abolitionist 
viewpoint also make others see the comparison as exploitative. While “Holocaust on 
Your Plate” is a dramatic shift in tone from the “I’d Rather Go Naked Than Wear Fur” 
advertisements PETA was most known for at the time, both campaigns appear 
sensationalist. The anti-fur campaign used celebrities and sex appeal in very 
conventional ways, with print ads featuring young, thin, white, female celebrities “on 
display for the male heteronormative gaze” (Deckha 42), but the very of use of nudity 
could be interpreted as shocking. This tactic is meant to entice viewers, in contrast to the 
confrontational tone of “Holocaust on Your Plate.” A more aggressive action associated 
with PETA’s anti-fur campaign is that of activists who threw paint on fur-wearing 
models and celebrities, though in fact these incidents have not been linked to PETA 
(PETA, “Sex and the City Movie”). Because of these anti-fur campaigns, PETA did 
have a fairly radical reputation that could predispose some viewers to disapprove of any 
new campaign, even one that limited their Holocaust analogy or made the comparison of 
perpetrators, not victims, the central focus.  
The brief blog entry “PETA UGA Stunt Reminds Us of Four Other Absurd 
PETA Stunts” is an example of a response that itself fails to engage in rhetorical 
listening. Blogger Fidel Martinez  classifies “Holocaust on Your Plate” as a publicity 
“stunt,” rather than a sincere expression of abolitionist thought. He writes that “to draw a 
comparison between humanity’s darkest moment and cruelty to animals is just wrong. 
There are some things that should not be touched, and the Holocaust is one of them.” 
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Martinez’s article is written for the Latino/a centered news and entertainment site 
Guanabee, and, while the controversy over Holocaust on Your Plate has been covered 
by a range of media outlets including The National Review (Smith) and CNN, 
Martinez’s is significant because he and his commenters directly engage with the 
morality and logic of Holocaust analogies.  
Readers are able to post comments in a discussion thread below Martinez’s 
article. When one reader posts in support of the PETA campaign by stating, “PETA is 
making the point that all life is equal and sacred, and that animals shouldn’t be seen as 
being beneath us, but just as important as we are,” Martinez responds by invoking 
Godwin’s Law. Mike Godwin, an attorney interested in promoting civil liberties in the 
realm of computer-based telecommunications, created this light-hearted “law” in 1990 
after noticing, and being annoyed by, the trend of comparing one’s opponent to a Nazi in 
Usenet discussions. Because Usenet is one of the oldest currently operating and widely 
used computer network discussion systems, the law caught on and is now referenced in 
other online media, including sites that reach a broad audience such as BBC News 
Magazine (McFarlane). In 2011, over two decades after the law was first publicized, the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum interviewed Godwin about it. He has been 
reflecting on the law in technology related media for much longer.  
In a 1994 piece for Wired Magazine, Godwin relates the history of his law. He 
envisioned it as a “counter-meme” that would “make discussion participants see how 
they are acting as vectors to a particularly silly and offensive meme . . . and perhaps to 
curtail the glib Nazi comparisons.” The original law states “as an online discussion 
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grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one” 
(Godwin), but subsequent users have added their own value judgments. If a person 
mentions Nazis, their argument is devalued and even dismissed when another poster in 
that discussion invokes Godwin’s law. Therefore, Godwin’s law is now also understood 
as “the law that states that once a discussion reaches a comparison to Nazis or Hitler, its 
usefulness is over” (Godwin) and “if any poster does mention the Nazis in a discussion 
thread, Godwin’s law can be invoked, they instantly lose the argument and the thread 
can be ended” (Chivers).17 The prescriptive form of Godwin’s Law relies on the 
Holocaust’s reputation in the West as the worst thing that ever has and ever will happen, 
and the assumption that all analogies are equations. This leads to the conclusion that all 
analogies to the Holocaust are fallacious because they equate something to an always 
incomparable event. Therefore, individuals who make the analogy are dismissed as 
irrational and not open to productive discussion. 
After Martinez invokes Godwin, the discussion thread below his article does not 
end. A new commenter points out that though there are differences between nonhuman 
and human victims, this analogy is apt because the industrial approach to factory 
farming and the Holocaust have similarities and the farmed animals suffer. This 
commenter indicates that the prescriptive form of the “law” itself leads to an intellectual 
failure if it is used to immediately dismiss an argument. Admittedly, people have been 
known to equate opponents to Nazis for trivial reasons, rather than creating a thoughtful 
                                               
17  A Usenet generated FAQ on the use of Godwin’s law, “How to post about Nazis and get away with it - 
the Godwin's Law FAQ” is available from FAQs.org. 
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and limited analogy. However, as Rothberg has documented, analogies that are limited 
and specific are less likely to engage in appropriation.  
Whereas Martinez argues the campaign is offensive because it makes a 
Holocaust analogy, the National Director of the ADL, Foxman, focuses on why this 
particular Holocaust analogy is offensive. In a short statement condemning the 
campaign, Foxman acknowledges that “abusive treatment of animals should be 
opposed,” a display of rhetorical listening to PETA because it is a conscious attempt to 
make a limited political identification with PETA based on a belief about action they 
both share. Even though Foxman disagrees with PETA’s abolitionist stance that animals 
should be brought into humans’ realm of moral concern, he promotes understanding of 
self and other, the first move of rhetorical listening (Ratcliffe 26) by identifying with 
PETA’s central cause and also explaining why he objects to their Holocaust analogy. 
Foxman states that animal cruelty should never be compared to the Holocaust because 
“The uniqueness of human life is the moral underpinning for those who resisted the 
hatred of Nazis and others ready to commit genocide even today.” Therefore, Foxman 
implies that analogic thinking about the Holocaust is not off-limits as long as it is 
compared to other examples of human suffering that is caused by genocidal thought, 
which differentiates his response from Martinez’s claim that the Holocaust “should not 
be touched.” 
The strong focus “Holocaust on Your Plate” put on suffering would seem to 
suggest that PETA believes an opposition to suffering will lead one to resist genocide, 
regardless of one’s thoughts on human uniqueness. However, the exhibit does not 
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explicitly engage the question of how a widespread loss of belief in human uniqueness 
could affect human rights work. Thus, the ADL does not dismiss the campaign simply 
for making a Holocaust analogy as Martinez does, but for making one that appropriates 
the Holocaust and may be detrimental to anti-racist efforts that are based on human 
uniqueness. 
Foxman’s other objection is that “Rather than deepen our revulsion against what 
the Nazis did to the Jews, the project will undermine the struggle to understand the 
Holocaust and to find ways to make sure such catastrophes never happen again.” He 
rightly points out that the campaign does nothing to aid understanding of the Holocaust. 
However, to remove the Holocaust from analogic thinking completely, as Martinez 
suggests, can also hamper our understanding of the Holocaust because it prevents us 
from considering the Holocaust’s relationship to past, contemporaneous, and present 
events in ways that could not only increase our understanding of those events, but also of 
the Holocaust itself. Patterson seeks to create a Holocaust analogy that both enhances 
our understanding of this event and factory farming in Eternal Treblinka by tracing how 
speciesism and other discriminatory mind-sets are similar, the historical links between 
technology used in slaughter houses and death camps, and the role the Holocaust played 
in inspiring animal advocates such as Isaac Bashevis Singer and others.  
PETA cites Patterson’s research as inspiration for “Holocaust on Your Plate,” but 
does not clearly translate his detailed research to the visual campaign. Lisa Lange, 
PETA’s vice president of communications, told CNN that “the campaign is appropriate 
because ‘Nazi concentration camps were modeled after slaughterhouses.’” This fact is 
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supported by Eternal Treblinka, and one of PETA’s panels is labeled “Eternal 
Treblinka” in reference to both Patterson’s book and the short story by Isaac Bashevis 
Singer from which Patterson took his title (750). However, PETA’s panels do not 
provide any of Patterson’s research on slaughterhouses which means that the campaign 
leaves out not only information about differences, but also similarities it could have used 
to support the analogy. The campaign also does not clearly express Patterson’s argument 
that the Holocaust and industrial meat production are linked through not only historical 
context, but also a transhistorical mind-set. CNN reports that PETA representative Mark 
Prescott wrote, “The very same mind-set that made the Holocaust possible—that we can 
do anything we want to those we decide are ‘different or inferior’—is what allows us to 
commit atrocities against animals every single day.” This analogy between perpetrators 
is not clear in the campaign. However, even a perpetrator based analogy would still be 
offensive to some, as is depicted in Coetzee’s novella The Lives of Animals.  
Many characters in this text object to the thought that these mind-sets are 
analogous. Elizabeth Costello makes this analogy when she gives a lecture at a 
university and criticizes her audience for ignoring the slaughterhouses on the outskirts of 
their community. She compares her listeners to Germans who closed their eyes to 
concentration camps, which garners a negative reaction from her listeners. Her daughter-
in-law claims “hackles [were] rising all around me in the audience” (49).  Though the 
text is fiction, Costello’s argument and other characters’ reactions to it reflect and 
comment on how such analogies between the abuse of animals and humans operate 
outside of the novel. The text encourages rhetorical listening by presenting characters 
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with opposing viewpoints sympathetically. Costello calls her Holocaust analogy a 
“cheap point” and states, “I know how talk of this kind polarizes people, and cheap 
point-scoring only makes it worse” (22). A similar accusation was leveled at PETA by 
Martinez, who saw “Holocaust on Your Plate” as a publicity stunt rather than a sincere 
expression of abolitionist thought. In The Lives of Animals, this accusation of cheapness 
is made by the faculty member Abraham Stern who attended Coetzee’s lecture and 
conveys his offense to her in a note. He writes that her analogy “trades on the horrors of 
the camp in a cheap way” and accuses her of equating Jews with cattle (50). Coetzee’s 
depiction of the audience’s negative reaction indicates not only that Costello is alienated 
from most other humans, but also that even well-intentioned Holocaust analogies can 
offend. The allusion itself can be enough to repel an audience who is not already 
convinced that animals and humans are relevantly similar. 
Even though Costello is explicitly comparing perpetrators, and not equating Jews 
to nonhuman animals, the implied identification between humans and animals is 
alienating to Stern. He writes that, “If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow 
that cattle are treated like Jews” (50). This indicates that for him, anti-Semitism is more 
than a manifestation of a generalizable hierarchical mindset; its specificity is central to 
how Jews were treated. Thus, The Lives of Animals brings up one of the limitations of 
the Holocaust analogy. Stern’s phrasing is similar to that of Kalechofsky who deemed 
PETA’s campaign worthy of a book-length response and published Animal Suffering and 
the Holocaust: The Problem with Comparisons in September 2003. She writes, “The 
Jew was not treated like an animal, nor is the animal treated like the Jew,” then explains 
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that “To the Nazi mind, the Jew was treated like a Jew, an anomaly, a mistake, a disease, 
a contamination, something that could bring disaster to the German people and then to 
the human race if he were not exterminated” and adds that nonhumans are mistreated for 
“wholly different reasons” (39-40). She is correct to point out that Nazi ideology was 
informed by Christianity’s history of anti-Semitism, which is one of the limits of the 
Holocaust analogy (45). While Stern’s phrasing seems to acknowledge that Jewish 
people may have been treated like farm animals, a proposition Kalechofsky denies, his 
conclusion that these animals are not treated like Jews indicates that he believes “Jews 
were treated like cattle” only on the surface. 
Kalechofsky supports her position that the Holocaust victim/abused animal 
analogy  cannot be made in either direction with a quotation from the writer of an 
anonymous diary found in Auschwitz who claims Jews were not treated like animals, but 
“some strange psycho-physical product ‘made’ in Germany” (qtd. in Kalechofsky 50).  
However, she ignores the testimony of others who did perceive that Nazis treated Jewish 
people like animals.18 Many others, including liberators of the camps and people who 
later learned of the Holocaust, have also perceived that Nazis treated Jewish people like 
animals. For example, Brigadeer General Henning Linden, who accepted the surrender 
of the Dachau camp, reported that, “The outstanding picture I got from my inspection of 
this camp was the barbaric, infamous systematic effort of the camp routine to degrade 
the human to a point where he bordered on the animal” (Dann 91), and materials at The 
                                               
18 While some nonhumans, such as companion animals, may be treated quite well, I and the other writers 
discussed here use this expression idiomatically to indicate that people who were “treated like animals” 
were not only subjected to harsh conditions, but were deprived of what may be considered “human 
dignity.” 
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Holocaust Teacher Resource Center state that, “The inmates were treated more like 
animals than humans by the Nazis” (17-18). Even some survivors have made this 
analogy. For example Tova, who was imprisoned at Ravensbrück as a girl, recounted, “It 
was just, [the overseers] treated us like animals” (Saidel 74).19 That Tova and others 
perceived that prisoners were treated like animals does not negate Kalechofsky’s 
argument about the Nazi’s perspective that they were treated appropriately for Jews.  
Tova’s testimony also does not indicate that she or others survivors would 
approve of the analogy being reversed, as it was by PETA. Though Kalechofsky herself 
neglects to practice rhetorical listening to people who belonged to other groups targeted 
by Nazis, such as the Romani, homosexuals, and the disabled because she does not 
mention them, she does make an important call for that animal advocates engage in 
rhetorical listening to Jewish people. She states that although the difference in 
perpetrator mindsets might seem petty in the face of the suffering experienced by both 
groups of victims, “to the Jew, . . . it is anything but petty” because it is important to 
understand the history of anti-Semitism to understand the Holocaust (40). While 
Kalechofsky ignores Jewish testimony in which survivors claim they were treated like 
animals in her analysis, she does clearly explain how Nazi attitudes toward Jews differ 
from those attitudes held by humans who take part in animal agriculture and testing. She 
argues that anti-Semitism is more than a manifestation of a generalizable hierarchical 
mind-set and its specificity is central to how Jews were treated. Because PETA is not 
interested in helping viewers understand the Holocaust, only in raising their 
                                               
19 Inside the Concentration Camps: Eyewitness Accounts of Life in Hitler's Death Camps by Eugène 
Aroneanu contains more testimonies that make this analogy. 
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consciousness about the conditions on factory farms, the history of anti-Semitism may 
seem irrelevant to them; however, by ignoring it, they both supported Holocaust denial 
and alienated many viewers. 
Though Kalechofsky’s text is framed as a rebuttal of the analogy, she actually 
spends the majority of the book arguing that the attitude of detachment promoted by 
vivisectors enabled Nazis to experiment on human beings. The Holocaust and the 
Henmaid’s Tale by Karen Davis reveals how much of Kalechofsky’s book supports the 
analogy. Davis repeatedly turns to Kalechofsky’s book to support her own argument that 
the analogy between factory farming and the Holocaust is valid. Kalechofsky writes, 
“one of the bridges that led to the Holocaust was the reduction of the laboratory animal 
to a non-sentient object ” and “analogues of [lab animals’ and Holocaust victims’] 
suffering could fill catalogues” (55). However, she states that the comparison should not 
be made because “The Holocaust lives in an historic and symbolic context different from 
that of animals,” which is one of the important limits of the analogy (55). For 
Kalechofsky, anti-Semitism’s symbolic dimension developed from Christians’ history of 
branding Jews as “usurious,” “carnal,” “perfidious,” etc. which enabled them to be 
viewed as “pollution” (45, 49). Because animals have only been considered pollution in 
times of plague (she claims), the comparison should not be made. Though some animals 
are considered vermin who must be eradicated more frequently than Kalechofsky 
implies, it is certainly true that anti-Semitism has its own unique history.  
Kalechofsky sums up her approach to history as “Every difference is a 
difference” (5). She believes this statement “constitutes a corrective to the natural 
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tendency of the cognitive mind to think through metaphors and comparisons, to make 
connections which erase distinctions, to veer towards tidy equations” (5). This statement, 
then, corrects for our tendency to over-identify when we should be listening for 
difference. It is true that analogies always elide something, always erase some 
differences. However, this does not mean all analogies are inaccurate or damaging. No 
analogy, no matter how authoritatively it is given or how much equivalence it asserts, is 
given in a vacuum. As participants in the meaning-making process, readers are capable 
of questioning the analogy, and, in fact analogies invite this sort of questioning because 
of the inevitable gaps between the concepts being compared. Even poorly done, 
appropriative analogies can elicit this response. 
 When PETA compares death camp prisoners to factory farm animals, readers are 
provoked to think of the differences as well as the similarities, as evidenced by the 
negative responses. In this way, the analogy can add meaning to both sides, though the 
appropriative analogies may result in angry viewers rejecting the similarities and 
emphasizing only the differences.If PETA had practiced rhetorical listening while 
creating the campaign, they may have been able to make a more informed, conscientious 
decisions about which differences they could gloss over and which they should 
acknowledge if they wished for viewers to consider their analogy rather than dismiss it 
in outrage. 
However, Kalechofsky believes that comparing the Holocaust and animal rights 
abuses “depletes both of meaning” rather than adding meaning. She believes that 
“History is obliterated in a wash of metaphors” and that “The motives, causes, and 
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symbolism of each form of suffering differs vastly as it does with every form of 
suffering, and it is the task of the historian to trace the motives, causes, and symbolism 
of suffering when they are embedded in the laws, institutions, and social habits of a 
society. Unless we do this, each victim, human or animal, Jew or non-Jew, becomes a 
generalized metaphor for any other victim, and understanding of the how and the why of 
cruel institutions such as slavery or war or concentration camps is obliterated” (34). 
However, in order to trace motives, causes, and symbolism across laws, institutions, and 
social habits we need to be able to compare them across laws, institutions, and social 
habits. As previously discussed, Richards and Hayles argue that metaphors are central to 
our very thought processes. Kalechofsky herself points out that vivisection was informed 
by and promulgated the institutional and social symbolism, such as the supremely 
objective scientist, that was partially responsible for human experimentation during the 
Holocaust.  
While metaphors can erase the differences between victims, in doing so they can 
also increase a form of emotional rather than intellectual understanding. For example, a 
student of the Holocaust may not know first-hand what it feels like to be anti-Semitic, 
they most likely do know what it is like to dismiss the suffering of those deemed 
subhuman. Though “empathy,” in its usual sense, for Nazis is not desirable, this analogy 
between mind-sets can be relevant to partial “understanding of the how and the why” of 
the Holocaust.  
Not only would Kalechofsky’s suggestion to remove the Holocaust from 
comparisons prevent such an analysis, it could also result in the deprivileging of other 
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wrongs. LaCapra warns against making the Holocaust sublime (Interview 10), which is 
what Martinez was implying in his blog, and philosopher Tzachi Zamir shows us one 
negative effect of doing so. Like Kalechofsky, Zamir objects to the use of the Holocaust 
analogy. His complaint is reasonable on its own. He critiques the mind-set analogy by 
stating that “Jews were not killed to produce soap” (47). As Kalechofsky also points out, 
it is true that motivation matters when it comes to the treatment of people or animals. 
However, if we disallow all analogies in which the motivations for abuse differ, we 
would be left with few or none available. Zamir himself continues to use such analogies, 
comparing speciesism to slavery and involuntary prostitution at several points in the 
book.  
 Zamir neglects specificity in his analogy between the meat industry and child 
prostitution. Like PETA’s Holocaust analogy, it uses sensationalism to generate 
empathy. Zamir argues that though one vegetarian will not impact the meat industry, we 
should still stop eating meat because we do not want to endorse it, just like we refrain 
from endorsing child prostitution even though the industry survives without us. As with 
the Holocaust analogy, this makes some sense as a critique of complicity. However, like 
the Holocaust analogy, it ignores the circumstances that make child prostitution possible 
(e.g. poverty, patriarchy, ethnic discrimination) which differ from those behind the meat 
industry. If the Holocaust analogy is invalid and unethical, so is this one. Jews were not 
killed for soap and which children end up in brothels is likewise informed by factors 
outside of their use for others such as intersections of racism, classism, and sexism. 
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Zamir makes his analogies between animal and child abuse too cavalierly, but it 
differs from PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” because he is primarily making a 
comparison between perpetrators (rapists and meat eaters) rather than victims (children 
and animals). This approach puts his analogy in the same category as Costello’s lecture. 
Although the comparison of perpetrators is less likely to invoke the dehumanizing 
stereotypes of victims of the original atrocity, it is also important to acknowledge the 
motivations of the perpetrators so that the audience understands what, exactly, is being 
compared. PETA president Newkirk came close to doing so in her apology for the 
campaign. 
Newkirk apologized on Holocaust Remembrance day in May 2005, and all 
evidence of the campaign has been removed from PETA’s website. Newkirk emailed her 
lengthy apology to several Jewish news outlets and defended the reasoning behind the 
campaign while, at the same time, admitting its emotional irresponsibility. She wrote, 
“The differences cannot be translated or reduced to a metaphor, particularly for the 
victims and survivors who still bear physical and emotional scars of persecution and for 
the Jewish community still so horribly vulnerable to continued acts of anti-Semitism.” 
Although Newkirk does not specify these differences and continues to support the 
analogy between Nazi and speciesist mindsets, her apology does show evidence of 
rhetorical listening to those offended by the campaign. It also recognizes that 
metaphorical, rather than metonymic, identification can unfairly reduce differences.  
In her apology, Newkirk continues to draw attention to the “might makes right” 
perpetrator mind-set PETA spokespeople referenced in 2003. However, she does so in a 
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considerate tone, indicating that though she and PETA understand both the Holocaust 
and factory farming in this way, she is not at present focused on convincing her audience 
to agree. She writes, “to our minds, both systems are hideous and devastating. We 
understand both systems to be based in a moral equation indicating that ‘might makes 
right’ and premised on a conception of other cultures or other species as deficient and 
thus disposable.” Newkirk’s identification between perpetrators’ mind-sets in the 
apology, in contrast to the identification between human and animal suffering made in 
the visual campaign, limits the Holocaust analogy. By focusing on the danger of “might 
makes right,” the apology can accommodate both PETA’s belief that human uniqueness 
is illusory and the belief espoused by the ADL that humans are significantly unique from 
other animals.  
Survivor Agency and Historical Specificity in Analogies to Colonialism, Slavery, 
and Racism 
Holocaust analogies are not always as poorly received as Costello’s and PETA’s. 
For example, Bradshaw compares captive elephants to concentration camp prisoners and 
kapos in Elephants on the Edge, a nonfiction book that attempts to convince both 
popular and academic audiences that elephants have experienced trauma at the hands of 
abusive humans and as a result of human encroachments on land where wild elephants 
range. Though many reviewers mention her Holocaust analogies, they do not criticize 
them.20 Few, however, acknowledged her comparisons of elephants to colonized African 
people. Helena Feder mentioned both uses. Feder states that “elephant violence is 
                                               
20 Reviewers who note Bradshaw’s use of the Holocaust are Elizabeth Cowles and Scott Runkle, John M. 
Kistler, Lynette A. Hart, and Ronald Baenninger. 
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another form of resistance to colonial oppression” because Bradshaw characterizes 
elephant-inflicted damage to human’s houses, crops, and bodies as an intentional attack 
on human privilege (441). Feder also quotes a passage in which Bradshaw compares 
elephants to black South Africans, but does suggest the comparison may be difficult to 
support or offensive to some readers. In contrast, she states that Bradshaw’s use of 
testimony from Holocaust survivors may be perceived as “controversial” (441). Perhaps 
the comparisons to the Holocaust stand out more to reviewers because of its prominent 
place in Western collective memory. That there is a long history of slavery analogies in 
animal advocacy may also make the comparisons of elephants and Africans less 
shocking to readers (Kim 314), especially when these comparisons focus on survivor 
agency rather than the degrading experiences of victims.21  
One of the strengths of Bradshaw’s analogy is that she acknowledges the agency 
of colonized people. Analogies with farm animals do not typically mention the 
innumerable ways Jews in Nazi Germany or enslaved people (and those who escaped) 
resisted because such species do not exert many of these forms of agency. In contrast, 
Bradshaw makes much of elephants’ ability to resist oppression in ways that indicate 
that both individual elephants and their cultures are sophisticated. The most developed 
analogy in Bradshaw’s book comes from elephant ethologist Eve Lawino Abe.  
Abe uses human suffering to illuminate elephant suffering without diminishing 
the severity of human rights abuses in Uganda. She compares elephants in Uganda to 
                                               
21 The slavery analogy also appears in environmental rhetoric. Murray Bookchin argues that, “the very 
notion of the domination of nature by man stems from the very real domination of human by human” and 
discusses slavery in The Ecology of Freedom (65). In “The Land Ethic,” Aldo Leopold compares the way 
we currently treat to the land to the way Greeks treated their slaves, as property.  
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Acholi people, who mostly live in the Northern part of the country, and have suffered 
under the forced displacement policies of the Ugandan government and the violent 
actions of the Lord’s Resistance Army.22 Abe makes this analogy in her academic 
research and her activist efforts to build a community center that benefits Acholi and 
elephants (Siebert). Bradshaw, a psychologist who argues that elephants can experience 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, praises Abe’s research. Abe’s dissertation title, “The 
Behavioural Ecology of Elephant Survivors in Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP), 
Uganda,” indicates her own interest in elephant trauma and how it is similar to that of 
Ugandans. As Bradshaw explains, the term survivor is a deviation from the objective 
language preferred in Abe’s discipline. She states that the word “implies agency, 
selfhood, and righteousness” and “is most commonly associated with human traumas: 
the European Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, the systematic elimination and 
subjugation of American Indians, and other iconic atrocities of the past centuries” 
(Bradshaw 55). This word, therefore, denotes that elephants have a culture that is 
disrupted when many of the older generations die (Bradshaw 55). It implies agency and, 
therefore, a stronger possibility for healing. 
Abe argues that Acholi and other Ugandans’ fate is linked to that of the 
elephants, so they should work to coexist with them rather than compete with and poach 
them. Abe’s focus on the Acholi as a whole—past, present, and future—differs from 
                                               
22 David Sangokoya describes how, after the overthrow of Idi Amin, the Ugandan national army was 
majority Acholi. The National Resistance Army, a rebel force that formed in 1981, took power in 1986 
and then attacked Acholi civilians. In 1986, the Ugandan government began putting Acholi districts under 
a policy of “forced displacement,” interning Acholi in camps, with 1.7 million people displaced at its peak. 
Ostensibly, the camps were made due to the violent insurgency of the Lords Resistance Army, but, as most 
of the Acholi refused to cooperate with the LRA, it is assumed the policy was meant to oppress civilians.  
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PETA’s limited focus on concentration camp victims. PETA’s presentation of the 
Holocaust—as an event that has been tidily wrapped up into an archetype—implies that 
anti-Semitism is no longer a relevant concern (Kim 326). In contrast, Abe is aware of a 
range of human suffering in Uganda, which she presents as an on-going struggle. She 
displays rhetorical listening to the Acholi because the elephant is respected by them. Abe 
calls it their “totem,” so her analogy builds on one that is already in place in Acholi 
culture (qtd. in Bradshaw 54).  
In contrast, PETA’s analogy to farm animals is not strongly based in Jewish 
culture. Whereas Abe’s analogy is contextually grounded by a shared history and 
geography, PETA’s analogy depends on the belief that the “might makes right” mind set 
is contextually relevant to both the Holocaust and factory farming. While this connection 
may seem like a strong one to some animal rights activists, it can appear tenuous to other 
audiences. Moreover, PETA’s analogy can more easily read as offensive as chickens and 
pigs are considered less flattering animals for a comparison than elephants, who may be 
considered “charismatic megafauna.”23 That the particular species of nonhumans 
domesticated for farm use are not valued is a large part of PETA’s point, as the 
Holocaust analogy is meant to show viewers that devaluing someone is morally wrong 
and leads to atrocities. However, PETA’s attempt to reframe our relationship to farm 
animals backfired when viewers became angry that the campaign reiterated the 
dehumanizing discourse used in Nazi rhetoric and therefore refused to follow PETA to 
the conclusion of their argument, that discriminating against animals is likewise wrong. 
                                               
23 Welling uses this term to describe animals whose images are popular in conservationist materials and 
questions the efficacy of this “obsession with visuality” (63). 
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Abe does not need to reframe how elephants are seen in Acholi culture. Rather, she 
strives to remind Acholi of these traditions and convince them to continue to value 
elephants even when the Acholi themselves are suffering, as well as bring attention to 
the plights of both the Acholi and elephants to the West. 
Abe creates identification between Acholi and elephants by explaining that the 
fates of these people and the elephants are not only similar in appearance, but are also 
derived from similar causes. Both groups have been subject to discourses of 
marginalization and are suffering from humans’ disregard of the ecological impacts of 
their actions. Moreover, both groups have also experienced the same acts of violence in 
the area such as the 1978-79 war when Acholi rebels joined Tanzanian forces to 
overthrow Idi Amin, and soldiers on both sides poached elephants, or the human rights 
abuses committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, which also poaches elephants.  
In an interview with Milton Allimadi for Black Star News, Abe further creates 
identification between Acholi and elephants when she states that “Acholi people and 
elephants share common cultural customs and ethics.” She explains how the loss of 
elders, particularly matriarchs, has negatively affected both elephants and humans: 
The role of matriarch is of major importance in the success of a family unit. 
Families composed of young, less experienced cows have difficulty finding food 
and water during times of stress and are less successful at rearing their calves 
than older cows are. . . Amongst Acholi people, with the elimination of the 
matriarchs, young, inexperienced girls became mothers and lack the skill to look 
after families. (6) 
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Abe also compares human male orphans to elephant ones in another interview when she 
explains to Charles Siebert that the humans “form these roaming, violent, destructive 
bands. It’s the same thing that happens with the elephants. Just like the male war 
orphans, they are wild, completely lost” (6). By acknowledging elephant violence, Abe 
displays evidence of rhetorical listening to Acholi who have come into conflict with the 
animals. However, both of these analogies “humanize” the elephants by 
anthropomorphizing them—as well-intentioned, but inept girls and traumatized boys—
which presents their violence against humans sympathetically. 
Abe also limits her identification between Acholi and elephants by describing 
Acholi violence toward the animals. She tells Siebert that during the war with Tanzania, 
soldiers on both sides engaged in poaching that reduced the elephant population of 4,000 
individuals to only 150. She claims the armies were not only at war with each other, but 
also engaged in “war” with elephants (6). She states, “They’d just throw hand grenades 
at the elephants, bring whole families down and cut out the ivory. I call that mass 
destruction” (6). Her use of the pronoun “they” lumps both Acholis and their oppressors 
on the same side, against the elephants, and the phrase “mass destruction” further 
implies the elephants are victims of war. 
Acknowledging differences between the Acholi and elephants is politically 
productive for Abe because it enables her to explain what each group needs to survive. 
When Allimadi asks Abe about solutions to human-elephant conflict in Uganda, she 
states that “Future generations need to learn to live with elephants. This means re-
learning how the Acholi people used to live with elephants and which is congruent with 
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Acholi culture. Human and elephant recovery are linked. One cannot occur without the 
other. Elephants, like Acholi people, need to live in peace without constant fear—in 
order to raise families in stable communities and in expansive habitat.” Though Abe 
believes both groups value the same things, she places the responsibility for the change 
on the Acholi, not the elephants. By acknowledging that humans have more flexibility 
and power in some ways, she is able to identify changes they can make in order to co-
exist with elephants rather than kill or remove them. 
Abe also recognizes one way in which the elephants are more privileged than the 
Acholi: their visibility in Western media. Instead of expressing resentment towards the 
West or elephants, she uses the animals to draw attention to human suffering and call for 
justice for the Acholi. Abe establishes a familial identification between the two groups 
when she states “The majestic mammal is an endangered species like its kin the Acholi 
people,” and continues, “It was only after the elephant massacres, over several decades, 
taken to Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species of fauna and flora 
that it drew attention of world community. The massacre of Acholi people should also be 
taken to an equally high body—the United Nations. The same community can act and 
stop the decimation of Acholi people” (Allimadi). She then suggests things the UN 
needs to do to help stop this destruction, and most involve strengthening the relationship 
between Acholi and elephants. After she claims that state sovereignty should be 
deprivileged so the UN can intervene in Uganda, she also says that the sale of ivory 
should be halted until the futures of both people and elephants are secure, children 
should be taught “traditional ways that respect and are congruent with the land,” and 
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everything that can be done “to prevent further violence and trauma” should be done 
(Allimadi). 
Whereas PETA chose to compare animals to a well-known example of abused 
humans in order to incite both controversy and sympathy, Abe selects a lesser-known 
example of human suffering. In the West, the forced displacement of the Acholi is less 
culturally “sacred” than the Holocaust and makes for a less provocative analogy. 
However Abe’s analogy is not more ethical than PETA’s because she chose a group of 
humans whose suffering is not highly valued by the West. Rather, her analogy works 
because it displays rhetorical listening and limits identification. 
 Bradshaw extends the limits of Abe’s analogy to cover all elephants and 
colonized human cultures in general (71). However, she does maintain a focus on agency 
and gives some attention to context. The one exception is her comparison of African-
Americans to elephants, which appears at the end of the book, is not as clearly 
supported. While the analogy between human and elephant occupants of an area can 
legitimately describe how their actions can have detrimental effects on both themselves 
and the other group, this analogy suffers from that lack of specificity. When she states 
that African-American families are matriarchal and have several strong female 
caretakers, like elephant allomothers, she means this as a compliment. However, it also 
essentializes African-American families, ignores the socioeconomic reasons that make 
the nuclear family a less accessible option for some of these families, and naturalizes this 
cultural phenomenon.  
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 Yet, the analogy focuses on the agency and care practiced in those families, 
which makes it less exploitative than PETA’s analogy between African Americans and 
nonhuman animals in the “Are Animals the New Slaves?” iteration of their “Animal 
Liberation Project.” That campaign failed at rhetorical listening because, like “Holocaust 
on Your Plate,” it also ignored perpetrator motivation and survivor agency. Despite 
Newkirk’s seemingly new perspective about what style of campaign is appropriative and 
hurtful in her May 2005 apology, PETA unveiled this visually similar exhibition three 
months later. “Are Animals the New Slaves?,” begun in July, featured twelve panels that 
juxtaposed images of American blacks experiencing racist violence during and after 
slavery with modern day uses of nonhumans for food, research, and entertainment. The 
panels contain quotations from civil rights leaders, notably King’s “Injustice anywhere is 
a threat to justice everywhere” (Brune). Like “Holocaust on Your Plate,” the campaign 
was suspended and removed from PETA’s website. However, unlike “Holocaust on 
Your Plate,” images of it have not been preserved in other online publications. While I 
cannot therefore perform an analysis of the visual details of “Are Animals the New 
Slaves?,” the choice of images means the exhibit focused on identifications between 
human and nonhuman victims rather than emphasizing similarities between perpetrators’ 
“might makes right” mind-sets. 
When the NAACP objected to the exhibit, Newkirk spoke in support of it: “I 
would fail in my duty if I allowed this exhibit to disappear from sight because of anger 
on the part of those who cannot or will not look beyond their own pain to the pain of 
others who need help today” (Brune). In a matter of months, Newkirk states that those 
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who cannot look past their pain about the Holocaust should have that pain respected and 
also claims that those who cannot look past their pain about slavery and subsequent 
generations of racially motivated violence should not. This inconsistency makes the 
apology to those offended by “Holocaust on Your Plate” appear insincere or indicates 
that PETA does not believe Blacks suffer(ed) as much as Jews do/did from racism, does 
not value their suffering as much, or some combination of these possibilities.  
PETA may also have continued with the “Are Animals the New Slaves?” 
campaign because they expected it to face less opposition regardless of its racist 
appropriations of suffering. Rothberg opens Multidirectional Memory with Walter Benn 
Michaels’s response to Khalid Muhammad’s criticism of the Washington D.C. 
Holocaust Museum. Muhammad is angered that the nation ignores slavery, and Michaels 
shares his belief that the Holocaust museum further obscures American racism in the 
nation’s public memory (1-2). While Muhammad’s criticism is based in anti-Semitism 
(Rothberg 2), the Holocaust does seem to have a more prominent place in public 
memory. The Orlando Sentinel notes that “a survey of media outlets shows less outrage 
about the ‘Animal Liberation Project’ than 2003’s ‘Holocaust on Your Plate’ campaign” 
(Brune). PETA may have assumed that, although many non-Jewish Americans were 
outraged by the Holocaust campaign, outrage over this one would be largely limited to 
the black community and receive less press. While the response was smaller, PETA still 
put the campaign on hold in mid-August after it sparked a protest in New Haven. 
Though the campaign was temporarily resumed on the West Coast, it was ultimately 
pulled.  
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A more generous interpretation is that perhaps Newkirk and PETA felt the 
slavery analogy was justified because the motivations of perpetrators were based on the 
instrumental use of their victims rather than their annihilation. That is, although, as 
Zamir states “Jews were not killed to produce soap” (47), black people were ostensibly 
enslaved for their labor. However, as with Zamir’s prostitution analogy, this position 
disregards the complex historical context behind who was enslaved and why. 
Kalechofsky’s point that Holocaust/factory farming analogies are flawed because they 
ignore the role degradation played in Nazi policies could also be made when discussing 
slavery and subsequent acts of racism in the United States. Moreover, the position that 
the slavery analogy is acceptable because both groups were exploited shows a failure of 
listening on the part of PETA because this historical exploitation of black people is 
exactly why PETA’s appropriation of that history upsets some viewers. As Scott X. 
Esdaile, president of the Greater New Haven NAACP, said to reporter Dana Williams, 
“Once again, black people are being pimped. You used us. You have used us enough.” 
Thus, the very quality that might make this analogy seem more acceptable to PETA than 
“Holocaust on Your Plate” is what makes it offensive to some viewers. 
That Esdaile uses language that analogizes the experience of black people with 
prostitutes indicates how common analogies of oppressions are. Like Zamir, Esdaile 
wants to exclude one group of people from analogies, but has no problem using another 
group—in fact, one of the same groups Zamir uses. However, like the slavery analogy, 
the prostitution analogy also exploits an already exploited group of people, those who 
have been forced into sex work. Despite the efforts of sex worker activists to engage in 
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media advocacy, this particular group of exploited workers has little recourse to voice 
objections to such analogies published in local and national media. A critique of 
“Holocaust on Your Plate” is important because PETA’s exhibit is part of a widespread 
use of analogies that engage in appropriation to highlight another’s suffering. While the 
use of the Holocaust in this way tends to elicit more media outrage (as Brune notes, 
fewer objected to “Animals Are the New Slaves?” than “Holocaust on Your Plate”), 
these other acts of appropriation should not be ignored. 
What the relative timing of Newkirk’s apology and “Are Animals the New 
Slaves?” indicates is that, even though one may decide to practice rhetorical listening to 
one group, this is not sufficient. PETA speaks on behalf of a marginalized group, factory 
farm animals, and practices rhetorical listening to these animals through their research 
on farm conditions, but, like Esdaile, also needs to consider the groups they are using to 
make their arguments. Rather, rhetorical listening must be a consistent and conscious 
practice when making any attempt at identification, especially when one is making an 
analogy to a marginalized group. Abe’s thoughtful analogies between elephants and 
Acholi people are such an example. Though Abe, who completed her doctorate at 
Cambridge, is more privileged than most other Acholis, she considers their needs and 
desires at the same time that she voices her concern for elephants.  
 Likewise, Esdaile’s response indicates that even when one is part of a 
marginalized group, rhetorical listening is still important. Though no one expressed 
public outrage at Esdaile’s appropriation of the suffering experienced by individuals 
forced into prostitution, he makes the same misstep that PETA does. PETA and Esdaile 
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are concerned with the suffering of one group (abused animals and African Americans 
from slavery to the present) to the exclusion of others’ suffering. Considering the abuse 
and suffering of other groups does not mean that one must present one’s favored cause 
as less important. Instead, this listening can enable one to make the analogy in a more 
limited, thoughtful way. 
The campaign is discussed by multiple writers in the Sistah Vegan anthology 
who are concerned with oppressions of both African Americans and farm animals. 
Editor Breeze Harper sees similarities between the experiences of black people, women, 
and nonhumans. However, rather than claiming whether the campaign is “right or 
wrong,” Harper considers PETA’s motivations and the reasons for viewers’ negative 
reactions. She notes that at least one woman of color was involved in the campaign and 
that similar comparisons have been made by Spiegel and Patterson. In an essay later in 
the book, she concludes that the message that “eco-sustainability, nonhuman animal 
rights, plant-based diets, and human rights are inextricably linked” is right, but the usual 
ways in which it is conveyed are not. She writes, “ it has been the tone and delivery of 
the message—via the white, class-privileged perspective—that has been offensive to a 
majority of people of color and working-class people in America” (20). PETA’s tone in 
its “analogy” campaigns is often too authoritative, presenting its analogies as truth rather 
than its own interpretation of the world.  
Later iterations of the “Animal Liberation Project” seem to be more limited. In 
2009 PETA again set up panels that compare images of human and nonhuman suffering 
(Flavell, Rodriguez). These panels are different than the “Holocaust on Your Plate” ones 
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because the images are separated rather than juxtaposed. The captions provide 
contextual information about the different images and the space visually separates the 
acts of violence, rather than simply equating them. The exhibit shows that rhetorical 
listening and limited identification can be practiced in this medium and do not have to be 
confined to lengthy, verbal works such as Patterson’s or Spiegel’s.  
 This version of the campaign has received less press than “Holocaust on Your 
Plate” and “Are Animals the New Slaves?” though it is unclear if that is because its 
performance of rhetorical listening incites less outrage, because it does not invoke the 
Holocaust, or because its public presence has been relatively small. The project’s main 
presence is at the website for PETA2, PETA’s youth division, which means that visitors 
already have an interest in PETA’s cause.  The site is framed as a “virtual museum,” a 
characterization that lends importance to animal suffering and implies that the exhibits 
within will be educational, providing context that encourages viewers to think about the 
display rather than relying solely on emotional impact. The door to the “main gallery” 
states “this exhibit looks back at history to show how we justified the abuse of humans 
in the past and continue to justify the abuse of animals today.”  This idea is explained in 
the museum, but not deeply in the main gallery. Rather, the gallery’s intent is to create 
sympathy for nonhuman suffering by displaying it and introducing an abolitionist 
message through the comparison.  
The main gallery pairs images of suffering, but they appear as individually 
framed photos on a museum wall and are not directly juxtaposed. Of the eight pairs, 
three depict African Americans: white men brand an enslaved woman; white police beat 
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a black civil rights demonstrator; and two doctors, white and black, inspect a subject of 
the Tuskegee experiment. While African Americans are the only group who appear in 
multiple images, these images all provide visual evidence of who the perpetrators are, 
which avoids one misstep of “Holocaust on Your Plate.” The website users can enlarge 
“plaques” under each image to read the captions. These provide historical context, 
though it should be noted that this context is minimal. Each caption is about two 
sentences and focuses more on the bodily experience of suffering than the context of the 
violence. For example, the Tuskegee caption does not mention race.  
Users can also choose to enlarge the photographs or not. This ability to interact 
with the text provides the user with more agency than the versions of the campaigns set 
up in physical public locations. While those viewers could approach the panels in any 
order, leave the exhibit at any time, and ask questions of PETA’s staffers, the website 
users have more direct control over their interactions with the museum. Barbara Warnick 
explains, “New media theorists characterize the user as a vital element in the creation of 
meaning and the experience because the user creates the text and experiences it as 
appropriated and altered by means of his or her perception” (30). This is certainly true of 
the “Liberation Project’s” virtual museum because users traverse its “rooms” nonlinearly 
and in as much or little detail as they desire or as is accessible to them. 
While users take an active role in authoring their experience of the website, this 
does not necessarily mean authorial agency is decreased (Brooke 79). Users can 
“wander” away from the main gallery while still remaining within the confines of the 
“Liberation Project” campaign or click links to other areas of PETA2’s site. The 
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museum itself includes a “torture chamber,” “library,” “film gallery,” and a “gift shop” 
with free, downloadable pamphlets, web banners, and other digital materials that 
criticize speciesism and “might makes right” mindsets. These modes of communication 
might be more appealing to users than the main gallery. For example, the torture 
chamber relies on the analogy strategy, but the explicit analogy is between tools of 
oppression, not oppressed groups themselves. In one pairing, chicken shackles are 
compared to restraints used on prisoners. This technique limits identification between 
human and animal victims. It also can avoid charges of “publicity stunt” as it does not 
contain graphic images of suffering. There are no photographs of abused humans and 
other animals and even the “torture implements” are semi-realistic illustrations rather 
than photographs. 
No images in the torture chamber or main gallery include the Holocaust, though 
whether this is because PETA respects the pain or fears the outrage it would cause is 
unclear. After all, the main gallery contains an image of corpses from the Cambodian 
genocide analogized with pig corpses. Two columnists specifically objected to a similar 
pairing in “Holocaust on Your Plate,” but no one has complained about the use of the 
Cambodian genocide (Smith, Lynne). The other images show child laborers for the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company, an African girl being circumcised, women in a 20th 
century textile mill, and the hand of an Iranian imprisoned in an Iraqi jail. By using 
images of human suffering that cover a range of historical and contemporary situations, 
the site manages not to equate any one group of notoriously dehumanized people to 
animals. Whereas Patterson and Spiegel’s book-length analogies have been commended 
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for their attention to context, I argue that the breadth of this campaign compensates for 
the lack of depth in its contextual analysis by showing the analogy is limited. 
The diversity of the comparisons provokes viewers to ask “what do all of these 
abuses of humans have in common with one another?” as well as “what do they have in 
common with the way we treat nonhumans?” This diversity limits the analogy. Viewers 
know there are differences between textile mill owners and the Khmer Rouge, for 
example, and that they operated in different contexts, even if they do not know much 
about those histories. Therefore, the analogy tacitly acknowledges differences between 
human and nonhuman experiences. It instead draws attention to the “mind-set” 
explanation Newkirk described in her “Holocaust on Your Plate” apology because it 
draws connections between perpetrators while also acknowledging historical context that 
affected how “might makes right” was enacted.  
Where the campaign loses focus on the mindsets of perpetrators is the inclusion 
of female circumcision, which is compared to the castration of pigs. While the other 
examples require that one group (industrialists, white people, etc.) feel themselves 
superior to another group of people, the women who engage in this practice do it to give 
their daughters a more secure future in communities in which uncut women are not 
considered marriageable (Mackie). While cutting is a manifestation of a patriarchal 
system that seeks to control women’s sexuality (Althaus), the women who perform 
cuttings differ from those who castrate pigs as part of their job because the women do 
not deem the girls essentially inferior to themselves and do nothing to them that they 
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would not want done to their own daughter.24 Moreover, though cutting is a painful 
process that can have dangerous side effects, PETA’s statement that “in most cases, the 
procedure is performed by elderly women with no medical training” is misleadingly 
critical. It is true these women do not have Western medical training and therefore 
sometimes perform the ritual under unsanitary conditions; however, those who usually 
perform the cutting are chosen because they have training from previous generations of 
“elderly women” and their own years of experience (Mackie).  
Despite the damage this ignorance of context does to PETA’s mind-set analogy, 
other aspects of the analogy are developed in more depth in the museum “library.” It 
provides more contextual information about how people justified cruelty and parallels 
several quotations supporting slavery, Nazism, and eugenics with ones in favor of 
factory farming. The “film gallery” also explicitly makes an analogy of mindsets across 
perpetrators. In “Liberation (Long Version),” three young adults define speciesism and 
explain that people once thought the exploitation of other humans was integral to the 
economy, etc. This analogy is developed most fully in the “gift shop” by a leaflet that 
concisely lays out PETA’s argument. It states “What do so many atrocities in our 
society’s past—and present—have in common? They are caused by the dangerous belief 
that might makes right. Whether it stems from greed, convenience, or hatred, this 
supremacist attitude has caused people to tolerate, perpetuate, and justify outrageously 
                                               
24 The work done by the organization Tostan indicates how little their motivation has in common with that 
of farms. When some Senegalese women decided cutting was detrimental to women’s health, they 
implemented a pledge system to great effect. Women in hundreds of communities that intermarry decide 
to pledge not only to stop circumcising their daughters, but also to encourage their sons to marry 
uncircumcised women, thereby ensuring these girls will have the opportunity for a secure future (Tostan). 
There is no analogical solution to end the castration of pigs.  
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cruel acts toward those viewed as ‘inferior’ or ‘expendable’” (PETA2, Liberation is 
Here). 
Though the leaflet contains some of the image pairs from the main gallery, its 
words do not explicitly compare any one human atrocity to our use of animals. Instead, it 
compares nonhumans to nonhumans to explain speciesism. The leaflet states that “dogs 
and pigs have the same capacity to feel pain, but it is prejudice based on species that 
allows us to think of one animal as a companion and the other as dinner.” This less 
emotionally charged analogy results in a non-accusatory tone and tacitly accepts a level 
of speciesism in the readers. That is, readers are able to consider humans more important 
than nonhumans because, for example, the leaflet does not ask readers to directly 
compare the number of people killed during the Holocaust with the number of animals 
killed in slaughterhouses. It concludes by politely asking the reader to “please consider 
vegetarianism” (PETA2, Liberation is Here). This shift in tone, away from accusing 
one’s audience of Nazi-level atrocities, keeps the dialogue open. While the prescriptive 
form of Godwin’s law is illogical and inconsiderate because it wrongly privileges the 
Holocaust above other organized mass killings, it is often an accurate depiction of an 
audience’s response. Once one side makes a Holocaust analogy, others assume they have 
“lost” the argument because the analogy is assumed to be fallacious. Therefore, the 
conversation either shuts down or ceases to involve listening. The tone of the leaflet and 
the website as a whole indicates PETA2’s willingness to listen because they limit 
analogies and provide context, which encourages more listening in its audience. 
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Another potential positive result of the website is that it draws attention to less 
publicized human suffering, such as the Cambodian genocides or child labor in U.S. 
history that PETA2’s target audience of adolescents might not know much about. True, 
PETA’s only motivation for using these events may be that those victims have fewer 
people to get offended on their behalf than Holocaust victims have. However, the result 
is a more diverse public memory among its viewers. Instead of merely using the 
Holocaust or slavery to draw attention to factory farming, this campaign has factory 
farming and human atrocities bringing attention to each other.  
Sisters and Sistahs: Rhetorical Listening in Collections by Women Writers 
Carol J. Adams similarly draws attention to objectification of both women and 
nonhumans in The Sexual Politics of Meat. She describes associations between meat 
eating and whiteness and masculinity. One of the most popularly mentioned topics of the 
book is her feminist analysis of meat advertising. As readers started mailing Adams 
examples of the sexualization of both women and nonhumans in advertisements, she 
compiled The Sexual Politics of Meat Slideshow which she continues to present today. 
Though Adams’s work discusses a range of oppressions, her focus is patriarchal 
devaluing of women and this is the theme that is picked up the most often by reviewers. 
Adams writes  “the coherence [meat] achieves as a meaningful item of food arises from 
patriarchal attitudes including the idea that the end justifies the means, that the 
objectification of other beings is a necessary part of life, and that violence can and 
should be masked. These are all a part of the sexual politics of meat” (14). Though the 
writers in Sister Species and Sistah Vegan do not identify patriarchy as the root of these 
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attitudes, their essays unmask violence and question the means and the necessity of 
objectification.  
A strength of these two books is that both are collections, and the inclusion of 
multiple authors helps encourage rhetorical listening, particularly metonymic thinking, 
in the reader. Though, for example, “Black-identified female vegans” is a small group, 
the twenty-five who contributed to Sistah Vegan came to veganism from a variety of 
paths and have diverse understandings of what veganism means in their own life and 
what it can mean for Black women and others. Some Sistah Vegan writers do not 
address nonhumans at all because they are more concerned about the relationship 
between race, diet, and health. A few of the contributors from Sistah Vegan also have 
pieces in Sister Species, which contains fourteen essays by women who work for animal 
justice in various capacities.  As in Sistah Vegan, the diversity of the writers encourages 
rhetorical listening. Both abolitionists and welfarists are represented as some women 
advocate for better conditions for farm animals, while others wish to do away with the 
practice altogether. While some have made a career of animal advocacy, others are 
involved as one aspect of their work or through volunteerism.  
The Sistah Vegan project itself was inspired by an act of rhetorical listening. 
Harper “eavesdropped” on a conversation on BlackPlanet.com about PETA’s use of 
images of slavery and civil rights abuses. Ratcliffe defines eavesdropping as “a 
rhetorical tactic of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one’s own knowing so 
as to overhear and learn from others and, I would add, from oneself” (105). Though 
Harper was familiar with the BlackPlanet discussion boards, she does not participate in 
 128 
 
the PETA discussion. Instead, she finds an outside position and, as Ratcliffe suggests, 
“grant[s] others the inside position” to learn from their responses (105). All but one of 
the forum members who commented found PETA’s campaign offensive. Harper, who 
was familiar with the slavery and Holocaust analogies made by Spiegel and Patterson, 
understood PETA was trying to critique the “master/oppressor ideology” involved in 
both the exploitation of humans and nonhumans, but also understood how the project’s 
obliviousness to sociohistorical context caused deep pain and anger in viewers (xiv).25 
Rather than assuming that the respondents simply do not care about nonhuman suffering, 
Harper deduces that their anger is a sign that “the wounds and scars” from United States’ 
racism have not been sufficiently “addressed and reconciled” (xv). 
She also listened to the point of view of Alka Chandna, a woman of color 
associated with PETA. Chandna responded to the NAACP’s criticism of PETA by 
asking people of color who have experienced racism to see the connections between 
rhetoric dismissing animal suffering based on the assumption that animals are “lesser 
beings” and racist rhetoric (qtd. in Harper xvi). Harper was inspired to find Black-
identified female vegans who “see the connections speciesism has to all the ‘isms’” 
(xvi). The women participated in online conversations with one another before 
submitting essays for the book; therefore, rhetorical listening was an important part of 
invention for Harper and the other writers. 
                                               
25 Val Plumwood critiques the “model of domination and transcendence of nature” (23). She claims that 
the linkage of humanity with rationality and masculinity combined with the positioning of this humanity in 
duality with nature “can be used to support the supposed inferiority not just of women, but also of slaves, 
people of other races and cultures (‘barbarians’) and those who perform manual as opposed to intellectual 
tasks” (47). 
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Several writers describe conversations they had with nonvegan friends, family, 
and fellow activists to stress the importance of listening to nonvegans. Harper describes 
being in the nonvegan position in college from which she resisted arguments made by 
white, wealthy, vegan students. She reflects that it was not that these students were 
wrong about the subject, but that they did not know how to convey their message to her 
effectively (35). Many of the sistah vegans are concerned with how to present veganism 
to other black people in ways that take into account the listeners’ values.  Therefore, 
many stress the health benefits of a vegan diet and its possibilities as a method of 
decolonization. 
For example, Ain Drew claims that her concerns about black health were ignored 
when she worked at PETA as the Urban Marketing Coordinator. She wanted to develop 
campaigns that would focus on diet and potentially alleviate health problems, while 
white PETA employees thought it was more important to get black people to stop 
wearing fur (63). Other writers point out the similarities between a vegan diet and 
traditional African diets. The book shows a complicated relationship to soul food, with 
some writers calling it a “slave diet” (though they do not explicitly base this claim on the 
dietary guidelines of the Nation of Islam), others critiquing only “neo soul food” as over-
processed, and some who value its associations with family and history. The relationship 
to the mainstream American diet is simpler; the belief that animal products are essential 
to health is seen as colonization because it ignores high rates of lactose intolerance in 
Blacks and Native Americans and devalues non-Western foodways.   
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While many of the writers note similarities between the treatment of black people 
in the United States and nonhumans, none make it their sole argument. Of those who 
mention it, some make direct identifications and others present the identification as 
partial and based in their own perspective. Some focus on the similarities of enslaved 
people and animals, while others focus on black people’s current position of complicity 
in the abuse of farmed animals. The intersecting oppressions of racism and sexism are 
also a recurrent concern, as Tashee Meadows shows when she writes that, as she read 
The Dreaded Comparison, Animal Liberation, and other texts, “I thought of my ancestry 
as a Black woman: the rapes, unwanted pregnancies, captivity, stolen babies, grieving 
mothers, horrific transports, and the physical, mental, and spiritual pain of chattel 
slavery” (151). Patrice Jones uses Meadows’s essay to support her criticism of PETA’s 
2005 slavery focused version of the “Animal Liberation Project” in the afterword. She 
states that “I hope that this anthology teaches animal advocates not that they ought to be 
trying to provoke such reactions [as Meadows experienced] but rather that they can trust 
that people are going to make the connections that are most meaningful to them without 
special prompting. Tashee Meadows didn’t need to be shown pictures of slave transport 
ships or people in prison to perceive the parallels” (196).  
However, according to Meadows’s own narrative, it seems she did see pictures of 
these ships paired with images from factory farming before she came to her conclusion 
that farm animals suffer like enslaved people because she does not mention considering 
this analogy until after she read Spiegel’s The Dreaded Comparison (151). Spiegel’s 
chapter “Transportation, or the Unbearable Journey” places an illustrated floor plan of a 
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ship’s slave hold on the same page as a photograph of a “silo”-type egg factory (53). The 
book contains many other visual and verbal comparisons between slavery and factory 
farming and laboratory testing. In fact, PETA appears to have used material from 
Spiegel’s book in its “Are Animals the New Slaves?” campaign because Spiegel sued 
them for copyright infringement (Goldstein). Of course, people do not have to be shown 
paired images of suffering to draw this parallel, but that does not mean the analogy can 
never be presented by animal advocates.  
While the ADL called Eternal Treblinka “offensive,” “ridiculous,” and “absurd” 
in a short article for their website, both this book and The Dreaded Comparison have in 
general received a more positive reception than “Holocaust on Your Plate.” Jason 
Edward Black praises Patterson’s attention to detail (84) and many of the sistah vegans 
praise Spiegel’s book, for which Alice Walker wrote a foreword.  Much of this has to do 
with the texts’ accessibility. Eternal Treblinka was published by Latern Books, a 
relatively small press with a focus on vegetarianism and The Dreaded Comparison was 
published by a nonprofit Spiegel founded, the Institute for the Development of Earth 
Awareness (IDEA). Therefore, the books were not directly targeted to the general public, 
as “Holocaust on your Plate” was, but to more sympathetic audiences. The works also 
made nuanced analogies. Rather than conflating Holocaust victims and factory farmed 
animals, the books detailed similarities in the technologies of violence. While both 
authors point out similarities in perpetrator mindsets, they do not rely on this point alone. 
Patterson also describes how American slaughterhouse technology was incorporated into 
Nazi death camps, and Spiegel identifies overlaps between the technology used to 
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control enslaved people and instrumentalized animals. In contrast, PETA’s campaigns 
relied on decontextualized images and quotations. The problem is not that they made the 
analogy, but they did so without legitimately considering how other people would feel 
about it, and they forced identification at the expense of context.  
Tara Sophia Bahna-James is particularly interested in hearing others’ 
perspectives over forcing identification in Sistah Vegan. She describes listening to Black 
female nonvegan acquaintances. She can understand why the analogies to slavery 
alienate them from animal rights activism and why they do not want to give up meat 
eating and wearing animal products because these behaviors are linked to material 
wealth. She does not feel the need to convert them and does not worry that she will be 
weakened in her veganism if she listens to their opinions (162). Bahna-James also seeks 
to understand why people get fanatical and determines that this is detrimental to their 
cause:  
when . . . a person realizes . . . there is blood on his hands, he is tempted to 
distance his awakened self from his former meat-eating self and from all whose 
actions remind him of his former ones . . . But when our own conversion eclipses 
our appreciation for others and their own narratives (even narratives we have 
come to associate with the behavior of an oppressor), it is desperate. And there is 
a reason desperation is suspicious. It is always too personal. (165) 
When being too personal, one does not take the person/people they are talking to into 
consideration, a failure of rhetorical listening. Therefore, one’s points are less likely to 
be appreciated by this audience that may feel alienated. Harper’s dismissive reaction to 
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the vegans she met in college and Drew’s frustration with her PETA co-workers who 
focused on the fur industry rather than the health issues she deemed more important are 
examples of the ways people may reject an argument they deem “too personal” to the 
speaker and irrelevant to them.  
In Sister Species, Pattrice Jones makes a point about fanaticism that is similar to 
Bahna-James’s:   
After we make a radical change in thought or behavior, we have a tendency to 
distance our new selves from our previous selves. That’s understandable, but not 
useful. If we can’t remember—much less have empathy with—our former ways 
of thinking and feeling, how can we make meaningful contact with those who 
still think and feel as we used to do? And, if we can’t make contact, how can we 
prompt others to rethink what feel to them like intensely personal choices? (47) 
Bahna-James says it is important to “appreciate” others’ narratives, and Jones stresses 
empathy with our own former selves as a way to find connections with people with 
whom we now disagree. Similarly, Sister Species contributor Miyun Park looks for 
identification with people who have varied attitudes towards animal well-being. She 
explains, “There is no us-versus-them when it comes to collaborating to reduce suffering 
. . . With every meeting and every lecture, I have just one goal: to find common ground 
on which we can stand, together, to improve the lives of farmed animals” (84).  
The phrase “common ground” evokes Burkean consubstantiality because it is a 
place that is created by people to join them in a larger purpose. Park objects to treating 
animals like “widgets in a factory,” but is not trying to immediately abolish factory 
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farming. Like another contributor, Twyla Francois, Park’s goal is to reduce the suffering 
of farmed animals. Because she believes that “there isn’t one answer” to this problem, 
she is able to be open to input from a variety of stakeholders, be they “animal advocates, 
scientists, consumers, legislators, corporate decision-makers, farmers, veterinarians, or 
vegans” (84). While these groups have different interests in factory-farming, they also 
have different abilities to change it.  
Park’s approach to common ground recognizes differences while Newkirk’s 
essay does not. In her contribution to Sister Species, Newkirk states, “My appeal is . . . 
that we reject all classification as much as we possibly can and demand to be part of 
something bigger, members of the community of all living beings” (66). While such a 
worldview indicates why she finds the analogies made in “Holocaust on Your Plate” and 
“Are Animals the New Slaves?” unproblematic, the reaction to the campaigns has shown 
them not to be particularly effective, especially among those who identify with the 
people analogized or who are invested in human rights concerns. Newkirk again shows a 
lack of interest in listening in this essay when she states that “Women still control most 
of the kitchens of the world, and I see no reason to object to the situation because food is 
vital to life” (70). Innumerable women in academic, popular, and personal discourse 
have explained their objections to the gendered division of labor that allots large 
amounts of unpaid work to women. Because veganism is a moral necessity to Newkirk, 
when she puts the burden of vegan food service on women, she makes them responsible 
not only for men’s bodies, but also their integrity.  
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Newkirk does not make any specific analogies between nonhumans and humans 
in this essay, though she does make an allusion to the Holocaust and another to women 
in Afghanistan. However, other writers in Sister Species and Sistah Vegan do compare 
nonhumans to oppressed people and also position people, even those who experience 
discrimination, as oppressors. In Sister Species, Lauren Ornelas quotes a worker who 
escaped bondage at a chocolate factory who said to tell Westerners “they are eating my 
suffering” (157). Ornelas says, “This is exactly what a nonhuman animal might say to 
those eating parts of their bodies, and their bodily products. I stopped eating all 
chocolate” (157). While Ornelas does not dwell on how these instances of eating 
suffering differ, she also does not equate the man to a nonhuman animal when she points 
out that the worker and the animal both suffer for a human’s enjoyment. Furthermore, it 
provides an example of how consideration for nonhumans can lead to consideration for 
humans. Ornelas was already a vegetarian, and the analogy she saw made her stop eating 
products that were derived from human suffering too. This experience indicates that, as 
Ornelas says, “animal advocates will draw more people, and become part of a more 
viable movement, when we explicitly connect injustices affecting the animals—human 
and nonhuman—and the environment” (159). While this claim is contested among 
activists, such explicit connections are persuasive to some people, such as many of the 
sistah vegans who are invested in making these connections and then making them 
known. 
 The connection between diet and health is mentioned by almost all of the Sistah 
Vegan writers. Many also make connections between diet and decolonization. For 
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example, Harper compares the belief that humans need to eat protein “derived from 
enslaved nonhuman animals” to the antebellum white belief that African slavery was 
necessary (34). Mary Spears asks “How many of my ancestors/Were treated like today’s 
farm animals?/How many of us look the other way?” when farm animals are used and 
suffer (81). Both writers draw a comparison between the mind-set of white people who 
were complicit in slavery and that of people of all races, but particularly black-identified 
people because they are a central focus of the Sistah Vegan project, who are complicit in 
the instrumental use of animals. To Harper and Spears, recognizing this mindset in 
oneself and adjusting it is a practice of decolonization.  
There are fewer of these direct connections between injustices made in Sister 
Species, perhaps because the pieces for this book were collected differently. Lisa 
Kemmerer sent out a call for essays by women working for social justice for animals. 
Therefore, most of the writers argue that nonhumans deserve ethical treatment because 
of their inherent value, not because this will also benefit humans. Many of the writers in 
Sister Species seek to bring animals into humanist moral consideration through 
anthropomorphic language and empathetic descriptions of their suffering and happiness. 
Sistah Vegan writers who are concerned with animal justice also draw on these 
techniques. While these writers differ from Goodall, de Waal, and Bradshaw because 
most are concerned with farm animals rather than cognitively sophisticated elephants 
and nonhuman primates, they use similar anthropomorphizing techniques to those 
discussed in Chapter II. For example, in Sister Species, Jones describes roosters as 
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“emotional” and names one chicken Mosselle after her grandmother because of their 
similar “stubborn charm” (46).     
One of the arguments for the inherent value of nonhumans in Sister Species’s that 
raises problems for some readers based on their relationship to feminism occurs in 
Kemmerer’s appendix. Here, she argues that the sex of the animals in factory farms 
(most are female) makes their “exploitation” a feminist issue (173).  Though Kemmerer 
is right that many farmed animals are exploited according to their sex, the problem with 
the appeal to an essential, trans-species femaleness to encourage veganism is that it 
reduces the scope of the problem and its appeal. First, it devalues male farm animals 
simply because they are often killed at a younger age than female ones. Second, it 
disregards readers who are either not feminist-identified or subscribe to a non-
essentialist feminism that, though it may center on women, does not see them as 
belonging to a natural category that transcends cultural differences among humans, 
much less species differences. While the point that both female humans and nonhumans 
are in some circumstances seen as vehicles of reproduction  is one worth making to 
audiences who are interested in such connections, it  does not necessarily make factory 
farming a “critical” issue for all feminists (173). Haraway critiques feminisms based on 
essentialism as exclusionary in “A Cyborg Manifesto.” She promotes “a conscious 
coalition” that recognizes differences among members (“Cyborg” 156).  Individuals find 
affinity with one another, but their voices are not interchangeable, and no single voice 
can represent the entire group. Some of the writers in Sister Species demonstrate the 
importance of affinity by recognizing the diverse histories and motivations that led them 
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to activism. Many also describe finding affinity with nonhumans, from roosters to 
chimpanzees, by patiently observing behavior.  
However, Francois is the only writer in this anthology to explicitly acknowledge 
that speaking for animals can be a problem: “One benefit of my position is that I am with 
the farmed animals—literally—and therefore act as a more legitimate spokesperson for 
them. I witness what is done to them daily, and I can therefore speak with some level of 
confidence about necessary changes” (61).26 This quotation acknowledges a relationship 
of affinity, and shows that Francois continually tries to consider what the nonhumans 
want rather than assuming she already knows. It also reveals the looseness of the affinity 
between the women themselves, as Francois is working to improve the living conditions 
of factory farmed animals, not end the practice, while other writers take a liberationist 
stance and work to end the instrumental use of animals. 
 Francois is not interested in getting her readers to adopt her exact beliefs, but to 
act according to their own. She makes the same essentialist claim that Kemmerer does 
that “As women, we must be aware of the suffering of sows (and ‘dairy’ cows, and 
‘laying’ hens),” but she also describes a different relationship between feminism and 
animal activism that is based on action rather than identity (63). She ends her essay with 
a call to young women to “resist, more and more, society’s grip” (63). Francois notes 
that as a preteen, she was a vegetarian despite criticism from her community, but then 
placed societal norms above her beliefs in early adulthood. She believes that there was 
                                               
26 In Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism and Animals in Translation, Temple Grandin argues that 
autism makes her a credible voice for farmed animals because she thinks visually, which allows her to 
perceive the animals’ surroundings as they do. 
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more pressure put on her to uphold the status quo because she is a woman (60). She 
encourages women to “follow your intuition” (63) and so presents vegetarianism and 
animal activism as feminist not because of any essential bond between female humans 
and nonhumans, but because activism (excluding some reactionary movements) is a way 
for women to resist pressures to uphold the status quo at the expense of their own 
beliefs.  
  Several other Sister Species writers acknowledge the possibility that social 
justice for animals can aid humans, though few say how. Christine L. Garcia, however, 
promotes the false choice of either helping humans or helping animals. She claims 
humans do too much to help other humans, and this causes over population (141). In 
reality, helping other people, particularly women, gain education and have increased 
access to family planning services often reduces the birth-rate.27 World Overpopulation 
Awareness lists “Women and Girls” first in their list of successful approaches to 
reducing the birth-rates (Gaia). Education, gender equality, jobs, and land ownership are 
some of the subtopics; healthcare and family planning are the two other main strategies 
(Gaia). 
 Garcia also makes another misguided statement; this one is about weight. 
Similarly to Francois, she ends her piece with the importance of questioning authority.  
Garcia writes, “If I had never questioned authority, if I had continued along the 
prescribed track of attorneys, I would have become just another unconscious consumer 
in a conventional job and would probably be overweight from eating dead animals” 
                                               
27 See Bulatao, Rodolfo and  Singh, S. et al., 
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(151). At the same time that she praises herself for being a questioner, she accepts and 
reiterates the stereotype that people are overweight because they are “unconscious,” a 
euphemism for what prejudiced coworkers might consider “lazy.” Mark Roehling found 
that overweight people were generally considered lazier and less conscientious in the 
workplace (403), though his literature review showed these stereotypes are unfounded. 
While questioning authority is important, and is certainly something both Garcia and 
Newkirk do, listening to other questioners is also important, both before and after one 
achieves one’s own position of authority as a published writer and/or leader of an 
organization. 
 None of the other writers in Sister Species trade in fat-phobic stereotypes, though 
none of them address the fraught relationship between vegetarianism and weight. 
Because the Sistah Vegan writers are more concerned with health risks related to obesity 
among black people, the topic does come up in this book. Many of the writers state that 
they lost weight after going vegan, but they invest only compassionate action, not 
physical appearance, with moral import. The final chapter, “Veganism and 
Misconceptions of Thinness as ‘Normal’ and ‘Healthy’” is compiled from a listserv 
discussion in which sistah vegans describe their experiences with weight-related 
stereotypes. The women recounted comments that they had received from others; some 
had been told they were “too big” to really be vegan, and others heard they were too fat 
or too thin to be attractive. The women also described their personal struggles with body 
image and/or how they have come to accept themselves. In their responses to each other, 
they empathize by sharing similar stories. Yet, they also assert difference. For example, 
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Raquel mentions that when she read one sistah call her “size 6 stomach  . . . a ‘big ole 
glob of mess’ I have to fight back searing pain at my own self-judgment . . . and 
remember that it’s not about me” (178). She conveys both that size six is not, in her 
mind, big, and that this notion causes her pain, and also that she is still willing to listen 
to the other woman’s feelings about her body. In expressing both her pain and her 
continued interest in the other woman’s point of view, she models a form of limited 
identification that both respects the experience of the Other and her own.  
Summation of Analysis: The Rhetorical Risk and Potential of Analogies 
Analogies that come from a place of rhetorical listening are more likely to be 
respectful. When well-known historical sources of trauma, such as the Holocaust or 
slavery, are used to draw attention to animal suffering and invest it with the moral 
import associated with human trauma, this process is especially important. These 
comparisons should not be off-limits because analogies are involved in how we conceive 
of the world; they have the potential to transform our understanding of it by showing us 
interlocking systems of oppression. According to Cvetkovich, “Trauma becomes the 
hinge between systemic structures of exploitation and oppression and the felt experience 
of them” by illustrating how these oppressive structures operate on the individual level 
(12). While the structures of exploitation vary, analogies can help shed light on their 
similarities, as many of the Sistah Vegan contributors found.  
The women’s willingness to speak and listen to critiques of social norms is 
central to the sistah vegans’ efforts at decolonization, animal rights activism, and 
increasing health awareness. Though not all of them endorse analogies between slavery, 
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racism, or sexism and speciesism, those who do so treat the analogy as a hinge that links 
oppressions together for a particular political purpose. Their use of these analogies is 
further non-exploitative because the writers often develop real connections between 
veganism’s benefits for nonhumans and black-identified humans, encouraging activism 
for both groups, rather than using analogies to only illuminate the suffering of one 
group. Some of the essays in Sister Species have the same effect, as does the work of 
Eve Abe. In contrast, PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the New 
Slaves?” used the Holocaust and slavery to benefit nonhumans, but did not seek to 
increase understanding of these events or current manifestations of anti-Semitism and 
racism.  
However, animal advocacy is a legitimate cause that should not have to also do 
work for human rights in order to be accepted. What is important is that animal-focused 
activism be “informed” by this other work so that it does not reinforce racism, sexism, or 
other discrimination experienced by humans at the same time that it attempts to undo 
speciesism. For example, Maneesha Deckha states that even though PETA need not 
campaign for women’s rights, their “campaigns should not intentionally entrench sexism 
and other difference-based hierarchies” (49). She criticizes several anti-fur 
advertisements that commodify women for the male gaze. While the ads draw attention 
to PETA’s cause, they ultimately undermine the organization’s “posthumanist project” 
because “[a]ll the usual suspects of things, rather than persons, are still aligned: women, 
body, animals” (55). Similarly, “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the New 
Slaves?” aligns people who were dehumanized by racist discourse with animals. 
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With these two campaigns, PETA did not intentionally reinforce racism as many 
of the ads Deckha analyzes seem to do with sexism. However, using the Holocaust or 
racism as part of an analogy “suggests that the Jewish and black struggles have been 
successfully completed, that they have the settled meaning of archetypes” (Kim 326), so 
these analogies can reinforce the idea that racism and anti-Semitism are no longer 
present, at least in the U.S. where these campaigns are centered. While an animal-
focused campaign is legitimate, and, as Kim stated, Holocaust and slavery tropes are 
important to animal liberation activists’ understanding of themselves as abolitionists, the 
use of such analogies without considering their historical specificity or that the 
discrimination against certain groups of people that made them possible lives on  is 
appropriation.  
PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” and the two versions of the “Animal 
Liberation Project,” the original and the most recent, are useful for outlining some of the 
major risks of such analogies. The first risk is simply that the person or organization 
making the analogy could be exploiting a group of victimized people and even 
reiterating dehumanizing discourse similar to the kind used to justify the mistreatment of 
them. An attendant risk is that the viewers may be alienated by the analogy, even if the 
speaker attempts to frame it in a non-exploitative way, if they perceive any use of the 
Holocaust or other such traumatic events as offensive. When the analogy does not 
contain sufficient historical context, it can obscure perpetrators’ culpability and victim’s 
agency. Paying attention to the values of the Other and then limiting the analogy is a 
way to circumvent these risks. A more limited identification likewise invites the 
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audience to exert more agency in the meaning-making process as people can decide 
whether or not they wish to extend some points of identification. 
Such limited identifications display rhetorical listening to human survivors and 
those who care about them by preserving differences between human and nonhuman 
they deem important. Another benefit of limited identifications is that, by stressing 
specificity, they may be more able to pin point how an audience can alleviate suffering 
caused by a particular situation. For example, Abe clearly identifies steps that can be 
taken by Acholi and the global community to improve the well-being of Uganda’s 
elephants. While analogies that rely on totalizing identification generate some sympathy 
for nonhumans, analogies that recognize differences may be able to make more 
productive suggestions for channeling this sympathy into action.  
It may not be possible to limit an analogy in a way that appeals to all audience 
members and still accurately conveys the speaker’s thoughts and feelings. Ideally, the 
speaker will have practiced rhetorical listening during the invention of her text and the 
audience will engage in rhetorical listening when crafting a public response, such as a 
press release, blog, book, or statement to a reporter. There is not an ethical obligation to 
listen to and consider perspectives one finds ignorant or reprehensible and outrage can 
be valuable public discourse. However, rhetorical listening is vital when one wants to 
engage in a conversation with the offending group. The responsibility for rhetorical 
listening is first and foremost on the speaker who chooses to enter a public forum and 
use a marginalized group for her own ends. Any group that makes a political call to 
action should be particularly concerned with incorporating rhetorical listening in the 
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development of their campaigns and showing evidence of it in the final product so that 
they do not encourage viewers to appropriate others’ suffering for their own ends. This 
listening would also enable the speaker to question how their terministic screen has 
filtered reality and perhaps adjust their text to accommodate multiple perspectives in 
their audience. Identification is central to our understanding of the world and can be a 
powerful political tool. However, analogies work not only through similarity, but also 
dissimilarity. These differences can likewise be productive because engaging in 
rhetorical listening to discover what differences are important to others is a way to open, 
and redirect, one’s own terministic screens.   
Criticisms of Speciesism in Maus and The Rabbits 
 The main part of this chapter addressed analogies made by advocates that made 
parallels between speciesism and other forms of discrimination in order to draw attention 
to nonhuman suffering at the hands of humans. Though speciesism, racism, and sexism 
are in some ways interlocking, it is possible to undermine one and reinforce others. 
Deckha provides examples of how anti-speciesist arguments can also be sexist in her 
analyses of PETA’s campaigns against the fur industry. Similarly, Bradshaw’s book is 
anti-speciesist, but at least one of its analogies reinforces stereotypes about African 
American women. In Animal Rites, Wolfe identifies speciesism in the film The Silence 
of the Lambs despite its anti-sexist and anti-classist portrayal of Clarice because she 
comes to realize that only people, not lambs, can be saved (105). However, just as it is 
possible to unwittingly affirm one form of discrimination while critiquing another, so 
can we undermine one while intending to critique another. To bring home this point, the 
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final section of this chapter analyzes how two illustrated narratives that intend to critique 
racial discrimination also draw attention to speciesism. 
 Art Spiegelman has commented that the animal figures in Maus, which depicts 
Jews as mice and Nazis as cats, are a metaphor that functions  in “an ironic fashion, in 
that on the surface at least this tends to, uh, verify the Nazi racial theories, and of course 
that can’t hold up as a—tsshh, can’t hold up even as a metaphor. And as a result the 
metaphor cracks a number of times in the book” (Witek 91). John Marsden and Shaun 
Tan’s picture book The Rabbits uses a similar metaphor: numbats represent indigenous 
peoples of Australia and rabbits represent European colonists. Rabbits, brought over by 
British colonists, are considered an invasive pest species in Australia that “has inflicted 
more damage on the Australian environment than any other” (Light 115).  The numbat 
is an indigenous endangered species. Unfortunately, The Rabbits does not explore the 
ironic “cracks” in the metaphor between species and ethnicities with the same acuity as 
Maus. The text has been criticized for portraying indigenous figures stereotypically, in 
accordance with the very colonialist framework that it claims to critique. While I agree 
that The Rabbits fails as an allegorical critique of colonialism, I argue that its animal 
metaphor successfully introduces a critique of speciesism. Maus also suggests a critique 
of speciesism because the fractures in its metaphor are stressed by, for example, an 
image of a pig (which are ciphers for Polish people) serving sausage, which can be read 
as an unsettling metaphor that analogizes meat consumption by humans with 
cannibalism. This section uses Maus as a lever to stress the cracks in The Rabbits’s 
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animal metaphors and argues that both texts show how speciesist discourse is related to 
discourses of racism that identify groups of people as nonhuman. 
 Because The Rabbits equates different species with human ethnic groups, it 
engages in the speciesist assumption that “the Animal” is a monolithic group by 
implying that the differences between species are no more significant than those among 
humans. However, representing different human ethnic groups with different species 
also replicates colonialist discourse that relied on claims from scientific racism about 
distinct biological differences between races in order to justify abuse. That the rabbits 
are anthropomorphized more than the numbats replicates the colonialist discourses that 
dehumanize indigenous people, even though the text aims to be a critique of colonialism. 
Though the book is participating in the tradition of using the animal fable as a means of 
political protest, its use of rabbits and numbats differs from the classic example of 
Orwell’s Animal Farm in which species and ethnicity are not paralleled. The Rabbits 
was published in 1998, when white Australia was beginning to publically recognize the 
mistreatment of indigenous peoples, and it shares some of the problems of the 
contemporaneous Australian discourse.  
Brooke Collins-Gearing and Dianne Osland describe the book as an illustration 
of the “clash” of older narratives that claim Europeans “settled” an unoccupied land, 
rather than violently invading and colonizing it, and newer narratives that are aware of 
the “invasion and dispossession” of indigenous lands and people. While the text at first 
seems to reject the older narrative (terra nullis) by showing that the land was inhabited 
prior to “settlement,” the animal metaphor fails as allegorical critique of colonialism 
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because it repeats the myth that indigenous people were “less human” than their 
European counterparts.  Although the rabbits look “human,” wearing clothes and 
walking upright, the numbats are unclothed and are usually crouching. Unsworth and 
Wheeler point out how the numbats, whom they call bandicoots, are portrayed as passive 
by both the verbal text and the illustrations:  
In several of the beginning illustrations the bandicoots are seen holding their 
spears just watching the rabbits. The rabbits, however, are seen as very active 
right from the start, driving, studying and measuring. This is mirrored in the text 
by the agentive roles taken by the rabbits and the bandicoots in relation to the 
kinds of processes represented by different verbs. The rabbits have active 
agentive roles with verbs like “made,” “brought,” “came,” “spread,” “ate,” 
“chopped” and “stole.” The bandicoots are less involved with words of action 
and more involved with communicative and mental process verbs like “warned” 
and “liked.” When they are involved in action, it is significantly negative – 
“lost.” (72) 
The final page, which depicts a rabbit and numbat meeting in a wasteland, over an 
almost dry billabong, asks “Who will save us from the rabbits?” (n.p.) As Collins-
Gearing and Osland point out, this ending takes away agency from indigenous people 
and depicts them as passively waiting for a savior instead of communicating with the 
rabbits about changing their behavior.  
However, Tan’s illustrations that depict the rabbits’ cattle make the book more 
complicated than just a well-meaning, but unintentionally colonialist, allegory. When the 
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rabbits raise cattle and the numbats attack the cattle not because they hate or fear cattle, 
but because they want to kill them in order to harm the rabbits, nonhumans are engaging 
in speciesism. These scenes invite readers to question humans’ relationships to farm 
animals. The cattle and sheep are another trapping of the rabbits’ Europeanism like their 
coats and top hats. Moreover, that rabbits, herbivores, are raising animals for meat and 
dairy, as well as wool indicates that humans’ farming practices are as culturally based as 
their clothing choices.  
The farm animals also reveal the speciesism inherent in Western Humanist 
thought that is not only manifested in the way we treat nonhuman animals, but also the 
way we treat animalized humans. Derrida defines “Men” as “first and foremost those 
living creatures who have given themselves the word that enables them to speak of the 
animal with a single voice and to designate it as the single being that remains without a 
response, without a word with which to respond” (32). The rabbits divide all living 
creatures into two categories: rabbits and everything else. Their attitude to non-rabbits, 
be they numbats, sheep, or cattle, mirror Derrida’s take on the human “tradition of a war 
against the animal” in which the animal is a tool for humans (101). According to Wolfe, 
this particular mode of being human is based on transcendence of “the ‘animal’ and the 
animalistic” (Animal Rites 43). Derrida calls this the “Cartesian tradition” in which “I 
am” comes into existence following the animal because Descartes defined “I” as the 
mind, which transcends the animalistic body (72). This mode makes possible “a 
symbolic economy” in which one can abuse the Other by identifying it as animal 
(Animal Rites 43). 
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 The numbats provide an alternative to this “us vs. everything else” mode. 
Instead, they divide animals into “those we like” and “those that scare us.” Within this 
world view, cattle are “animals we like,” as evidenced by the location of the text near 
cattle and sheep in a rosy scene in which numbats congregate near their pasture. While I 
could claim that this is another colonialist thread in the book that implies that, even 
though Australia was occupied, indigenous people made less use of the land than 
European, and are therefore not deserving of land rights, I want to take the argument in a 
different direction and claim that this illustration does offer a critique. It critiques 
speciesism by showing nonhuman animals practicing it.28 According to Derrida, we tend 
to think of “the Animal” as an undifferentiated mass (Mallet x). Therefore, seeing 
animals “use” other animals in a systematic, culturally sanctioned way reminds us that 
animals are in fact diverse while at the same time providing a surreal mirror of our own 
practices.  That the rabbits’ use of cows and sheep as if they were machinery, not fellow 
living beings, is highlighted by ridiculous features—the perforated lines on the cows’ 
hides that indicate where to carve them up into beef, the wheels that have replaced their 
hooves, and the 100% tags on the sheep’s wool—which all draw attention to the 
instrumental use of animals in the everyday practice of commercial farming. The sheep’s 
ear tags mirror their 100% wool tags, and the cows’ wheel-hooves are identical to ones 
on their milking machines.  
                                               
28 Though nonhumans generally “discriminate” when it comes to who they mate with and/or eat, 
“speciesism” is based on a system of beliefs that depend on an understanding of species as a means of 
categorizing animals and ranking those categories.  
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 While numbats do eat other animals (they are insectivores), the allegorical 
numbats do not perceive other animals as tools until colonization becomes violent.  The 
numbats not only fight rabbits, but also destroy one of the rabbits’ steam-powered 
cannons and kill cattle.  While dismantling the cannon shows the numbats resisting not 
only the rabbits, but also the industrialism that the book elsewhere blames for destroying 
the land, their attack on the cattle indicates that they share the rabbits’ speciesism. For 
the numbats, the cattle are no longer “animals we like,” but machines of colonization 
that need to be destroyed. Ironically, this spread depicts the numbats and the rabbits on 
the same side. The panels on this page are not in chronological order, so a panel 
featuring numbats armed with spears is stacked on top of one that contains rabbits with 
guns. They are facing the same direction instead of at each other. Though both groups 
have different cultures (as indicated in this illustration by the rabbits’ “might makes 
right” motto as compared to the numbats’ apparent lack of interest in slogans and 
militarism) and different types of power (the numbats have a better knowledge of the 
land, as they have located themselves on higher ground, but the rabbits’ weapons are 
more destructive), they are joined in their violence towards each other that also causes 
them to direct violence against other species in order to harm the enemy. In the numbats’ 
efforts to resist colonization, they take on the rabbits’ worldview and see cattle as a tool, 
like cannons, that they have a right to destroy. Thus, the book shows how speciesism, as 
well as the related discourses of racism and sexism that rank some people as subhuman, 
can also be enacted by oppressed groups. 
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 Maus also suggests a critique of speciesism through ironic interactions between 
“human” animals, like the mice, and “animal” animals, like insects. Richard DeAngelis 
claims that the text “take[s] at face value the artificial hierarchy” between “humans and 
other species” (231). While DeAngelis criticizes the text because the characters and 
narrator do not verbally comment on this irony, I argue that the illustrations themselves 
sufficiently convey the critique and emphasize that humans are animals. A few panels 
show Art, the son of a Holocaust survivor who is writing a graphic novel about his 
father’s experiences, exterminate some insects. I agree with DeAngelis’ claim that these 
panels illustrate Art’s speciesist sense of superiority, but I disagree with his claim that 
the panels are not ironic. Only three pages earlier, the text explains that Zyklon B was 
invented as a pesticide and Art uses a gas pesticide to kill the insects rather than a fly 
swatter or his palm (71).  
As DeAngelis points out, the final panel strategically draws attention to the dead 
and dying insects (241). The tender moment in which Art helps his wife up is spoiled by 
the dead animal underneath their clasped palms. Another insect weakly drops below the 
panel; it is the last image of this chapter. That a chapter which is entirely focused on 
Auschwitz ends with insects gassed to death is hardly a coincidence. Even without the 
verbal commentary DeAngelis thinks the panels need, the irony is apparent. The irony is 
actually heightened by the characters unawareness. Francoise remarks that “It’s almost 
impossible to imagine that Auschwitz ever happened” because her knowledge of it does 
not directly impact the tranquility of the evening. Though Art and his wife do not see the 
similarities between their behavior and the Nazi death camps, the parallel is (literally) 
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drawn: Art and his wife consider themselves good, decent people, but have no qualms 
about killing subhuman beings that “inconvenience” them.  
  While neither Maus nor The Rabbits actively pursues the metaphor between 
atrocities committed by humans on humans with speciesism, the cracks in their 
metaphorical representation of different human ethnic groups as different species opens 
up this analogy. Maus pursues these cracks more thoroughly with, for example, the 
panels that make an explicit connection between using pesticides for their intended use 
and using them in gas chambers or pigs who eat pork and human animals who eat other 
animals. Again, DeAngelis claims that this image is not ironic and, yet, one astute point 
that he makes actually supports a reading of this image as ironic. He correctly claims 
that the father’s work repairing leather shoes in the camp is not ironic, because, as 
DeAngelis puts it “There are no cows depicted in Auschwitz—either as humans or 
animals” (237). However, there are pigs in Auschwitz, and when we see them in one 
panel, as both “human” and “animal,” presenting their own kind to be eaten, there is 
visual irony. These panels complicate the animal metaphors in the book, indicating that 
racist analogies that compare different groups of people to different species cannot be 
sustained. They also begin to suggest an analogy between anti-Semitism and speciesism. 
 The Rabbits does not pursue such cracks in its animal metaphors as thoroughly as 
Maus, which is why the book re-inscribes colonialist thought by animalizing indigenous 
people into numbats and humanizing rabbits into Europeans. However, Maus can 
illuminate a reading of The Rabbits because the graphic novel is rife with irony. Maus is 
written for an older audience, which is one reason it delves into the animal metaphor 
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with more nuance and complexity. However, Tan claims that picture books do not have 
to be for children, and that The Rabbits is aiming for a broader audience (“Why” 1). The 
Rabbits could have been less colonialist, if, like Maus, it had engaged in more irony and 
tried to account for the specificity of the event, rather than trying to create a universal 
story of colonialism for a universal audience. 
 Tan has said, “I . . . try to remove any details that might interfere with the 
universality of an idea—that is, particular references to places, people, or things, 
anticipating that readers will fill these ‘gaps’ with their own personal experience, 
inevitably different from my own” (Interview 46). This approach works for many of 
Tan’s other works in which he writes the text as well as the images, such as The Red 
Tree, a picture book that evokes the experience of depression or The Lost Thing, in 
which a fantastical creature enters a humdrum world. These books do what Tan claims 
he wants them to do: they are “provocative” and encourage the reader to ask “questions 
of the book” which are “questions about their own experience” (“Picture Books” 5, 4). 
Tan’s illustrations do work to open the The Rabbits a little, by creating a parallel in the 
numbats’ and rabbits’ treatment of cattle, making the normal practice of raising farm 
animals seem surreal and suggesting that the instrumental use of animals is similar to the 
use and abuse of dehumanized people. For The Rabbits, the speciesist assumption that 
“the Animal” is a homogenous group is, on one level, what makes the metaphor work to 
show that colonization is “humans abusing humans.”However, the book also suggests 
that “humans using animals” is also an abusive relationship made on an arbitrary divide, 
because it guides us to condemn the rabbits and numbats’ treatment of farm animals. 
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Unfortunately, the openness of Marsden’s text oversimplifies a historical event. 
In its attempts to create a story that can be applied to many situations by, for example, 
never naming the place and time, it presents a simplified version of colonialism that 
reiterates the myth that the colonizers are human and active, while indigenous peoples 
are animalistic and passive. The lack of specificity in The Rabbits also makes it easy for 
readers to deny their white privilege by distancing themselves from the rabbits. The final 
image denies the agency of indigenous people in the past and the present. In conclusion, 
The Rabbits does open up one avenue of decolonization through its animal 
representations that subtly critique Western industrialized use of nonhumans, but this is 
not a sustained theme of the book. Rather, it is one that has to be fought for by prying 
apart the cracks in animal metaphor. However, reading The Rabbits next to Maus helps 
us see how animal metaphors destabilize the animal-human divide, undercutting both 
speciesist assumptions about human superiority and the racism that functions by 
dehumanizing certain groups and making them available for instrumental use and abuse 
by self-identified humans. Analogies can only be extended so far, but this does not mean 
that atrocities such as the Holocaust or colonialism should be off limits. Paying attention 
to where a metaphor cracks is crucial to using it ethically. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEHUMANIZATION AND REHUMANIZATION IN TWO GRAPHIC 
NARRATIVES ABOUT THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
Despite the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement signed in 1993 by the Hutu 
government and the Tutsi rebel forces the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and the 
presence of a small international peace-keeping force in Rwanda, both government and 
private media refuse to curd their use of anti-Tutsi hate speech. After President 
Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6th 1994, Hutus were told to commence 
killing their neighbors with the intent to eliminate the Tutsi ethnic group (Thompson 2). 
The Interahamwe, paramilitary groups that had been organized and armed by 
Habyarimana’s government, were at the forefront of the killing (24). After 800,000 
people were murdered, the genocide ended when the RPF won the capital city Kigali in 
mid-July (29). Since then, according to Madeline Hron, “writing about Rwanda has 
become a ‘hot commodity’ in the West,” with “hundreds of scholarly of books . . . as 
well as dozens of literary works” published including the two graphic narratives 
discussed in this chapter (163).   
J.P. Stassen’s graphic novel Deogratias was released in 2000 by Belgian press 
Dupuis, with the English translation following six years later. Stassen’s fictional text 
displays the trauma experienced by a reluctant perpetrator, Deogratias, who has 
flashbacks to his crimes and frequent delusions in which he turns into a dog. Stassen’s 
work has received multiple awards and has been the subject of some critical attention. 
Madeline Hron condemns it as an example of Francophone fiction that, because of 
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sympathies with France’s pro-Hutu politics, obscures Hutu and French culpability in the 
genocide. Though Suzanne Keen is interested in how the book generates empathy for a 
perpetrator, she does not claim the text reduces his responsibility for his crimes. Another 
graphic narrative about the genocide, Rupert Bazambanza’s Smile through the Tears, 
was published in 2007. In contrast to Deogratias, this text focuses on the experience of 
victims and has not received as much popular or scholarly attention. Bazambanza’s work 
is creative nonfiction rather than a novel, but instead of describing his own experience as 
a survivor, he tells the story of his close friends, the Rwanga family. 
 Both texts depict and condemn the dehumanization of Tutsis by extremist 
rhetoric before and during the genocide. Both also seek to “rehumanize” Tutsis by 
focusing on individual stories, and Deogratias also does this for a perpetrator, the title 
character. How the graphic novels depict dehumanization and rhetorically work to 
rehumanize people varies based on their conception of what it is to be human and to 
have human memories. Therefore, this chapter builds on the discussion of the subject 
from Chapter II. As argued in that chapter, Bradshaw and Goodall accepted the liberal 
humanist definition of the subject as autonomous and rational for both humans and some 
nonhumans, specifically elephants and chimpanzees, to encourage readers to identify 
with these species and take steps to aid them. Bazambanza presents a similar view of the 
human subject in Smile to similar ends. 
 Bradshaw and Goodall seek to include nonhumans in the realm of moral 
consideration, and Bazambanza seeks to awaken Western readers’ moral concern for 
Tutsis through appeals to identification. While I do not wish to unthinkingly compare 
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Tutsis and the nonhuman animals of other texts, I do think a comparison of the West’s 
attitudes towards these groups can be legitimate. Bazambanza makes such an association 
when he criticizes the West for expressing more concern for Rwanda’s gorillas than its 
people. By accepting the liberal humanist subject for people, if not gorillas, 
Bazambanza, like Bradshaw and Goodall, is able to invoke the agency of his readers by 
condemning their indifference that enabled the victimization of Tutsis and call for the 
readers to change their ways. 
In contrast to Bazambanza’s text, which could be considered “humanist 
humanism” according to Wolfe as it is does not attempt to rethink the human or the 
medium of the graphic narrative, Deogratias functions as posthumanist rhetoric. While 
The Lives of Animals could be placed in the “posthumanist posthumanism” quadrant of 
Wolfe’s chart of posthumanism, Deogratias could more aptly be characterized as 
humanist posthumanism. Unlike The Lives of Animals, Deogratias does not ask readers 
to “rethink the hierarchy of human/animal” (Wolfe What is Posthumanism? 124). The 
graphic novel does deconstruct the human subject and critique agency through its 
ambivalent treatment of memory; however, it seems to accept that humans have, or 
should have, more responsibility than nonhumans and is only interested in nonhumans 
for what they can reveal about the human subject.  
Deogratias’s relationship to the category of graphic novel can be described as 
posthumanist. Though not an academic work that critiques its own discipline, such as 
much of Derrida or Haraway’s work, Deogratias does reflect on the comic book as a 
medium. For example, Deogratias attempts to win a girl’s affection by giving her a 
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romans-photos, which is similar to a comic book, though illustrated with photographs 
rather than drawings, that tells a love story. As Keen points out, the girl turns down both 
Deogratias and his book, showing that readers are often not persuaded by texts, and 
“[t]hus Stassen acknowledges within his text that the uses of graphic narration are not as 
predictable as the naïve boy imagines, even as he attempts to use his art to raise readers’ 
consciousness of the bloody recent history of Rwanda” (136). Deogratias indicates that, 
though we can often choose to accept or reject overt efforts at persuasion, we are not 
aware of all the influences that affect our decisions. Deogratias, in particular, is shown to 
be affected by aspects of his mind, body, and environment that are beyond his control 
and partially obscured from him. This view of the subject, with diminished agency, 
makes it difficult to assign culpability for the genocide; therefore, the text focuses on the 
memories of individuals rather than crafting a public memory that makes a narrative of 
the causes of the genocide. 
 In contrast, Smile seeks to raise consciousness by providing a great deal of 
contextual information about Rwanda’s history of racism and the politics surrounding 
the genocide. Through the example of Rose Rwanga, who successfully teaches her 
family and community about racial harmony, Smile promotes the idea that learning about 
the causes of the genocide will persuade readers to avoid these dangerous behaviors and 
encourage Western readers to take preventative action instead of remaining bystanders to 
human rights abuse. In accordance with its acceptance of the liberal humanist subject, 
the text depicts humans as making conscious choices that led to the genocide, which 
gives readers the hope that genocide can be understood and thus prevented. 
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Hron criticizes Deogratias and other Francophone literature for not providing 
sufficient historical context and concludes that more attention should be paid to survivor 
testimony (163). Although I will argue in this chapter that Deogratias does not obscure 
perpetrator culpability, I also believe that the text should not stand alone, but be read 
with other accounts, such as Smile Through the Tears, to further encourage rhetorical 
listening and metonymic identification. Bazambanza and Stassen encounter a problem of 
identification also faced by those who write in support of nonhuman subjects: how to 
speak on behalf of those who cannot communicate or cannot do so to the same audiences 
in the same ways that the writer can. Strategies of empathetic unsettlement and limited 
identification are useful for speaking on behalf of both human and nonhuman subjects. 
These techniques are practiced to some degree by both authors, but reading multiple 
texts assists readers in practicing rhetorical listening by providing them with more voices 
to consider in what Nienkamp refers to as the “internal rhetoric” we engage in to make 
decisions. 
  This chapter begins by contextualizing the role of hate media in the genocide 
because, while this rhetoric did instigate violence, each graphic narrative presents the 
influence of media differently, according to its views of the human subject, in their own 
attempts to counteract the dehumanizing messages of hate media. The chapter then 
considers how the texts memorialize events and encourage sympathy for the individuals 
who experienced them through their use of identification and empathetic unsettlement. 
Running through this chapter is a discussion of how animalization has been used as 
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grounds for human abuse and also how animals, serving as witnesses to violence, have 
been used to reflect on the trauma caused by this abuse. 
Dehumanizing Language in Rwandan Media 
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), one 
phenomenon that led to the genocide was the degradation of Tutsis by the Rwandan hate 
media. The radio station RTLM and newspaper Kangura “called for the extermination of 
the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political threat they associated with Tutsi 
ethnicity” (ICTR qtd. in Thompson 2). In its sentencing of RTLM founder Ferdinand 
Nahimana, the ICTR declared, “Without a firearm, machete, or any physical weapon, 
you [Nahimana] caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians” (qtd. in Thompson 
305). Hassan Ngeze, the owner and editor of Kangura was told by the ICTR, “You 
poisoned the minds of your readers, and by words and deeds caused the death of 
thousands of innocent civilians” (306). RTLM and Kangura incited hatred before 
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and called for the mass killing of Tutsis 
much more directly after this assassination.  
The ICTR condemned RTLM and Kangura for defining all Tutsis as the 
“enemy.” These media characterized all Tutsi women as femme-fatale spies and 
conflated all Tutsi civilians with rebel groups by using Tutsi, Rwandan Patriotic Front, 
and Inyenzi interchangeably (Des Forges 48). English language representations of the 
genocide such as the film Hotel Rwanda translate inyenzi as “cockroaches.” Deogratias 
and Smile are translated from French, and the original texts use “cafards” and 
“cancrelats,” zoological terms for cockroach. In Burkean terms, the repetitious use of 
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inyenzi is meant to transform the substance of Tutsi individuals, in the eyes of Hutus, to 
that of anonymous vermin that should be exterminated. Burke calls substance an 
“ambiguous” term because, while we use it to mean the “essence” of thing, it 
etymologically refers to the “ground” under the term, or its context (Grammar 57). 
Despite the ambiguity of substance, the way that a particular substance is defined has 
“citable realities” (57). Burke identifies several ways in which substance can be defined, 
and both familial substance and directional substance are relevant to the characterization 
of Tutsis as inyenzi. 
Inyenzi establishes a familial connection between Tutsis and cockroaches through 
dehumanization that codes Tutsis as a different species than Hutus. This familial 
identification can be seen in the title of the Kangura editorial “A Cockroach Cannot 
Bring Forth a Butterﬂy.” In Deogratias, a DJ for RTLM describes Tutsis as having 
“cockroach faces,” a phrase that moves them from the human family to the insect family 
(34). Describing Tutsis as cockroaches also implies a directional substance, which Burke 
explains as identifying a “motivating essence” (Grammar 32). This type of identification 
has the past, and therefore the future, “wound up” (32). The Kangura editorial states that 
“a cockroach brings forth a cockroach  . . . The history of Rwanda tells us that the Tutsi 
has remained the same and has never changed” to claim that Tutsis, like cockroaches, 
will always attempt to invade Hutu homes because that is simply the way they are (2). 
Kangura thus uses directional substance to argue the two have substantially the same 
motivation. 
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 However, “cockroaches” captures only one effect of the Kinyarwanda word 
inyenzi, the dehumanization of Tutsis as vermin that should be exterminated. For 
Rwandans, the term also evokes the Inyenzi, a Tutsi rebel group that existed in the 1960s 
and 70s. Just as the term establishes a familial and directional substance between Tutsis 
and cockroaches, so it does between civilians and rebels. According to Tutsi 
revolutionary Aloys Ngurumbe, the Inyenzi chose this name for itself, as an acronym 
that means “a member of Ingangurarugo [an army division of a 19th century Tutsi king] 
who has committed himself to bravery” (qtd. in Higiro 84). The group carried out 
nocturnal attacks, killing Hutu civilians, then quickly retreated to the countryside or 
neighboring nations. Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro states that “Due to this ability to 
terrorize the country and to disappear, the population associated the attackers with 
cockroaches instead of bravery” (85).  “A Cockroach Cannot Bring Forth a Butterﬂy” 
declares that the Inyenzi of the 1960s is identical to the modern RPF, an identification 
based in familial substance. The editorial asks “can a distinction be made between the 
Inyenzi that attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and those of the 1960s? They are all 
related since some are the grand children of others. Their wickedness is identical” (3). 
The editorial also makes a directional identification between Inyenzi and civilians by 
declaring that civilians are also engaged in subterfuge by means of their money, 
education, and Tutsi “vamps” who marry Hutus (2). Thus, inyenzi was meant to invoke 
not only disgust, but also fear in Hutu audiences. 
Higiro was the director of the government agency in charge of public media 
known as the Office Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR) in the months leading up the 
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genocide. In support of the Arusha Accords, Higiro banned the use of inyenzi to refer to 
the RPF and “all language that incited violence” in state-run media (85). He believed 
that “Given the volatile political climate of the time, labeling a person or a group of 
people cockroaches was similar to sentencing somebody to death” (85). Higiro’s party 
ignored this ban, and private media such as RTLM and Kangura, despite their ties to the 
government, had no respect for Higiro’s efforts or the Arusha Accords. While legal, 
historical, and media studies approaches to Rwandan hate media shed light on the role it 
played in the genocide, literary representations of these media are also illuminating 
because they reflect on individuals’ response to them and how individual agency is 
affected by local communities.   
Representations of Hate Media in Deogratias and Smile through the Tears 
Both Deogratias and Smile through the Tears portray hate media, especially 
RTLM, as dangerous yet also imply that individuals have sufficient agency to resist its 
efforts at persuasion. Where the texts differ is the relevance of this agency to 
individuals’ subsequent actions in the genocide. The liberal humanist subjects of Smile 
that are persuaded by the hate speech that occurred before the genocide also answer 
RTLM’s calls to attack specific individuals during the genocide. Deogratias’s brother 
Julius, a member of the Interahamwe, acts similarly. However, Deogratias commits the 
same crimes as Julius, the rape and murder of Apollinaria, Benina, and their mother 
Venetia, even though he rejects the messages of hate media. His actions indicate that 
belief and behavior are not directly linked. 
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That Deogratias’ ability to reject hate media’s persuasive attempts is irrelevant to 
his ability to resist other influences from his communities because he commits atrocities 
does not mean that Stassen’s text presents RTLM as powerless. Rather, the text shows 
that individuals have different reactions to hate media, depending on their own beliefs 
about race. Deogratias rejects racial discrimination because of two friends he has grown 
up with, Apollinaria and Benina. These two sisters are Tutsis, and Deogratias tells them 
and other characters that he thinks racial differences are insignificant at multiple points 
in the narrative.  In contrast, Julius is a racist who parrots language from RTLM and 
becomes a member of the Interahamwe.  
Deogratias places some culpability on RTLM in a panel that depicts a DJ’s 
words oppressing Apollinaria and Benina. In this panel the radio is foregrounded and is 
therefore larger than the sisters. The speech bubble filled with the DJ’s racist rhetoric 
takes up the top half of the panel, literally overwhelming the women. The DJ says, 
“Maybe the Tutsi COCKROACHES should dance a bit more to that good music from 
Kinshasa,” then laughs while stating that “their weird cockroach faces” make him and 
his listeners want to throw them in a river or “reach for a good bug spray!” (34).The 
sisters’ reactions to the radio indicate that these threats should be taken seriously. 
Apollinaria pretends to laugh along with the Hutu listeners in an effort to blend in. 
Benina chides her, which attracts the attention of the listeners. Their responses of 
smirking at the horrific humor of the DJ or glaring at the sisters because of their 
ethnicity indicate that the DJ’s words can enhance racial tension.  
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RTLM’s role in directing violence during the genocide is also dramatized when 
Deogratias and Benina hear RTLM announce the assassination of President 
Habyarimana and blame “that foul race of cockroaches” (57-8). The DJ tells his listeners 
to “go to work” with their “tools,” euphemisms for murdering with machetes, and to 
“eradicate” Tutsis (57-8). While Deogratias is not persuaded by such claims and instead 
hides Benina in his room, his brother Julius picks up the rhetoric of the radio, referring 
to the genocide as “work” and “the job” as well as speaking of  “exterminat[ing]” 
“cockroaches”(56, 70). Like the RTLM listeners who smirked and glared at the sisters in 
the earlier panel, Julius uncritically accepts RTLM’s message that attempts to 
rhetorically transform Tutsis so that they are “substantially” the same as cockroaches, 
which in turn means murder can be transformed in to the job of pest control. The text 
does not explain how Julius became a racist, but it is apparent that RTLM and other hate 
speech venues have played a role in his development. That Deogratias quickly succumbs 
to pressure from Julius and other extremists to participate in the genocide reveals how, 
when hate media is adopted by family and community, it becomes more influential. 
Smile’s condemnation of RTLM places more importance on the individual’s 
ability to accept or reject hate media than Deogratias. Bazambanza’s text focuses on 
both hate media’s audience, like Deogratias, and its creators, like the ICTR trials, which 
emphasizes the agency exerted by those in each position. A narrative “voiceover” 
explains that “Habyarimana and his followers founded a radio station to spread hatred 
among the different ethnic groups. This was RTLM, ‘Radio-télévision libre des mille 
collines’” (29). The connection between the privately owned RTLM and Habyarimana’s 
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government is reinforced by the action in the panels. Hyacinthe Rwanga and her friend 
are walking by the RTLM office which is guarded by soldiers. These men stop the 
women and accuse them of attempting to bomb RTLM, then one soldier assaults 
Hyacinthe. That both soldiers and RTLM are promoting the same belief, that all Tutsis 
are enemies who are trying to kill Hutus, indicates that RTLM and the government are 
working together to promote this dangerous stereotype. The soldier guarding RTLM 
calls Hyacinthe and her friend “cockroaches,” and throughout Smile Hutus refer to Tutsis 
as cockroaches and other animals, such as snakes, to show “how the process of 
animalization precedes and justifies murder” (Chaney 96). This focus on the creators of 
RTLM emphasizes that the radio station is part of a systematic attempt to incite hatred 
against Tutsis, which makes its influence seem stronger. 
However, the next page makes the point that hate media’s power to cause 
physical harm can only be exerted through the agency of individual listeners. A Hutu 
neighbor overhears Hyacinthe’s brother Wilson making fun of some print propaganda 
released by the CDR, the extremist Hutu party that the ICTR concluded conspired with 
RTLM and Kangura to incite genocide (Des Forges 44). The neighbor immediately 
informs RTLM, which then broadcasts this statement: “Right now at the Umuco bar, 
Wilson Rwanga and his Tutsi friends are saying that only idiots join the MRND and the 
CDR…” (ellipses in original, 30). A friend offers to drive Wilson home because “that’s 
the signal for the Interahamwe to come and kill those who were just named” (30). A 
voiceover reinforces this piece of dialogue by contextualizing it: “This tactic used by 
RTLM and the Interahamwe had already caused the death of many Tutsis” (30). The 
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dramatization of this tactic shows that, even though RTLM had government influence 
behind it, its ability to oppress Tutsi civilians and spark violence depended on the agency 
of individual listeners who must accept the station’s racist message, call in, and act on 
RTLM’s commands. Therefore, Smile depicts individual agency as more significant than 
Deogratias.  
Though both Smile and Deogratias concur that hate media had some role in the 
genocide, neither one gives it primary responsibility. However, they do so for different 
reasons. Deogratias presents hate media as one force among many, including individual 
agency that, because they are too difficult to untangle, cannot be easily assigned blame. 
Smile blames the people who headed the organizations behind the genocide, including 
RTLM in a list with the MRND, CDR, and the Interahamwe; however, it distinguishes 
the audience from the creators and thus assigns more agency, and therefore more 
responsibility, to them for their reactions to hateful rhetoric.  
The Duty to Preserve Trauma in Deogratias through Empathetic Unsettlement 
 Deogratias is set after the genocide, but contains many memories of life before 
and during it. Though readers who come to Deogratias with different sets of 
interpretative tools will draw different conclusions, a central question the text raises is 
“What is the duty of memory?” In 1998, the French Ministry of Culture funded a project 
called Écrire par Devoir de Memoire, The Duty of Memory, to generate literary texts 
about the genocide (Hron 165). Though Deogratias is not part of this project, it was 
produced contemporaneously. Nine Écrire par Devoir de Memoire texts were published 
by 2000, the year Deogratias came out (Hron 165). Most trauma studies writers with a 
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therapeutic background, such as Dori Laub and Herman, argue that telling one’s 
memories of trauma is the key to healing (Felman and Laub 59, Herman 68). According 
to this theory, witnessing works to heal trauma by transforming memories into a 
coherent narrative, rather than disorganized flashbacks, because the narrative allows one 
to understand the past and therefore focus on the future and become a functioning 
member of society. However, the title character of Deogratias refuses this “duty” to 
interpret memory in a way that benefits his community and, by extension, refuses justice 
and reconciliation.  
His dog transformations are a visible manifestation of this refusal. The 
transformations reflect his unresolved trauma because they occur involuntarily, 
disrupting Deogratias’s attempts to move past his crimes, and alienate him from his 
community, which labels him as insane and determines both the homeless Deogratias 
and stray dogs to be nuisances. The transformations are also visible representations of 
the suffering caused by his regret for participating in the rape and murder of three 
women who trusted him. The illustrations indicate his regret through his tears and the 
painful-looking transmogrification. His transformations show he wishes to reject his 
status as human, and therefore presumably some of the responsibility for his crimes. 
They also indicate his refusal of the duty of memory, because, as a dog, he cannot 
construct a coherent narrative of events to “explain” the genocide and his part in it. 
Though the text encourages some identification with Deogratias, it also undercuts his 
refusal of the duty of memory through empathetic unsettlement by showing the toll that 
unresolved trauma takes on Deogratias and others. Rather than working towards healing 
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himself and the community, he murders three people who know the atrocities he 
committed in an unhinged effort to obliterate his past. 
  Though Deogratias suffers from trauma and harms others, the text itself also 
values trauma through the structural representation of traumatic memory as temporally 
dysfunctional. That is, instead of constructing a coherent, chronological narrative of the 
genocide, the text accepts that a disordered and unclear narrative can also provide 
important insight into the genocide and its impact. Many pages of Deogratias have 
panels from both the past and present. Out of seventy-eight pages, thirty-two have at 
least half of their panels set before the genocide. Another fifteen pages are devoted to the 
genocide. The earlier memories provide some historical and social context. One such 
scene is when Deogratias, Apollinaria, and Benina learn racist propaganda about Hutu, 
Tutsi, and Twa people in school. Hron criticizes such scenes for simplifying context for 
Western readers into something a child can follow (165). However, in Deogratias, the 
scene is not just educational, but also crucial to the literary representation of trauma in 
this graphic novel.  
By making Deogratias a naïve critic of racism who says “the teacher is a fool” 
but does not seem to see the teacher’s words as part of an expansive, state-promoted 
racism, this scene heightens the betrayal of his later cruelty toward the sisters (18). The 
betrayal is foreshadowed in these panels because, while Deogratias looks like an 
innocent child, the sisters are not comforted by his declaration. Their downcast eyes, 
somber faces, and hunched posture show they have a more serious understanding of 
racial discrimination. They understand it as systemic because they experience racism 
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first hand in multiple venues. One such scene would be the panel described earlier in 
which the women hear a racist RTLM broadcast and receive a negative reaction from the 
Hutu listeners. Deogratias gives some contextual information about the genocide; 
however, the text focuses more heavily on trauma itself.  
Caruth calls trauma “unclaimed experience.” She theorizes that the original event 
was “unclaimed” at the time it was experienced because it was too horrible to 
comprehend. Therefore, the trauma is not the event itself, but its unclaimed state or “the 
way that its very unassimilated nature . . . returns to haunt the survivor later on” 
(Unclaimed Experience 4). This haunting may take the form of flashbacks or other 
effects associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (57). For Caruth, the perpetrator of 
violence can experience trauma because she describes Tancred, in Tasso’s epic poem 
about the First Crusade, La Gerusalemme Liberta, as traumatized after he accidentally 
kills Clorinda, the woman he loves, during a battle (2). Though Caruth’s assertion about 
perpetrator trauma has been criticized, Rothberg astutely points out that it does not 
necessarily obscure the violence done by the perpetrator as long as we recognize that 
trauma does not confer moral value on those who experience it (90).29 LaCapra similarly 
argues that perpetrators can experience trauma, but that their trauma is “ethically and 
politically different” and should not be used to conflate perpetrators and victims (History 
and Memory 41). Like Tancred, Deogratias did not want to victimize these particular 
women, though he does so knowingly rather than mistaking them for his enemies.  
                                               
29 For a criticism of Caruth’s argument, see Leys, Ruth.  
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The victimization of Apollinaria, Benina, and Venetia draws attention to the 
blurring of one’s conscious intention and other influences. Primo Levi claims that “each 
individual is so complex that there is no point in trying to foresee his behavior, all the 
more so in extreme situations; nor is it possible to foresee one’s own behavior” and 
therefore concludes that we should refrain from judging the “special squad,” death camp 
prisoners who escorted other prisoners to the gas chambers and operated the crematoria 
(60). Levi explains how these collaborators differ from the Nazi perpetrators, who can be 
judged, because the prisoners had suffered months or years of extreme oppression in 
ghettos before their grueling and disorienting deportation to the camps (59). Moreover, 
they faced a “rigid either/or, immediate obedience or death,” whereas the perpetrators 
would have suffered relatively moderate punishment (60). Levi thus places the special 
squad and other Jewish collaborators in “the gray zone.”  
Deogratias differs from the special squad or other Jewish collaborators in the 
Holocaust because he did not experience great oppression before the genocide, but he 
may have similarly had to choose between obedience and death. His Hutu privilege 
continued to protect him during the genocide, but to what extent is unclear. Deogratias is 
not faced with an immediate choice between life and death until after he commits 
genocide and wants to return to the women’s corpses and Julius threatens to kill him 
(72). However, he does state that he was “forced” to rape and murder the women, and 
the threat of physical violence from Julius does seem present from the very beginning of 
the genocide (59). Whether or not Deogratias would be considered judge-able by Levi’s 
criteria is unclear as the graphic novel does not give much information surrounding his 
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actions. However, historical accounts show that moderate Hutus were frequently 
murdered for not participating in the genocide (Kuperman 111), which I would argue 
means some of the moderates who did participate may belong in the gray zone of 
collaborators forced to choose between obedience and death.   
Deogratias’ own participation remains incomprehensible to him in part because it 
did not coincide with his feelings about these women in particular or his attitude to the 
racist rhetoric that attempts to transform Tutsis in general to his enemies. LaCapra 
explains that trauma can “raise problems of identity” for perpetrators, collaborators, and 
bystanders “insofar as it unsettles narcissistic investments and desired self-images” 
(History and Memory 9). Though Deogratias does not take responsibility for committing 
such atrocities, he also cannot escape them. The sheer amount of page space devoted to 
memories indicates how much the past intrudes on Deogratias’s present. Likewise, the 
blurry, unframed edges of the past panels show that they are not temporally bounded and 
can bleed into the present at any time. The panels in which Deogratias turns into a dog 
are framed, due to their present temporal location, but they reflect the “unclaimedness” 
of trauma in another way, through Deogratias’s vague, shattered language. He evokes 
images of the genocide with phrases like “they devour the bellies, and the bellies spill 
open” but does not recollect his culpability or create a narrative version of the events, 
leaving the experience unresolved (26). 
 Graphic narratives are a way to address unclaimed experience by depicting the 
struggle with representing trauma, rather than trying to “claim” and dramatize the 
traumatic events themselves. Caruth states that trauma “defies” witnessing because it can 
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never be fully described and also “demands” witnessing because the experience 
persistently recurs to the sufferers in flashbacks. To account for trauma’s call for 
witnessing and its elusiveness, Caruth suggests we address trauma in “literary” language 
(5). Diamond similarly suggests that we should approach “the difficulty of reality” 
through literature. This enables readers to recognize the complexity of reality, even 
though the text cannot represent it. One function of posthumanist rhetoric is to evoke the 
difficulty of reality through its deconstruction of the subject and its insistence on the 
ambiguity of morality. According to Diamond, “the difficulty lies in the apparent 
resistance by reality to one’s ordinary modes of thinking: to appreciate the difficulty is to 
feel oneself being shouldered out of  . . . how one is apparently supposed to think, [and] 
to have a sense of the inability of thought to encompass what it is attempting to reach” 
(58). This graphic novel brings attention to the difficulty of reality by showing 
Deogratias’s struggle with it while not promoting or condemning any one approach to 
this difficulty.  
 By creating empathetic unsettlement through identification and disidentification 
with Deogratias, a perpetrator, the graphic novel brings attention to the complexity of the 
genocide and its causes. “Empathetic unsettlement” is a strategy that LaCapra suggests 
historians and others who read and write about traumatic events should use. Empathetic 
unsettlement results from the “virtual” not “vicarious” experience of trauma in which 
one imagines oneself in the victim’s position “while respecting the difference between 
self and other and recognizing that one cannot take the victim’s place or speak in the 
victim’s voice” (History in Transit 125). While LaCapra develops empathetic 
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unsettlement as a technique for recounting victims’ experiences, it also has potential for 
describing the experiences of collaborators who operated under coercion. Encouraging 
empathy with a perpetrator risks obscuring his or her agency and culpability; however, 
empathetic unsettlement is a way to relate how a person became a perpetrator without 
making him or her so sympathetic that this story diminishes the victims’ stories.  
 Deogratias creates empathy with the title character through narration. Because 
the story is told and illustrated from the perpetrator’s point of view, we develop more 
empathy for him than we otherwise would. The choice to have Deogratias transform into 
a stray dog, the subject of many public service campaigns in the West, likewise 
generates some sympathy for him, even though he makes for a beady-eyed, scruffy adult 
dog, rather than a cute, wide-eyed puppy typical of adoption materials. That the text 
illustrates Deogratias as a dog further encourages readers to accept his point of view. In 
these panels, other characters do not appear to see his transformations and behave as if 
he is delusional. The illustrations validate his transformations and guide readers to 
accept Deogratias’ blurring of his internal and external state. Therefore, the panels that 
feature transformations create identification between the readers and Deogratias. His 
submissive body language while in dog form also generates sympathy, particularly when 
he sheds anthropomorphic tears (Stassen 67).  
However, the dog transformations also unsettle the connection between reader 
and character. The “otherness” of the canine species is highlighted by how grotesque the 
process of transformation looks when it is illustrated. Also, near the end of the text, stray 
dogs are shown eating corpses during the genocide. As Keen sates, Deogratias as “a 
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scavenging dog that eats the flesh of the dead could be a mirror for the true self of a 
guilty survivor [which] evokes disgust as much as sympathy for the cringing creature” 
(140). Deogratias is associated with the scavengers because he transforms while 
crouching beside a pile of bodies that includes Apollinaria’s and Benina’s. Keen refers 
to this action as his self-condemnation (152).  
The transformation emphasizes the “bestial” nature of his crimes by aligning him 
with the dogs, while also acknowledging his actions were even worse than theirs. Like 
the dogs, Deogratias did not hate Tutsis, and he figuratively feeds on their corpses 
because he participated in their deaths to sustain his own life. However, as the novel’s 
audience likely holds only humans, not dogs, to a moral standard, they should find his 
crimes more reprehensible. While I maintain that Deogratias would best be described as 
“humanist posthumanism” because it uses animals to reflect on aspects of human trauma 
rather than considering the ontological status of nonhumans, the dog transformations can 
be interpreted as undermining the divide between humans and nonhumans, a 
qualification for “posthumanist posthumanism.”   
The comparison between Deogratias and the scavenging dogs implies that neither 
one is a fully conscious agent. However, though the graphic novel seems to imply 
human consciousness is not completely unique, it does not carry out Heise’s call to 
portray it as just “one mode of being among others” without making any claims of 
human uniqueness (505-6). Deogratias does not present readers with other modes of 
consciousness as literal animals do not appear often, and it seems to imply that morality 
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is unique to human consciousness. That is, the dog version of Deogratias expresses 
regret through tears, but the actual dogs in the illustrations do not.  
Because Deogratias’s attempts to excuse or erase his culpability (through 
delusions and murder) are shown in a negative light, the text does not diminish Hutu and 
French culpability, as Hron suggests. The reader is never encouraged to identify with 
characters who do not experience regret, such as French sergeant and Julius. Also, 
though the flashbacks create empathy for Deogratias, they simultaneously heighten our 
empathy for Apollinaria, Benina, and Venetia. This means that our empathy for 
Deogratias is deeply unsettled at the end of the text when Deogratias reveals how he 
victimized them. Because we have seen the friends grow up together, we have an 
understanding of the sisters’ terror as well as their feeling of betrayal as Deogratias 
participates in their torture, but we also may retain some understanding for Deogratias 
who may have been killed by extremists if he did not join them. His decision to return to 
the women’s corpses, where he expects to be killed by the RPF, indicates his regret for 
taking their lives to preserve his own, as do his involuntary dog transformations that 
prevent him from joining his community’s project of moving on with life.   
 These transformations critique the use of animalizing language to enable the 
abuse of humans and show that its use continues even in the aftermath of the genocide. 
The villagers mockingly call Deogratias a dog because they are not sympathetic about 
his delusions. They treat him like a stray dog, dehumanizing him because he is a 
homeless beggar rather than a productive member of the village. The graphic novel 
makes parallels between the Hutu’s dehumanization of the Tutsis as cockroaches, a term 
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that appeared in both government and popular discourse, and the townspeople’s behavior 
when they treat Deogratias like a dog. On the first page of the graphic novel, the owner 
of a hotel bar brandishes a club at Deogratias and tells him to “beat it” (1). On the next 
page, the French sergeant who helped murderers flee has returned as tourist. He calls 
two Tutsi women “bitches” and implies that the worst thing about the genocide is that 
there are now fewer Tutsi women to have sex with. Moments later, the man is 
recollecting Venetia and is about to squash a cockroach with a bottle when Deogratias 
yells “No!” and knocks his hand out the way (5). This row of panels becomes more 
significant at the end of the book, in which we learn that Deogratias witnessed men rape 
Venetia with a bottle and behead her in a panel that is reminiscent of the one with the 
cockroach. The earlier panel is a skewed close up of the cockroach and a bottle 
surrounded by puddles of condensation. The later panel is a similarly framed close up of 
Venetia’s corpse and a bottle surrounded by puddles of blood. 
 There are also panels from before, during, and after the genocide in which Hutus 
call Tutsis cockroaches, showing that the racism that led to the genocide continues. The 
graphic novel does not imply that dehumanizing Deogratias, an individual, is identical to 
inciting hatred against an entire group and committing genocide, but, rather, indicates 
that dehumanization is a deeply rooted practice that cannot be overcome by a few years 
of human rights activism. The townspeople behave as if they have moved on after the 
genocide and mock Deogratias for his debilitating delusions. In this village, 
remembering trauma dehumanizes one; the human is that which forgets distressing 
experiences. Yet, this means that the villagers unthinkingly reiterate dehumanizing 
 179 
 
discourse in their treatment of Deogratias. The text itself does not specify an optimal 
approach to memory. Though the town is critiqued for dehumanizing Deogratias and 
mocking him for preserving the trauma of the genocide, we also see how destructive 
Deogratias is. Because the graphic novel does not provide us with an ethical approach to 
memories of genocide, it highlights the difficulty of the genocide’s reality for the reader, 
who now must turn to a range of texts and experiences if she wishes to draw conclusions 
about memory, culpability, and reconciliation. Therefore, Smile Through the Tears can 
be productively read alongside Deogratias. 
The Duty to Resolve Trauma by Locating Culpability in Smile Through the Tears 
 Bazambanza’s work of creative nonfiction also reflects on what one’s duty to the 
memory of genocide may be and implies that the duty is to make memory useful. The 
text deflects the difficulty of reality of the genocide to claim that we can clearly 
determine its causes and that by remembering them we can spot other potential 
genocides and intervene. This text is more straightforward in content and structure than 
Stassen’s because its aim is different. When Cicero outlined the three functions of 
rhetoric as to teach, please, and move, he stated that whichever was the predominant aim 
would determine whether the orator would use plain, middle, or ornate style. The 
transmogrifications, disordered chronology, and use of framed and unframed panels are 
visual manifestations of ornate style in Deogratias. Cicero warns that the orator of this 
style must “temper his abundance with the other two styles” or risk being seen as a 
“raving madman” by his audience (99). While Stassen does include a few tempered 
teaching scenes, Deogratias the text like Deogratias the character comes across as 
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“mad.” This effect is constructed, not the result of a lack of precision as it would be with 
Cicero’s unsuccessful orator, but as a method of representing trauma.30  
 In contrast, one of the main functions of Smile is to educate English and French 
speakers, both those in the West and Rwanda, about the historical context of the 
genocide. The text places culpability on specific individuals and political groups by 
creating an easy-to-follow narrative of events leading up to the genocide. However, by 
its very medium, the graphic novel goes beyond the merely educative function. Whereas 
the illustrations in a technical manual would be a visual example of plain style intended 
to teach, those in comics and graphic novels are meant to please and/or move, though 
they are also capable of teaching. Michael Chaney criticizes Smile for “blurring the 
boundaries between history and propaganda, memory and imagination”; however, such 
blurring is inherent to works of creative nonfiction (93-4).   
Though the dramatization gives historical figures dialog they might not have said 
and therefore reveals Bazambanza’s interpretation of Hutu leaders’ motivations rather 
than uncritically presenting accurate quotations, the stated aim of the text is not to 
demonize particular Hutus but to “tell the whole world right to its face how racism was 
an abomination” and prevent genocide from occurring again (Bazambanza, preface). The 
dramatization is crucial to this mission because it rehumanizes the victims, counter-
acting the dehumanizing discourses involved in the genocide by depicting Tutsis as 
individuals rather than a homogenous group. The illustrated narrative about the Rwanga 
                                               
30 While original aim of Deogratias was not to educate about the context of the genocide, this shifted after 
the French text garnered acclaim. The English edition comes with an introduction by the translator, Alexis 
Siegel, about the facts of the genocide, and the text has been recommended for classroom use by 
Feigelman in School Library Journal and Taylor in Teacher Librarian. 
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family means the text engages readers by creating identification with the major 
characters and emotional investment in their fates. The narrative propels the reader 
forward because the graphic novel is told from the point of view of the Rwangas as they 
are experiencing events.  
 Smile uses the graphic medium to guide readers to value Tutsis as a population 
by encouraging the reader to feel sympathy and admiration for individuals. Chaney 
refers to the text as primarily a “hagiography” (94). Christianity is very present in Smile. 
God is clearly present at multiple moments, such as when he tells a white missionary to 
protect the Tutsis instead of fleeing the country (Bazambanza 43). The Rwangas, 
particularly the women, express religious devotion. Chaney analyzes one moment in 
which Hyacinthe calls out to God for aid when she is being assaulted by the soldier 
outside of RTLM (94). Her face is lifted up to heaven and lit by heavenly rays of light 
(Bazambanza 29).31  
Hyacinthe is further sanctified as she repeatedly turns down opportunities to use 
her sexuality for material gain. Before the genocide, but when oppression is heightening, 
a French soldier propositions Hyacinthe and suggests that he might be willing to take her 
to France. She angrily rejects him and later the priest who offers to hide her during the 
genocide. Hyancinthe becomes a martyr when she tells the priest “I would rather die 
than shame myself before you!” and he sends her out to the street where she is killed 
(59). While Hyacinthe is portrayed as saintly, the reason she expresses for valuing her 
virginity is that she does not wish to “dishonour” her parents (13, 59). Though 
                                               
31 The graphic novel does not consider questions such as whether or not God was to intervene during the 
genocide, and the author expresses no blame or anger at God for the genocide. 
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presumably religion plays a part in her and her parents’ investment in her virginity, none 
of them specifically cite it, which makes her portrayal more three-dimensional than a 
“hagiography.” That Hyacinthe sacrifices her life for familial as much as religious 
devotion helps rehumanize her as an individual, rather than a saint, whose material 
connections to family are important to her and reminds readers she is genuinely missed 
by people. 
Smile is a tribute to the Rwanga family, but invests them with human rather than 
saintly dignity. Their human imperfections also encourage empathetic unsettlement in 
Western readers because they are dramatized in scenes that are specific to the Rwanga 
family. For example, although the parents try to teach their children not to stereotype, 
their son Wilson makes a generalization about Hutus (31-2). His mother Rose chides 
him for it, which reinforces her role in the text as an advocate for nondiscrimination, but 
the scene shows how difficult this project is because even a Rwanga falls short of it. The 
family also experiences tension when their other son, Degroot, joins the MDR. This 
political party plans to oppose President Habyarimana, but the father Charles has an 
outburst of anger because MDR led the 1959 revolution in which many Tutsi civilians 
were murdered. While Western readers may be able to relate to family disagreements 
about politics, the text is clear that the stakes are very different for the Rwangas.  
This interaction serves to humanize the Rwanga family by showing they are 
subject to disagreement and expressions of anger. Despite this moment of tension 
between Charles and Degroot, the Rwanga men are all presented positively, and it is 
obvious that the family cares deeply about each other. Charles sacrifices himself in an 
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attempt to save his children, and Rose repeatedly tries to trade her life for her children’s. 
Rose is the person for whom Bazambanza encourages the most admiration because she 
also functions as the “teaching” voice of the text. Rose is the only Rwanga survivor, and 
Bazambanza reconnected with her after the genocide. In his preface, Bazambanza 
invests her with credibility when he writes:  
A living emblem of an entire generation of ethnic betrayal, this extraordinary 
woman has refused to respond to hatred with hatred. She hasn’t lost her smile, a 
smile so captivating that people stop in the street to look at it. But today her smile 
appears turned toward the hereafter, turned perhaps to her loved ones who watch 
her from on high. Is there any other way she could have salvaged some hope for 
herself? It was to honour this  woman’s calm courage, and to affirm our resolve 
to overcome our despair and live normal lives, that I chose to include the word 
‘smile’ in the title of this spine-chilling tale. 
In this passage, he positions Rose as a spokesperson for Rwandans because of both her 
experience and her reaction to it. She is emblematic because she was orphaned by the 
1959 genocide and lost her husband and children in the 1994 one. Bazambanza does not 
restrict her iconic status to Tutsi experience, but to “ethnic betrayal” in Rwanda as a 
whole. Therefore, the preface implies Rose has the ability to provide a comprehensive 
representation of the genocide.  
Unlike Deogratias, which bears the subtitle A Tale of Rwanda, Smile presents 
Rose’s life as the tale of Rwanda, making a metaphorical identification between her and 
all Rwandans whereas Deogratias opts for a metonymic identification. Ratcliffe explains 
 184 
 
that “metaphor foregrounds resemblances based on commonalities, thus backgrounding 
differences; metonym foregrounds resemblances based on juxtaposed associations, thus 
foregrounding both commonalities and differences” (emphasis in original, 68). This 
metaphorical identification in Smile undercuts some of the empathetic unsettlement 
created in the narrative itself, in which Rwanga family experiences are depicted with 
specificity.  
Rose’s status as a Christian is also used to give her words authority beyond her 
own personal experience and legitimize her metaphorical identification with all 
Rwandans. According to Bazambanza, Rose’s smile is derived from her interaction with 
the souls of her loved ones. Thus, it becomes a symbol of her divine wisdom. 
Bazambanza’s rhetorical question reinforces Rose’s credibility by implying that her 
path, a Christian trust in the promise of life after death, is the only way to 
psychologically survive the genocide. In the final sentence of this passage, Bazambanza 
identifies himself with Rose and all Rwandans through the ambiguous use of “our.” 
Therefore, while Hron is right to point out that survivors’ narratives can enhance 
readers’ understanding of the genocide, these narratives are, as she also acknowledges, 
“partial and politicized” (173). That Bazambanza’s work does not acknowledge its own 
partiality is perhaps due to his political and spiritual perspectives. Because Bazambanza 
states in his preface that he believes God spared him to be a witness to the genocide and 
also paints Rose as such a divinely appointed witness, their testimony is presented as 
complete rather than partial.  
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 The graphic novel therefore develops an ethos for Rose’s character as the 
spokesperson for morality and has her state moral lessons plainly. Unlike Deogratias, 
Smile argues that clear moral lessons can be derived from the genocide. Rose says “to 
me the lesson [of the genocide] is this: none of us has the right to take the law into our 
own hands. We must let justice take its course. After all, impunity is what made the 
genocide possible in the first place” (62). The panel that contains this dialog is a close up 
of Rose’s determined face, turned to the right with her eyes looking slightly up. Because 
we read from left to right, the direction of her face implies she is oriented towards the 
future. The sensation of forward movement is especially strong in this graphic novel due 
to the page layout. Though there are some panels set in the past, they are not trauma-
induced flashbacks, but narrative histories told to educate people about events leading up 
to the 1994 genocide. Every page, whether set before, during, or after 1994, consists of 
rows of panels arranged in chronological order from left to right.  
 Rose’s lessons are focused on the future. For example, when she is feeling 
despondent about rebuilding her family’s home only to live there alone she tells herself 
“It’s one way to honour the memory of my loved ones” (63). Thus, she sees 
constructive, future-oriented actions as more appropriate than melancholia. Even before 
the genocide, Rose was focused on improving her community. She intervened when a 
Hutu man mistreated his wife and instructed her children to refrain from stereotyping 
others. After the genocide, she continues to correct her neighbors’ behavior and smooth 
over ethnic tensions. This is a positive sign of what Herman calls “commonality,” or the 
resolution of trauma through re-establishing one’s connection to others, “belonging to a 
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society, [and] having a public role” (236). Because Rose is the moral center of Smile and 
the model for recovery, she has the last words of the text, telling young Rwandans that 
their mission is to “restore harmony so that [their] children will never know the meaning 
of the words ‘racial discrimination’” (64). In this final panel, she motions towards a 
sunny path that leads past two mass graves and into the horizon. There is no visible 
destination. Like Rose’s advice, the image is inspirational but vague. Readers are left to 
determine their own ways to achieve this goal, which means that, like the readers of 
Deogratias, they are shown that they need to draw on a variety of texts to make 
decisions about what actions are appropriate. 
 Smile itself demonstrates one productive way to follow this path: learn from 
history and share those lessons with others. Smile is structured to convey a great deal of 
information about Rwandan history. In contrast to Deogratias, this work is very text-
heavy. Many panels are more word than image because Rose, her husband, and the 
narrator describe the context of the genocide and name the political and military leaders 
who instigated it. The book also contains explanatory footnotes when characters allude 
to a past event or political organization. Smile implies that all memory should be made 
useful. As Rose tells her son’s former fiancée and a young orphan she found calling for 
his parents at a mass grave, “None of your loved ones who are now dead would wish us 
to live our lives in mourning. What they want is for us to rise as one and combat the 
barbarism of a country that devours its own” (64). Because the preface implied that Rose 
interacts with the spirits of her own loved ones and describes her as “emblematic” of the 
generation who experienced the genocide, she has the credibility to speak for the dead. 
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According to Rose and Smile, memory is important when it identifies culpability so that 
one knows what to fight against.  
 One place Smile locates blame is the West. The opening page of the graphic 
novel states the legitimate and oft-made criticism that the international community could 
have stopped the genocide, but also goes a step further to claim that “the real question is 
why the international community did nothing against the country’s systematic racial 
discrimination” before the genocide even began (1). Smile chides Westerners for being 
more interested in protecting gorillas than Rwandan humans. This criticism aligns the 
West with Hutu extremists because President Habyarimana is quoted as saying that he 
will not allow refugees from the 1959 Hutu Revolution to return to the country for fear 
that they will impinge on gorilla habitats (2). This panel contains his official discourse in 
a speech balloon, and is followed by a panel of one of his Hutu listeners with a thought 
balloon containing his interpretation of the speech. This man is happy that Tutsi refugees 
are not allowed to return because Hutus commandeered their lands and do not want to 
relinquish them. The strategy of using gorillas’ endangerment to exclude humans from 
their land is repeatedly referenced in Smile. These panels imply that, though the West 
heard the official discourse, they ignored the subtext either willingly or due to cultural 
ignorance of Rwandan race relations.  
 Both Smile and Deogratias remind readers of their status as Westerners and 
bystanders, but Stassen’s text is less critical of them. Deogratias seems to accept that 
their ability for agency is minimal because it presents Westerners’ inaction during and 
after the genocide as due less to a conscious choice on their part and more to a variety of 
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influences and ignorance that was not entirely willful. Ignorance among Westerners who 
lived in Rwanda is critiqued through the character of a Belgian missionary who asks 
Deogratias what ethnic group he belongs to as a way of establishing a deeper 
relationship with him. The man does not realize that this question is objectionable to 
Deogratias because he refuses to believe that ethnicity is a central part of one’s identity 
and opposes the country’s pervasive racism. However, the character can also be used to 
excuse the ignorance among those in the West whose only exposure to Rwanda was 
mediated by news sources.  
Because Stassen’s book shows how a moderate Hutu like Deogratias chose to 
commit rape and murder of his loved ones through the influence of his community and 
threats to his life, it is more willing to acknowledge a lack of agency in everyone, 
including Western bystanders. The problem with such a view of the world is, of course, 
that it makes it more difficult to locate blame. In contrast, Smile’s approach enables the 
text to place responsibility on those who were culpable for and/or complicit in the 
genocide. Therefore, the text gives hope that justice can be carried out on at least some 
parties and that similar actions can be prevented in the future. 
 Along with locating Western culpability, Smile establishes the human dignity of 
Tutsis by contrasting the West’s attitude toward humans and nonhumans in Rwanda. The 
text positions gorillas and humans against each other in the fight for Western aid, yet 
also hints at the posthumanist argument that the lives of the people and animals of a 
place are intertwined. When the genocidal regime realized it would be ousted, it had 
many of the gorillas killed so that the new government could not profit from Western 
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interest in them. Bazambanza’s relation of this fact is scathing: “In the end, racial 
discrimination benefited no one. Had it only known, the world might have at least saved 
the gorillas!” (61). However, the illustration has a different tone. It is a close-up of a 
gorilla corpse facing the viewer in a puddle of blood. This image is reminiscent of 
previous ones of human bodies. Sometimes the human remains are jumbled into piles or 
are casually placed in the background of a panel to indicate the scale of the genocide and 
the apathy of the murderers. However, some panels focus on the face of a corpse, 
reminding a reader that each of the 800,000 murdered were individual lives. By 
containing only one gorilla, the panel implies that gorillas too are individuals and that 
each one’s death matters for more than economic reasons.   
 Though the graphic novel shames the West for focusing more on gorillas than 
humans, it also creates a connection between Tutsis and nature in order to heighten the 
importance of their suffering by illustrating the animals and landscapes in line with 
Tutsis’ emotions.  As Chaney states, “affect itself is transported from the scene of the 
human to that of the clouds, the trees, or the jungle. . . The front cover, after all, depicts 
Rose Rwanga beside a gorilla; between them a tree bleeds where a machete has cut it. 
The jungle is thus history’s feeling mediator” (99). Chaney identifies “animal witnesses” 
in the white doves that appear after the Rwanga men die and the gorilla that an RPF 
soldier suggests is “begging us to right the wrongs [gorillas] have suffered at the hands 
of the MRND” (Bazambanza 19). These animals work as expressions of the pathetic 
fallacy, reflecting Tutsi emotions. 
 190 
 
According to Chaney, this use of animals “imbues Bazambanza’s characters, as 
well as his readers, with an ethics that everywhere seems to transcend the human, 
stretched cosmologically between the sanctity of the angel and the quietude of the 
animal” (99-100). This transcendent ethics is not the posthumanist ethics described by 
Bauman or Zylinska. Rather, Smile identifies Christian, human-focused ethics in all 
levels of the world. The doves are a cipher for the Rwanga’s Christian souls and, while 
the gorillas are depicted as living beings who suffer, they also serve to show the RPF as 
virtuous because, in contrast to the corrupt MRND, they are presented as the gorillas’ 
defenders. 
One animal witness Chaney does not mention is the frog that sees the 
Interahamwe chase the Rwanga men and other captives. One prisoner, Joseph Bitega, 
falls into the gutter where the frog is. Unlike other animals, the frog has a speech bubble. 
Instead of a symbol of Tutsi righteousness, like the doves and the gorillas, the frog 
seems to be an individual. Its speech bubble contains only a question mark, which is a 
reflection of both its species difference from humans and a similarity between humans 
and nonhumans that is more than a pathetic fallacy. According to Chaney, the animal 
witness “invoke[es] the same questions of address and audience that relentlessly vex 
traumatic narratives,” namely that the genocide is “so vicious that it strains human 
comprehension and the vicissitudes of narrating or indeed receiving the story of that 
killing” (Chaney 95). The frog’s wordless reaction works as an indication that human 
actions are often incomprehensible to other animals and that the genocide is 
incomprehensible to humans as well because it is impossible to translate it into verbal 
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form. While the doves and gorillas further the narrative telling of trauma, the frog is a 
witness to the “difficulty of reality” encountered by those who attempt to turn trauma 
into a narrative. 
Developing Ethos to Convey the Duty of Memory 
 The stated goal of Smile is not to make individuals aware of the entangled 
relationship between Rwandans, wildlife, and the land, but to prevent genocide through 
education. In the preface, Bazambanza explains that he created the book because he 
wondered why he survived when so many others died and concluded, “I was spared so 
that I could be a witness. My mission was to be a town crier; I was to tell the whole 
world right to its face how racism was an abomination. I was to say this loud and clear, 
in the hopes of preventing another genocide or similarly terrible crime.” He fulfills this 
exigence by educating people on the sociopolitical trends that led up to genocide and by 
encouraging them to identify with the victims of genocide by showing the suffering of a 
particular family. Bazambanza establishes an ethos as a survivor who has not only 
experienced the genocide, but also reached conclusions about it. He positions himself 
like he does Rose, as a survivor who has found direction and purpose in life by taking up 
a social cause.  
 Stassen does not speak directly to his audience, so his ethos is established 
differently than Bazambanza’s. The back cover of Deogratias is filled with praise from 
reviewers, something made possible by the Belgian text’s renown and the size of the 
English language publisher, First Second. In contrast, Bazambanza’s book was published 
by a small Canadian press, Soul Asylum, and has no reviewer quotations on the back. 
 192 
 
However, it does feature an excerpt from Bazambanza’s preface which establishes the 
authority of the survivor ethos. Because he has experienced the genocide, the back cover 
implies, he does not need Western reviewers to give their approval of his representation 
of it. In contrast, Stassen is not a survivor. He grew up in Belgium, so his biographical 
blurb seeks to establish his authority to write about the genocide by stating that he “has 
travelled all over the world” and “eventually settled with his family in Rwanda.” This 
section positions Stassen as cosmopolitan, implying he has an informed and complex 
view of the world while also establishing him as a Rwandan because he has chosen to 
make his home there. Thus Stassen is credited with detachment that enables critical 
thought, but avoids charges of passivity that have beset cosmopolitanism since the 
nineteenth century (Linklater 33). The blurb also establishes the authority of Stassen’s 
account of the genocide through awards, stating that he won “the prestigious Goscinny 
Prize” for Deogratias and “many awards” for other works. Below Stassen’s bio, it is 
noted that Deogratias was also declared the ALA Best Book for Young Adults and 
YALSA Great Graphic Novel.  
 Though Deogratias has received more acclaim, Smile is an equally valuable text. 
Deogratias is more well-known not only because it is older and was taken up by a larger 
publishing house, but also perhaps because it takes a more “literary” approach to trauma. 
Hron rightly points out that literary accounts of the genocide are more popular than 
testimonial ones and that this needs to be corrected. Smile walks a middle ground 
between the two. Though Bazambanza positions himself as a survivor in his preface, he 
only makes a cameo in the narrative, so his ethos is replaced by Rose’s. Smile’s middle 
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style and clearly stated lessons are easily grasped by the reader, while Deogratias is 
purposely difficult to comprehend. Deogratias’s difficulty as a text indicates that 
refusing closure is a valuable, though dangerous, form of mourning because it insists that 
the reality of the genocide is complex, even incomprehensible, and cannot be contained 
in a single narrative.32  
While mourning is traditionally seen as a way to “work through” trauma, 
Cvetkovich explains that refusing to resolve mourning is important when the cause of 
trauma has not been resolved (164). By refusing to resolve trauma, Deogratias reminds 
readers that racial tensions have not disappeared in Rwanda and that the attitudes that 
make genocide possible, including not only the extremists’ hatred, but also others’ 
complicity, continue to exist in the world. Smile also reminds readers of continuing 
racial tensions and, unlike Deogratias, offers hope that they can be resolved through 
constructive uses of memory.  While Smile attempts to create a comprehensive 
interpretation of the genocide that leads to a resolution of trauma, it can also be 
productively read in relationship to Deogratias as one of many responses to the duty of 
memory. In this way, the reader confronts the difficulty of reality of not only the 
genocide, but also the complex ways in which we address moral questions by engaging 
                                               
32 The text also critiques the post-genocide approach to justice and reconciliation. Deogratias is 
apprehended for murdering the “French tourist” after the genocide. This is the sergeant from the earlier 
panels, whose identity as a soldier who assisted genocidaires has been forgotten by the country’s officials. 
Ironically, Deogratias is not seized for his actions against Tutsis during the genocide. The text’s criticisms 
can be supplemented by other works on the aftermath of the genocide such as Jean Hatzfeld’s four 
collections of testimony by perpetrators and victims published from 2005-2010. Positive, negative, and 
ambivalent responses to the Gacaca courts, which were formed in 2001 to try accused Hutus and set 
relatively mild punishments for them, can also inform the reader of the ways in which the duty of memory, 
in tension with reconciliation, has been framed in Rwanda. 
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in rhetorical listening to these texts and their characters as metonymic depictions of 
Rwandan experiences. 
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CHAPTER V  
RHETORICS OF TRAUMA IN MEMOIRS ABOUT LIFE AFTER WAR*   
As discussed in the previous chapter, some texts may encourage what LaCapra 
calls “empathetic unsettlement” in their readers.33 Because LaCapra is a historian 
particularly interested in how we remember the Holocaust, he is largely concerned with 
interpretations of trauma written by those who, like himself, were not there. He 
concludes that accounts which strive to create identification without empathetic 
unsettlement may “conceal the ways survivors are not simply victims but may 
themselves become effective political and ethical agents” (History in Transit 142). 
Similarly, though Burke describes identification as a tool for joint action between two or 
more individuals or groups, Ratcliffe points out that this desire for identification can 
force the less powerful to compromise differences they deem important. Empathetic 
unsettlement allows for limited identification and survivor agency in joint actions 
between survivors and others. The trauma narrative, which features marginalized voices, 
can show how it is possible to resist the totalizing tendencies of consubstantiality by 
seeking rhetorical identification when evoking a reader’s empathy while also limiting 
identification by stressing the specificity of the traumatic experience and the effects of 
the traumatic aftermath. The result can be a call for social action that recognizes the 
diversity of individual experiences.  
                                               
* Portions of this chapter have been previously published in “‘I Was Ready For a Mending’: Rhetorics of 
Trauma and Recovery in Doug Peacock's Grizzly Years and Walking it Off” in Rhetoric Review 30.4 (Fall 
2011): 406-422. Copyright 2011 by Taylor & Francis Group.
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This chapter analyzes texts by two authors with different political aims to show 
that writing, and the consubstantiality that is part of this process, is a means of recovery 
that accommodates a variety of viewpoints. This chapter alternates between analyzing 
Doug Peacock’s and Jay Kopelman’s writing, moving through a discussion of different 
forms of consubstantiality present in the texts. Peacock and Kopleman, veterans of the 
Vietnam and Iraq Wars respectively, seek to both explain the impact of war on their 
psyches by depicting trauma for their readers and remind these readers that they cannot 
fully comprehend the writer’s experiences. Their experiences in war have also shaped 
the writers’ relationships with nonhumans, the central topic of the texts. However, each 
writer understands consubstantiality across species in different ways, with Peacock 
focusing on the disidentification between humans and “wild” animals, namely grizzly 
bears, and Kopelman creating strong identifications between traumatized soldiers and a 
dog who also lived in a combat zone. The writers interpret their relationships with 
animals to create consubstantiality among their versions of their selves.  
Doug Peacock’s memoirs Grizzly Years (1990) and Walking it Off (2005) achieve 
consubstantiality through the literary interpretation of trauma, which aids their rhetorical 
function as environmentalist appeals. Jay Kopelman’s From Baghdad to America: Life 
Lessons from a Dog Named Lava (2008) also uses trauma to build consubstantiality, but 
with the goal of helping service members seek mental health treatment. The texts from 
both writers are memoirs by soldiers returning home from war and their experiences 
with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). They consider the importance of animals as 
therapeutic to humans. Peacock finds tracking grizzly bears and advocating for their 
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conservation a source of healing. Kopelman describes how Lava, the dog he rescued 
from Iraq, displays symptoms of PTSD and helps him recognize these symptoms in 
himself and seek treatment. The type of change each writer seeks to create is different, 
which affects how their texts create identification. Peacock’s project is more 
posthumanist in that he encourages readers to see humans as both insignificant parts of 
nature, vulnerable to grizzly attacks, and powerfully destructive. To convince readers 
that grizzlies should be left alone, Peacock makes connections between individual 
trauma, the devastation of war, and the destruction of wild animals and their habitats. He 
criticizes government, war, and conservationist efforts that put human convenience over 
animal lives.  
In contrast, Kopelman is focused on validating his and other service members’ 
difficulties after redeployment and encouraging these individuals to seek treatment for 
symptoms of PTSD. He uses his dog Lava, whom he adopted in Iraq against military 
protocol and brought to the U.S., as a point of identification for this audience because 
Lava also displays symptoms of trauma. Because Lava successfully adapts to domestic 
life through behavioral therapy and medication, he models how humans can treat PTSD. 
Kopelman criticizes military policies against pets and military culture that makes it 
difficult for soldiers to seek psychological counseling, but, unlike Peacock, continues to 
see enemy combatants as one-dimensional “bad guys” and trusts that the Iraq War has a 
positive effect that outweighs the devastation he witnessed. He also leaves the humanist 
distinctions between human and animal relatively unblurred. Though Lava is depicted as 
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having a complicated internal life, Kopelman’s focus on dogs is the value they have for 
the people who care about them. 
Both Kopelman and Peacock’s texts conform nicely to Michelle Balaev’s 
definition of the trauma narrative as one that “demonstrates how a traumatic event 
disrupts attachments between self and others by challenging fundamental assumptions 
about moral laws and social relationships that are themselves connected to specific 
environments” (150). This definition applies to Peacock’s creative nonfiction because 
the source of trauma is his time as a medic in Vietnam, where he saw people 
dehumanized and the land destroyed—effects of an ideology that he links to the 
destruction of American wilderness. The memoirs use trauma to establish identification 
with the audience and persuade them to value not only the grizzlies and their habitat, but 
also other humans. Grizzly Years is Peacock’s account of tracking bears during the 
1970s and 80s, interspersed with flashbacks to his experiences in Vietnam. In this text, 
recovery is initiated by what should be a traumatic moment: he is almost charged by a 
grizzly. He experiences an adrenaline rush, then collapses, realizing “I was ready for a 
mending” (51). The vulnerability of the body is the source of both trauma and recovery 
because it indicates that, no matter how destructive humans can be, there are limits to 
their power. This is not to say that Peacock does not underestimate the power of humans 
as a species to drive grizzlies to extinction. He characterizes the 1970s approach to 
wildlife management as “The grizzly could accommodate our notion of what a stroll in 
the woods ought to be or go the way of the passenger pigeon” (270). He finds the 
experience of vulnerability in the face of the bear a valuable insight into humans’ ability 
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to change for the sake of another species, rather than attempting to change or eliminate 
it. 
When Balaev uses the word “environment,” she means both the social and 
geographical aspects of place, and Kopelman’s concerns are largely social as he has 
difficulties interacting with people in an environment where the threat of violent death is 
largely absent. After redeployment, Kopelman finds that he is quicker to anger with 
others because his service convinced him that any concerns unrelated to life and death in 
the war are petty. This is a significant shift in “fundamental assumptions” that leads to 
the dissolution of some relationships. Though Kopelman states that he does not have 
PTSD, From Baghdad to America shares the characteristics of a trauma narrative as 
described by Balaev. Kopelman believes that Lava has PTSD and finds that he can 
identify with many of Lava’s symptoms. He comes to realize that many of the strategies 
used to help Lava recover can also help him remake connections. At the end of the book, 
Lava is continuing to take medication and Kopelman has decided to return to therapy, 
not because their attempts at healing have been unsuccessful, but because recovery is an 
on-going process.  
Peacock’s term “mending” is likewise significant because, as Herman writes, 
“[r]esolution of the trauma is never final; recovery is never complete” (211). “Mending” 
implies an active renegotiation of relationships that is not expressive of a desire to return 
to the past, but of a will to survive. Ruth Leys explains that PTSD is understood as 
“fundamentally a disorder of memory” in which the survivor’s past intrudes upon the 
present in the form of incoherent memories, flashbacks, nightmares, etc. (2). According 
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to this model, these disruptions affect the survivor’s ability to live in and interact with 
the present. Peacock and Kopelman’s books indicate that “mending” is possible by 
interpreting trauma through the act of writing. The books focus not on the original 
traumatic events, but the experience of PTSD and the difficulty of redefining one’s 
relationships. Because they are written for a public audience and have the rhetorical goal 
of inspiring group action (for wilderness conservation or a shift in military culture to de-
stigmatize mental health services), the texts suggest a model for healing that is 
underpinned by consubstantiality. This model creates new attachments after old ones 
have been disrupted by trauma. Peacock’s texts illustrate how he builds consubstantiality 
with the grizzlies, with himself as he reconstructs identity after the disruption of trauma, 
and with his audience. Similarly, Kopelman creates consubstantiality with Lava, himself, 
and his audience—particularly those who have recent military service.  
Consubstantiality in Depictions of Trauma 
PTSD is an exigence for both Grizzly Years and From Baghdad to America. In 
the first, PTSD results in the need to persuade the readers to adopt Peacock’s 
understanding of humans as part of nature, rather than above it, and to work for grizzly 
conservation. Kopelman seeks to persuade readers that everyone, human or animal, is 
shaped by their experiences and that if some of these experiences have resulted in 
symptoms of PTSD, they should seek treatment. Both texts depict symptoms of trauma 
to enhance their persuasiveness by building consubstantiality with the reader. In both 
texts, trauma means that one cannot control when and how the past intrudes on the 
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present. Flashbacks are depicted, then not explained, in Grizzly Years. Similarly, 
Kopelman records racing thoughts in his text and does not interpret them. 
In Grizzly Years, Peacock describes traumatic events with little to no reflection, 
instead using narrative structure to build identification with readers and direct their 
interpretation of the text. The structure is shaped by his bouts of malaria, one of which 
was arrested by his first grizzly encounter when a bear almost charged him. These flare-
ups are associated with PTSD both literally and metaphorically. Peacock contracted the 
illness in Vietnam, and its recurrent episodes not only evoke the repetitive quality of 
trauma, but also induce flashbacks. The structure of Grizzly Years creates identification 
by mimicking this effect of trauma for the reader, with disturbing scenes from Vietnam 
inserted into the narrative seemingly at random. “Triggers” are sometimes present, like a 
change in weather or the physical symptoms of an on-coming episode of malaria, but the 
reader is no more prepared for these flashbacks than Peacock’s character is. Also, there 
is no “talking through” after the flashbacks. Peacock does not reflect on them, much less 
impose a definitive interpretation of the events’ significance on the reader.  
Despite the lack of verbal explanation, the reader is guided to interpret the 
memories by the structure of the narrative. The Vietnam interludes are examples of how, 
though Peacock often refrains from reflective analysis in this text, he is conscious of his 
readers and attempts to create a mutual interpretation with them through the non-
narrative structure of the book. One example is the section in which Peacock describes 
investigating a tunnel in Vietnam. Inside, he discovers several dead bodies and also 
hears the breathing of a Vietcong fighter. Peacock explains that “Whoever was there 
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could have killed me or tried to at any time. But he did not. . .  All I could hear was the 
regular sound of breathing. He did not move. He just sat there with the dead, and so did 
I” (40). Peacock then leaves the tunnel and tells his comrades that the place is empty. He 
does not interpret his action in the text, but its position in the narrative—it comes soon 
before Peacock’s first encounter with a grizzly—does give the reader a context for 
understanding it by drawing comparisons between Peacock’s interaction with this man 
and with grizzlies and therefore creates identification between reader and writer. Both 
the man and the bear, the enemy and the animal Other, display mercy despite perceiving 
him as a threat.  
Peacock’s first grizzly encounter is accidental and could have been fatal, but the 
moment is not traumatic. It allows the previous Vietnam scene to be interpreted as not 
just a harrowing brush with death that makes one feel powerless over one’s life or one’s 
ability to effect change, but also as an opportunity to reevaluate one’s relationship to 
other people and the world. The tunnel scene becomes interpretable in light of the 
grizzly scene and vice versa. In both, Peacock encounters an individual from an Othered 
group and the two are able to construct consubstantiality without verbal communication. 
The point of identification in both situations is that both parties feel threatened by the 
Other and subsequently realize that the Other does not wish to harm them. That the 
reader is able to reach this interpretation of Peacock’s experience also creates a point of 
identification between the audience and their perception of the writer because they 
reflect on the significance of his memories. 
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Rather than using silence rhetorically, Kopelman records his inner monologues 
of racing thoughts to show how his experiences in Iraq continue to affect him. However, 
like Peacock, he does not interpret these moments for the readers. In From Baghdad to 
America, circling thoughts and second-guessing open the book. Kopelman has just 
gotten Lava to his home in San Diego, and the dog runs into the street and is hit by a car. 
Phrases like “It’s happening again” and “wounded—not injured, wounded—puppy” 
(italics in original 4) evoke Kopelman’s experiences witnessing violence and suffering in 
Iraq without explicitly making a connection between Lava and wounded or killed 
Marines. On the way to the veterinarian, Kopelman states that “My mind is racing, 
taunting me: You broke the rules to get Lava here, and you deserve this. It’s some kind of 
sick karma coming down and you’re gonna lose Lava because you broke those fucking 
rules and saved a fucking dog. Asshole!” (italics in original 4). Kopelman’s self-blaming 
for an accident that is not his fault along with his frantic concern for Lava invites 
identification with readers by presenting Kopelman as, like many of them, caring deeply 
for his pet. However, he also limits this identification by indicating that his panic is 
shaped by his time in Iraq because he feels as if he is being punished for saving Lava.  
Kopelman’s shock that this could happen to his dog, which would be a fairly 
common reaction, is heightened by the contrast between the war zone he and Lava 
survived and the perceived safety of his home in the San Diego community of La Jolla. 
He asks “I mean, how in God’s name do you reconcile something like this with 
everything you know to be right? You’ve survived the absolute worst conditions in the 
world, including rocket attacks, mortar attacks, and suicide bombs . . . You come home 
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to ‘America’s Finest City,’ where you’re surrounded by surf, mountains, and desert—not 
to mention your friends and family—you don’t look before you cross the street one day, 
and wham! Just like that, it ends” (2). In this passage, Kopelman shifts from his own 
point of view, which entails an understanding of San Diego as removed from war with a 
landscape and social environment that comfortably enfolds one, to Lava’s as he is hit in 
the street. Such identifications between Kopelman’s and Lava’s thoughts occur 
throughout the book and will be discussed in the next section. 
Consubstantiality across Species 
 To speak of consubstantiality between individuals of different species implies a 
shared language, and Burke explains “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk 
his language by speech, gesture, tonality, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways 
with his” (55). Burke’s inclusion of the nonverbal in language resembles Wolfe’s claim 
that language does not make humans different from animals in kind but by degree on a 
continuum of communication techniques (Animal Rites 79). Wolfe’s example of a 
nonhuman using language is the chimp Lucy. About to throw a tantrum, she signed 
“Lucy cry,” recognizing herself and her actions (Animal Rites 84). Peacock’s approach 
to the bears has a significant difference in that he, for obvious reasons, takes the Burkean 
approach of learning their “language,” rather than, like the researchers working with 
Lucy, teaching the animals to use a system already granted the status of language. 
Peacock learns to read the grizzlies’ behaviors, to locate the bears, and, most 
importantly, to know how to avoid a direct encounter with them. Similarly, Kopelman 
draws on experience with domesticated dogs to read Lava’s behavior. For example, in 
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his first book From Baghdad, With Love: A Marine, the War, and a Dog Named Lava 
(2006), which details how he came to love Lava and the difficulties involved in bringing 
the dog to the U.S.,  he first assumes that Lava urinates whenever he sees him because 
he usually wakes the puppy up. Another marine tells him it is a sign of submission and 
Kopelman is disturbed because “I want him to be loyal, but I don’t want him to be 
submissive to anyone. I want him to survive” (With Love 69). As this book continues, 
and in To America, Lava takes more agency in their relationship.  
Though Burke theorizes about consubstantiality as if it were a meeting of two 
equal individuals, this is almost never the case. To take Lucy’s situation as an example, 
some systems of communication are privileged over others. Ratcliffe’s critique of 
consubstantiality is concerned with inequalities of institutionalized and discursive 
power, but she does mention that for Burke “substance,” the meaning of a term as 
shaped by its context, has a material dimension that is inextricable from the cultural one 
(56). Building consubstantiality across species draws attention to how both material and 
immaterial power plays a role in identification between parties and the compromises 
they reach.  
In Kopelman’s text, the power inequality between humans and dogs is made 
particularly evident when Lava is given antidepressant medication. He states, “I don’t 
want or need medication. Lava had no choice. It’s helped him enormously, though. 
Graham [Lava’s trainer] told me that medication has actually saved dogs’ lives; without 
it, they are just too hard to rehabilitate” (To America 126). While Kopelman tried 
behavioral training first and turned to medication only after Lava bites someone, the 
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choice between medication and euthanasia is constructed to privilege humans’ needs 
over dogs’ lives. The bite is material, but its “substance” as just cause for euthanasia is 
not. That is, limiting the options to medication or euthanasia for a dog who has bitten 
someone values human wellbeing over the dog’s life. Similarly, a human with 
behavioral problems like Lava’s would not be limited to these two options as human 
lives are privileged over dogs’. 
Another unequal “compromise” is described in Grizzly Years, and Peacock 
condemns this privileging of human over animal. He describes “the great purges of the 
early seventies,” when park employees and people in the surrounding area killed or 
removed almost one hundred grizzlies and many other bears from the Yellowstone 
ecosystem (75). The impetus for this arrangement, in which bears were to be relegated to 
the backcountry and humans were to have a bear-free zone along the roads and 
campgrounds, was the killing of two people by grizzlies in Glacier National Park and 
Yellowstone’s desire to avoid similar attacks. This solution was determined by 
considering only human needs and not the bears’ needs. Against the advice of 
researchers who had observed grizzlies for several years, Yellowstone rapidly closed the 
open-pit dumps where bears had been feeding. As a result, they began seeking food in 
camp grounds or communities outside the park, endangering the safety of both humans 
and themselves (269). While physical power is overwhelmingly on the bears’ side when 
confronting a camper, the institutionalized humanism of the National Park Services 
(NPS) ultimately shifts material power to humans in this example. 
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 When the bears “resist” the first human-made decision by continuing to seek 
garbage in campgrounds, the humans continue to force the “compromise” by killing or 
capturing the bears. Peacock seeks to undo the humanist separation that underpins the 
NPS’s actions by encouraging his audience to empathize with the grizzlies as they would 
with humans who are animalized and persecuted with his use of words like “purges” and 
“pogroms” that evoke genocide (75, 270). Within the context of the book’s posthumanist 
argument, this language is not a hyperbolic flourish that continues the animalization 
already experienced by Jewish people and other ethnic groups, but a destabilization of 
the entire animal-human divide. In this way, it fits within the liberationist strain of 
discourse that PETA drew from for its “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Animal 
Liberation” campaigns. In contrast to the NPS, Peacock’s understanding of grizzlies is 
based on observation and promotes an arrangement that acknowledges the bears’ needs 
by recommending they be allowed more land and that hikers be better educated about 
bear behavior. The bears are treated as subjects, not as a problem to be fixed.  
Kopelman continues to recognize Lava’s subjectivity while giving him 
medication. Like Peacock, he does so by comparing this action on Lava to a similar one 
on humans. Rather than comparing killing bears to murdering people, though, he 
compares giving Lava antidepressants to humans voluntarily taking them. Kopelman 
speaks favorably of medication for both dogs and people and encourages readers with 
symptoms of PTSD to be open to it (126, 150). He is also careful to explain that he did 
not put Lava on medication for his own convenience. He first consults with Lava’s 
veterinarian who concludes that “with a dog with Lava’s background there were bound 
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to be issues that couldn’t be helped by behavior modification alone” (126). Kopelman’s 
approach to behavior modification also shows a consideration for Lava as a subject. This 
practice requires that both human and dog learn to communicate better with each other. 
According to Kopelman, the training “was as much about training me as training the 
dog. Lava knew how to push my buttons like the finest of best friends, and I always rose 
to the occasion. Graham didn’t have that problem. He could use physical posturing to 
show Lava some submission but not too much, and he’d keep his composure at all 
times” (116). Though Kopelman is at first resistant to the trainer, Graham’s, less 
assertive approach, he comes to appreciate it and his relationship with Lava improves 
greatly. That he describes Lava’s negative behavior as that of a “best friend” rather than 
a “bad dog” also frames their relationship positively and further creates consubstantiality 
across species by implying that Lava has a complex internal life. 
Diagnosing Lava with PTSD has the same function. This medical explanation 
provides a way for Kopelman and the readers to understand Lava’s behavior not as a 
“problem” so much as the manifestation of Lava’s psychological complexity. The 
chapter title “You are the Sum of Your Experiences” applies to Lava, Kopelman, and his 
readers. In this chapter, Kopelman practices a layman’s version of Bradshaw’s 
transspecies psychology. Though not apparently familiar with her work, he likewise 
applies the criteria of PTSD to a nonhuman. Whereas Bradshaw works to convince 
readers that elephants have a complex psyche susceptible to trauma, Kopelman writes as 
if his readers share this assumption with him. He is able to do so by citing Steven R. 
Lindsay’s The Handbook of Applied Dog Behavior and Training, which lists eight 
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criteria to diagnose a dog with PTSD. Because Lindsay stands in as authority, Kopelman 
does not need to support the claim that dogs are able to experience PTSD, only the claim 
that Lava does. According to Kopelman, Lava meets five of Lindsay’s criteria and 
therefore has PTSD. Kopelman then takes his transspecies psychology a step further than 
Lindsay and puts Lava up against the Army’s description of PTSD.  
Whereas Lindsay’s criteria are behavioral, some of the Army’s are more abstract. 
However, Kopelman illustrates that they can still be applied to dogs, reinforcing the idea 
that these animals have sophisticated minds. For example, the first symptom is “Reliving 
the event” and Kopelman states that “The ocean waves crashing on the rocks at the 
beach take Lava right back to his unhappy place. You’d think he was going to have a 
seizure on the spot” (113). Here Kopelman is interpreting Lava’s behavior as evidence 
of his psychic complexity. While Lava does not fit all of the Army’s criteria, he fits 
enough for Kopelman to consider him as having PTSD. This diagnosis, and the 
identification it creates between Lava, Kopelman, and other service members, is central 
to Kopelman’s goal of convincing others it is okay to use mental health services.  
While Kopelman upholds some assumptions about the differences between 
humans and nonhumans, he characterizes both as trainable and this point of 
identification justifies his analogy between service members and Lava. Kopelman 
emphasizes the power of marine training on himself and others and the effects of 
repeatedly experiencing life-endangerment in the combat zone. Therefore, just as Lava 
can be trained out of his symptoms, so can we “train our heroes to modify their behavior 
in order to live happier and more fulfilled lives as civilians” (To America 133). Though 
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he sees both himself and Lava as trainable, the identification between Kopelman’s and 
Lava’s treatments is limited. For example, Lava cannot access the Virtual Reality 
therapy available to some service members and would most likely find it terrifying and 
confusing to be immersed in a simulation of warfare. Lava also cannot benefit from the 
verbal exchange in therapy that Kopelman has found so helpful, while Kopelman 
chooses not to take antidepressants. The variety of recovery methods practiced by him 
and Lava validate the idea that individual readers have a variety of methods available to 
them rather than one right path to follow. 
Limited identification is also very important in Peacock’s texts, though for a 
different reason. He limits identification with the bears to emphasize the need to limit 
human interaction—or interference—with them. The closest encounter with a grizzly in 
either book occurs in Grizzly Years when Peacock is filming a blond grizzly for a 
documentary about the bears’ plight. He accidentally gets too close to the bear, who 
notices him but refrains from attacking and instead allows him to retreat. Sarah E. 
McFarland makes a salient point that Peacock represents the bears in stereotypically 
gendered terms and makes the blond grizzly appear less imposing than her male 
counterparts (56-7). However, I argue that this bear is not, as McFarland claims, 
rendered “inconsequential” and somehow less than a “true grizzly” than the male bears 
through his feminizing rhetoric (57). Rather, the encounter is significant as an 
illustration of a more equal “compromise” Peacock made with the bears.  
He acknowledges that filming the grizzlies troubled him because it put ideology 
before individuals, as the Vietnam War did. He explains, “I was filming bears, bothering 
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them in the short run, hoping my long-term plans would alleviate their plight. When the 
bear most needed to be left alone, I had to get in even closer to make the grizzlies’ 
predicament more clear. The best compromise seemed to me to be to choose only those 
grizzlies who were already accustomed to the presence of humans” (237). Consequently, 
Peacock films the blond grizzly not because he sees habituated bears as feminized and 
therefore not “true grizzlies,” as McFarland argues, but because he believes it is less of 
an imposition to film them (57). Moreover, his nearness to this female grizzly is not 
presented as an act of aggression, but a nerve-wracking “miscalculation” that puts him at 
the risk of being mauled (258).  
Peacock does not recount what he says to this grizzly; however, as he states in 
another story about facing a bear, “the words were irrelevant, but tone and posture were 
everything” (226). The body language is meant to convey confidence, by holding out 
one’s arms, as the grizzly might charge an animal it senses is subordinate. However the 
words that Peacock does relate from the other encounter, “Sure hate to bother you,” are 
respectful and acknowledge the grizzly’s right to the space over his own (226). Though 
the meaning of the words does not matter to the bear, combined with body language, 
they become a way to recognize the animal Other as a subject without losing one’s own 
subjectivity. When the blond bear stops approaching, he finishes the last minute of film. 
McFarland describes this as “antagoniz[ing]” the bear and attributes his behavior to a 
desire to “challenge” and dominate the grizzly (57). Peacock, however, shows an 
awareness that this action was “[n]ot too bright” (259). Moreover, his comment “I could 
see the muscles of her shoulder ripple. I could have touched them if I wanted” (emphasis 
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added) also acknowledges her dangerous strength. More significantly, however, these 
lines indicate a respect for the limits of identification, regardless of which party has more 
power. Though he “could,” theoretically, touch her if he didn’t mind the consequences, 
he does not want to. What this demonstrates about consubstantiality is that total 
identification between two interactants is not only not possible (except in a delusional 
form when one projects oneself onto the Other), but also not desirable because an over-
identification results in one not recognizing the Other as a subject.  
 After Peacock experiences consubstantiality across the species line, he 
understands that humans should not invade grizzly homelands, just as humans should not 
destroy other peoples’ homes and cultures. Peacock’s interactions with grizzlies remind 
him that he is part of the material world and therefore undermine the concept of human 
uniqueness. After his first encounter, Peacock suddenly realizes, “my dreams were not 
so important. Something big was out there. For the first time since returning to the 
world, my thoughts chose themselves without Vietnam intruding” (51). His experiences 
in Vietnam are traumatizing because humans are animalized and abused by other 
humans. When the grizzlies remind him that humans are animals, he sees humanity 
placed in a larger system, one that is not motivated by hatred of the Other and in which 
animalization is not necessarily associated with abuse. What makes the grizzlies 
dangerous is that they too do not recognize humans as transcendent. Peacock never 
forgets that he is an animal when interacting with the bears, and an animal that is 
considerably less powerful than they.  
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Kopelman’s consubstantiality with Lava does not lead to such as posthumanist 
view. Instead of destabilizing the line between human and animal, the text uses Lava as a 
key to understand human trauma. Lava is depicted as sophisticated and capable of 
rehabilitation, but Kopelman is not interested in re-thinking how humans relate to the 
natural world because his main concern is how humans relate to one another, that is, how 
human relationships are negatively impacted by PTSD. The book’s secondary aim is to 
critique General Order 1-A (GO-1A), which states that service members cannot adopt 
animals and makes it nearly impossible for people to take these animals back to the U.S. 
The Foreword by President of the Humane Society of the United States, Wayne Pacelle, 
describes his organization’s efforts to change GO-1A and claims that Lava is a “therapy 
dog” (x). This argument, that service members should be allowed to adopt animals for 
the therapeutic benefit, retains the humanist assumption that animals should be valued 
first for their use to humans. Therefore, Pacelle and Kopelman present their goal as the 
increased well-being of service members and do not focus as much on the increased 
well-being of the animals who are adopted.  
For Burke, identification requires that two people decide they share an aspect of 
themselves and thus can be persuaded to share a goal. Pacelle and Kopelman therefore 
use a love of dogs as a point of identification between themselves and their human 
readers to work towards their goal changing GO-1A. Peacock’s goals are focused on the 
well-being of grizzlies rather than humans. The bears obviously cannot discuss their 
goals beyond using body language to convey neither wants to receive or inflict harm. 
However, they do share certain interests: protecting the bears’ territory and lives. 
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Peacock aligns himself with the bears’ material interests through his political 
interpretation of them. This version of consubstantiality recognizes that all identification 
is constructed and the differences between the parties have the potential to be 
productive, despite the inherent risk of abuse when there is an unequal distribution of 
power. Peacock, as a human, can recognize how grizzlies are suffering from human 
actions. This perspective, combined with his respect for the grizzlies indicated by his 
willingness to interact with them on their own terms, means that he is able to 
communicate the bears’ interests to other humans and bring together their interests with 
those of the bears.  
Similarly, Kopelman and Lava cannot discuss the impact of their experiences in 
Iraq has had on them. However, Kopelman can learn to read Lava’s behavior and to 
communicate with him in this way. While he cannot explain medication to Lava and get 
the dog’s consent for antidepressants, he does his best to take into account Lava’s 
interests. By carefully outlining Lava’s rehabilitation, Kopelman also shows that it is 
possible for dogs raised in war zones to live with human families in the U.S. In doing so, 
he critiques GO-1A.  
Consubstantiality with the Self 
Kopelman’s and Peacock’s books contain a call to action that uses descriptions 
of trauma for persuasive purposes. This rhetorical dimension differentiates it from the 
therapeutic writing studied and promoted by Pennebaker who states that, when writing 
about a traumatic experience, “you will be better off making yourself the audience. In 
that way, you don’t have to rationalize or justify yourself to suit the perspective of 
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another person” (Opening Up 42). However, even writing to one’s self entails writing to 
an audience and these texts written for the public also present themselves as therapeutic 
for the writer. Pennebaker asked research participants to write about the same upsetting 
past experience and their emotional responses three to five days in a row. Those who 
revised their writings the most over this period, particularly those who developed a 
narrative consisting of causality and insight, experienced the most benefits such as fewer 
doctor’s visits, a higher GPA, and more successful job search.  (Pennebaker “Telling 
Stories” 5-7, King 359). This revision seems to mimic the effect of a live listener with 
whom the writers were able to interpret past events and future possibilities as a coherent 
narrative.  
Paul Ricœur conceives of the self as dialectical, consisting of idem and ipseity. 
Idem is “the same,” patterns one identifies in past actions, and ipseity is “changing,” 
intended future actions (101). Defining the self in this way allows for consubstantiality, 
the identification between two or more substances (defined as “actions” by Burke) (A 
Grammar of Motives 33). Consubstantiality with one’s self is the process of identifying 
commonalities between one’s past deeds and the actions one wants to perform in order 
to persuade the self to act in this manner. For the traumatized subject, whose connections 
not only with society, but also within the self, have been disrupted, consubstantiality 
indicates recovery is in process because the subject is reinterpreting his or her past and 
present experiences to achieve a sense of coherence, as Pennebaker describes. This new 
interpretation gives the promise of a future.  
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One way Kopelman finds consubstantiality with himself is through writing. In To 
America, he claims that “until I started writing this book, I didn’t think I had any issues 
coming out of the war” (47). More specifically, it is writing about Lava that helps him 
better understand himself by both identifying with and differentiating himself from 
Lava. As Kopelman comes to realize how Lava’s experiences in Iraq have had negative 
effects, such as making him aggressive and easily stressed, he notices these responses in 
himself. This recognition of a change he dislikes in himself involves a dialog between 
idem, his past patterns of behavior that helped him define who he perceived himself to 
be, and ipseity, the way his military experience has shaped him. It is also linked to the 
hope for a positive change. He sees that therapy has been useful for Lava, and considers 
that therapy might be a way for him to take agency in the ways he changes. As part of 
his contemplation on starting therapy, he writes: 
Lava and I know firsthand how easily life can be taken away if you’re not paying 
vigilant, constant attention. (Even that is not always enough.) So maybe I’m not a 
‘normal’ person, especially if Lava and his actions—like being protective of his 
family, for example—are a reflection of my own. Okay, I don’t just arbitrarily 
assault other people when I see them at the dog park. And as far as I know, I 
haven’t tried to hump anyone in public as a display of my dominance. It’s just 
that from time to time, I still think about the things I saw and experienced during 
our time in Fallujah. (118-9) 
The disidentifications between himself and Lava in this passage use humor to deflect 
some of the seriousness of the possibility that a therapist will diagnose Kopelman with 
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PTSD. They also stand in for, and deflect, the violent behavior exhibited by some 
humans experiencing PTSD that Kopelman mentions a few paragraphs earlier (117). By 
using Lava to minimize the possibility that Kopelman might have PTSD and that PTSD 
might manifest in assault rather than the disturbing thoughts that only affect the 
individual, Kopelman makes consulting a therapist seem less intimidating. This act of 
self-persuasion works for himself and, by representing it in writing, it provides a model 
of self-persuasion his readers can use if they are considering therapy but are reluctant to 
seek it. 
Peacock’s dialectic between idem and ipseity is most apparent in Walking it Off, 
the more reflective of his two books. In it, Peacock contemplates his relationship with 
Ed Abbey and compares his younger self, the source material for Abbey’s fictional 
character George Hayduke in The Monkey Wrench Gang, with his current self and the 
self he hopes to become. Peacock explains that his goal on the series of long walks 
recorded in this memoir was “to walk myself into good health: to walk off the roll of 
belly fat around my middle-aged gut, to walk away from war, to walk up and on in 
defiance of my hereditary gift of high cholesterol and blood pressure into a dimly 
perceived better world and maybe a new beginning. I wanted more out of the living I had 
left” (2). He is seeking identification between his younger self, a defiant character, and 
his goals for his present self, who is now concerned with defying cholesterol, but also 
still objects to land developers and any others deemed a threat to conservationist efforts. 
This dialectic between idem and ipseity exists not only in the act of interpretation, but, 
for Peacock, is also tied to the literal action of walking. 
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Walking is itself a type of interpretation as Peacock recounts it in this memoir. 
Through walking, one reads the land, noticing traces of people and other animals, and 
the way that Peacock interprets these traces informs the constitution of his self. For 
example, while hiking the Sonoran Desert, Peacock trespasses into an Air Force 
bombing range and finds a Hohokam Indian site that was used for target practice. 
Hohokam potsherds intermingle with napalm containers, thousands of slugs, and 
destroyed cars that were brought in for target practice (Walking 179). Peacock decides to 
the name area “the Bullet Site,” which emphasizes military violence against nonwhite 
cultures (180). This scene is one of many moments in both books that draw a contrast 
between American Indians, whose traditional ways of life are portrayed as peaceful and 
sustainable, and those Americans who seek to dominate nature and other people. 
Through his naming of the site, Peacock associates himself with oppressed cultures and 
so builds an identity for himself and an ethos for his audience.  
He does not blame the military for destroying the Hohokam, who disappeared 
from the archaeological record before European contact, but criticizes how the Hohokam 
are treated after their society ends. The military's fault is that they “bombed the shit out 
of” the place, showing no respect for the people who once lived there or for the artifacts 
that remain (180). Haraway extrapolates the Latin etymology of respect, respecere or to 
see again, to entail “to hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to 
pay attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem” (When Species Meet 19). Peacock 
shows respect for the Hohokam by paying attention to the things they left behind and 
those that they did not. Though a certain place in the site seems like it would be a good 
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spot to camp, he decides to keep going because there are no pictographs in the vicinity, 
indicating that perhaps “something unfortunate or terrible” that he cannot access 
happened there (180). That Peacock recognizes his anxiety but chooses not to create an 
interpretation for it beyond the evidence the Hohokam did, or rather did not, leave, is an 
act of respect because it is not only a response, but also limited. This limited response 
helps constitute a self for Peacock that is a sympathizer with indigenous peoples who 
does not claim to speak for them. As Burke argues, identification can never be total, and 
Peacock conforms to this theory by limiting his interpretation of Hohokam history. 
However, consubstantiality is “an acting together,” and, while Peacock aligns his own 
agenda, harmonious living with nature and across human societies, with the Hohokam 
way of life, his works do not contain calls to “act together” with living Indian activists.  
Some other mentions of Indians, particularly in Grizzly Years, are problematic 
because they appear as attempts at consubstantiality, but ultimately function to empower 
the Self by continuing to Other this group. Peacock aligns American Indians with the 
grizzly by characterizing these peoples as endangered or extinct throughout the book. 
While it is true that much cultural heritage has been destroyed or lost, and some groups 
such as the Hohokam have disappeared, the book ignores the existence of activists who 
work to reclaim and carry on traditions. Moreover, equating the experiences of Indians 
and grizzlies recalls the Western practice of animalizing the Other. Haraway writes, 
“The discursive tie between the colonized, the enslaved, the noncitizen, and the 
animal—all reduced to type, all Others to rational man, and all essential to his bright 
constitution—is at the heart of racism and flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of 
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humanism” (When Species Meet 18). Blurring the species distinction between humans 
and other animals for only some groups of humans allows for the racism that Haraway 
claims is central to humanism. 
Though in most of Grizzly Years and Walking it Off, Peacock describes all 
humanity as animals, there is one chapter in the first book that conflates indigenous 
people with grizzlies in a way that erases these people in order to establish a Self for 
Peacock and other environmentalists as heirs to an indigenous environmentalist legacy. 
“The Sacred Bear of the Blackfeet” presents this tribe as a model for how to identify 
with and live with bears. For example, the chapter states that when the Blackfeet hunted 
grizzlies, more bears were alive and the hunt was a rare occasion that was part of sacred 
rituals. However, rather than building towards consubstantiality with the Blackfeet, the 
chapter partakes in over-identification with their value system (as interpreted by white 
scholars) in order to erase living members and establish an ethos for modern day white 
conservationists as the rightful successors to this heritage. 
The chapter concludes, “Since the passing of the traditional Indian, the attitude of 
the dominant culture toward grizzlies has become one of unmitigated hostility. Whatever 
the Blackfeet, along with nearly all other ancient peoples of America, knew or learned of 
the grizzly has been lost. By the time we got around to finding out about these people, 
they, like the grizzly, are mostly gone” (150). This statement, though it may seem to 
undermine the humanist divide between humans and other animals, actually reinforces 
the racial Othering that Haraway critiques. Characterizing indigenous peoples as nearly 
extinct animals fits a pattern in American thought identified by Renée L. Bergland: 
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“Native American ghosts function both as representations of national guilt and as 
triumphant agents of Americanization” (4). Peacock's rhetorical appeal, by mourning the 
vanished “traditional Indian,” feeds a white desire that is not to create consubstantiality 
with Native Americans, but to impose a totalizing identification in order to a construct a 
unified Self as their heir rather than a more complicated identity as one who, as an heir 
of those who exploited indigenous people, has benefited from this exploitation yet still 
sympathizes with the victims of it. The chapter on the Blackfeet follows a European-
American pattern of defining indigenous peoples as “authentic” and oneself as their 
spiritual heir by critiquing the atrocities that disrupted indigenous societies. It establishes 
the writer, and a sympathetic reader's, supposed right to represent this “vanishing” 
culture. Though Hohokam society faded away centuries ago, the number of people 
identifying as Blackfeet in the US census increased 73%, from 21,964 to 37,992, in the 
decade leading up to 1990, the year in which Grizzly Years was published.  
This conflation of Blackfeet and grizzlies is not intentionally exploitative, but 
identifying solely with indigenous ancestors and ignoring the fact that native “heirs” to 
these traditions also exist precludes consubstantiality with modern Indians in favor of 
constructing an identity for white environmentalists. Therefore, while Peacock's 
discussion of the Blackfeet may seem to show respect like his passage on the Hohokam 
does, it fails to do so because it lacks what Haraway identifies as the companion to 
respect: response. While respect is a display of esteem, which Peacock does show for the 
Hohokam and early Blackfeet, Haraway defines response as the process of 
“comprehending that subject-making connection is real,” and that it exists in “an 
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entangled relationship” (When Species Meet 227). While Peacock listened to the 
nonextant Hohokam and recognized them as separate subjects, he does not acknowledge 
the words of existing Indians in this chapter and also ignores the role the Blackfeet play 
in his own subject-making and the entangled, ethically suspect relationship between 
indigenous and white Americans.  
Kopelman also draws on racism to shape an identity for himself and some 
readers. However, unlike Peacock’s attempt at respect that neglects response, 
Kopelman’s racism in To America is intentionally derogatory. This is in contrast to his 
first book, With Love, which reflects critically on some acts of racial prejudice in Iraq in 
a way that takes into account idem and ipseity. In one such passage from With Love he 
describes riding in a Humvee with three other Marines and Lava. They “make jokes 
about the old men in dresses and fat women behind veils” in a refugee camp. When Lava 
barks, they “egg on” the dog saying “Kill, Lava, kill” (46-7). Kopelman’s assessment of 
this situation is mixed. His criticism “we think it’s so damned funny” is quickly 
mitigated with the excuse “We’re nervous. It helps pass the time,” which gives the 
impression that racism is part of the idem identity for their Iraq selves, a pattern they 
return to for comfort (47). However, Kopelman also describes his immediate regret he 
felt on the ride. When the refugees stare at the Marines, rather than yelling back at them 
or attacking them, Kopelman “start[s] feeling like I’ve pulled off a brilliant practical 
joke that went too far and Lava’s rooing starts getting to me . . . it’s not funny anymore” 
(48). In this passage, Kopelman criticizes both this moment of joking, and the war as a 
whole. This ipseity is part of his increasing ambivalence to the war. He reflects that the 
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“joke” is in part on him because he imagines the war as a game, “Capture the Flag with 
grenades,” he had no part in starting (47). Kate McLoughlin describes laughter in war 
literature as a reaction to and criticism of the “hyperlogic of the war zone,” which is 
“rejected by the mind and makes the body laugh” (187-8). While the group laughter 
expressed by the Marines is directed toward the civilians, Kopelman’s bitter description 
of the war as a practical joke that follows the logic of a game can be considered an 
example of McLoughlin’s theory. In With Love, Kopelman reflects on his racism as a 
manifestation of the situation—nervousness about violence from Iraqis—but also 
criticizes it and the hyperlogic of war, creating a dialectic between idem and ipseity.  
While Kopelman’s feelings about the war are ambivalent, he does ultimately 
believe it was justified and that his participation was for the best. This conviction seems 
to have become stronger by the second book, To America, and the racism in this book is 
not presented critically. Racial prejudice against Iraqis is not an inevitable part of 
supporting the war; however, in To America it bolsters Kopelman’s belief his 
participation in the war was correct. Kopelman is highly aware of the unpopularity of the 
war, particularly among his community in La Jolla. Speaking in support of the war, and 
racism, is a way of creating identification with himself across time, rather than a more 
complicated consubstantiality, by emphasizing idem over ipseity. That is, he returns to 
his earlier pattern of racism instead of critiquing it. 
Kopelman calls Iraqis “bad guys” and Marines “kids,” painting them as innocent, 
value judgments that present the war in fairly black and white terms (To America 10). 
This frame-work appears in another Marine-penned text, the song “Hadji Girl.” Tyler 
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Wall analyzes this supposedly humorous song in which a Muslim woman invites a 
Marine to her home where he is attacked by her family and he kills them all. Wall points 
out that “Hadji Girl” opens with lyrics that position “soldiers as victims of Iraqi violence 
without acknowledging the larger geopolitical project: military occupation of Iraq” (77). 
Wall calls this sort of framing “racial inversion.” Michael Rogin developed this term to 
describe “instances in which historical actuality is perceptually inverted so that red, 
black, brown, or yellow-skinned persons become the murderers of white people, instead 
of vice versa” (Wall 77). Likewise, Kopelman emphasizes violence done to Marines 
without framing this violence as resistance to an occupation.  
Wall’s critique of “Hadji Girl” is also applicable to To America:  
“Hadji Girl” reveals that the sovereign convention of demarcating who may live 
and who must die has all too often been a racist and racialized project . . . The 
U.S. killing state is premised on a racist proposition, though it is subtle and rarely 
acknowledged outright. “Hadji Girl,” however, brings it forcefully to the surface. 
. . . Therefore, Belile’s song articulates mythologies of regenerative violence and 
racial superiority and inferiority (see Slotkin, 1973; 1992) that have been 
circulating through the U.S. body politic from the colonial period into the violent 
present. (Wall 78) 
In To America, Kopelman evokes racial inferiority by repeatedly referring to Iraqis as 
“smelly fuckers” and describing how Lava is superior to Iraqis. The racist comments are 
not framed as part of a virtual flashback to his experiences in Iraq, but are clearly 
presented as his current opinions and part of his justification for the war and his 
 225 
 
participation in it. For example, he states that “In 2004 there didn’t seem to be the level 
of emotional or nationalistic investment by the Iraqi military you would expect to see 
from people who wanted to live in a free, democratic and secure society. I’d like to think 
this seems to be changing, slowly but surely, but I’m not sure. With Lava, the 
commitment never wavered. He was fully vested in his rescue and delivery to a free, 
democratic, and secure society—Southern California” (26). Projecting on Lava an 
understanding of democracy is done in jest, as Kopelman often adopts a jocular tone in 
the book. However, it also legitimizes the expectation that the Iraqis should be as loyal, 
adoring, and obedient to the U.S. military as an orphaned puppy is to those who take 
care of him.  
When Kopelman compares himself and other service members with Lava, he 
does so in a sympathetic manner that breaks down barriers between species with 
productive results for both dogs and humans. “Bad” dogs like Lava are portrayed 
sympathetically as trauma victims and shown to be redeemable; humans who may suffer 
from trauma are also given hope. In contrast, his comparisons of the Iraqis and Lava 
draw on the “discursive tie between the colonized, the enslaved, the noncitizen, and the 
animal” described by Haraway (When Species Meet 18). By placing the Iraqis lower than 
the animal, Lava, Kopelman strengthens identifications between the “men” of his story 
(Lava, himself, and service members whom Kopelman usually refers to as men or boys) 
by distancing them from Iraqis. This (mis)use of Iraqis constitutes a self for Kopelman 
whose racism is supposedly justified and whose similarities with a dog are not to be 
interpreted as demeaning because the dog is apparently superior to many humans. 
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 Kopelman also reveals the role of racism in “demarcating who may live and who 
must die” (Wall 78) in this book. At one moment, he does acknowledge that readers 
might perceive his attitude toward Iraqis as racist, but insists they are wrong to do so. He 
states, “How do you think it looks when we’re [Marines] taken out by some jackass 
wearing a ‘man dress’ because we took the time to think rather than rely on our instincts 
and training?” Then he anticipates readers’ objections to this comment, which portrays 
Muslims as inferior and feminized, with “And don’t tell me, by the way, that I’m being 
racist. No one wants to befriend someone you might have to kill in the next minute, or 
who might open fire on you and your best friend” (69). These sentences acknowledge 
the existence of an alternate point of view, that Kopelman and others in the service hold 
racist attitudes to those with whom they are in combat. However, Kopelman does not 
acknowledge this perspective as having legitimacy. His reason, which seems to be that 
racism is necessary to surviving war, justifies both his past and present bigotry in his 
mind. However, even if one were to grant that racial prejudice during combat is useful 
for preserving one’s own life and killing the enemy and that this practicality outweighs 
any harm that results from racism, Kopelman’s justification should only apply to his 
racism displayed in Iraq, not his racist comments published in the books. By extending 
his bigotry and his justification of it into the present, he creates identification with the 
self in Iraq who practiced racism. Clinging to racism in the present is a way to further 
deny or justify past examples of it. 
Kopelman’s interactions with Lava, described in the previous section, are a way 
to find consubstantiality with himself without depending on bigotry. Reflecting on how 
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Lava’s and his behavior have changed in similar ways enables him to recognize ipseity. 
Lava had problems with irritability and aggression, and Kopelman saw these in himself. 
He explains that upon his return, the problems of his girl-friend and their social circle 
seemed petty to him, and he would say so. While he originally felt this behavior was 
justified, “Having the advantage now of time and some self-reflection, I can see that I 
was a jerk, behaving more like a child than a responsible, mature adult. Intentionally? 
Maybe. Was it my fault? Yes and no.” (47). In this passage, he is able to be sympathetic 
to his past self while also criticizing his behavior. That the intentionally and “fault” of 
his behavior are left ambiguous leaves room to acknowledge that some civilians were 
also rude to him, but it also indicates that symptoms of trauma-related stress affected his 
behavior. As he describes his work with a therapist to control some of these symptoms, 
he recognizes that change is possible and that he has some agency over it.  
Peacock also establishes identity in a variety of ways. Walking it Off uses an 
interplay of identification and difference within the self rather than erasure of an Othered 
group. In this second book, Peacock uses Abbey’s caricature of him, as Hayduke, and 
Abbey himself as points of identification. All three (Hayduke, Peacock, and Abbey) 
share an on-going anger towards government-sanctioned destruction of humans, other 
animals, and environments, but exercise it differently. Walking it Off depicts the dialectic 
between idem and ipseity as Peacock carries these past and possible selves with him on a 
solo hike he takes after Abbey’s death. Peacock carries a representation of his former 
self in his memory and in the form of Abbey’s last novel, Hayduke Lives! He also takes 
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Abbey’s notebook with him, and these thoughts of his mentor indicate possibilities for 
future selves.  
Peacock calls Hayduke “a one-dimensional dolt” and describes this caricature as 
an abuse of their friendship by Abbey because Hayduke “reflected the adolescent, 
wayward son, not the maturing friend” (Walking 12). However, Hayduke, while not a 
flattering portrait, is just as reflective of his creator as his model, as Peacock implies 
when he writes “The real Hayduke was buried” after illegally interring Abbey’s body in 
the desert (Walking 49). Harold Alderman argues that Hayduke is an exaggerated 
manifestation of Abbey’s anarchistic tendencies (144), which is the point of 
identification between Abbey and Peacock that Hayduke represents. Alderman states 
that Abbey’s writings express “a man in perpetual rebellion—against himself, against 
the status quo, and against the mediocrity of the past that crushed the human spirit” 
(148-9). This rebellion against oneself is what makes change possible. While 
consubstantiality within the self requires that one make identifications between idem and 
ipseity, it necessarily implies that there is some conflict between the two.  
Hayduke, as a simplified and exaggerated representation of Peacock, serves as a 
map. The caricature exaggerates certain traits and omits others, and so provided him 
with a key to understanding himself. Peacock explains that “Abbey probably did me a 
favor in creating a caricature of myself whose dim psyche I could penetrate when my 
own seemed off-limits; Ed painted the ex-Green Beret Hayduke, with precise 
brushstrokes, as caught in an emotional backwater, a backwater out of which I wanted to 
swim” (Walking 13). Peacock’s word choice reflects the construction of PTSD described 
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by Leys, in which, because the mind experienced dissociation during a traumatic 
experience, access to these memories and/or the ability to interpret them is “off limits.” 
The image of a backwater, where a current is obstructed, is analogous to the traumatic 
state in which one feels stymied, unable to move forward with life and reintegrate into 
the main currents of one’s society. Though PTSD was not officially recognized as a 
medical condition until five years after the publication of The Monkey Wrench Gang, 
Peacock writes that “Ed nailed the PTSD with visionary accuracy and sketched the 
character of Hayduke with the insight that George’s great anger resulted from witnessing 
injustice—such as events in Vietnam—and that this rage could be turned into a positive 
weapon, especially in the war against industrial desecration of the wilderness” (Walking 
109).  
Grizzly Years is the story of how Peacock himself came to this realization, and 
the person it depicts is certainly different than Abbey’s Hayduke. While both are 
portrayed as loners who are passionate about the wilderness, Peacock’s representation is 
not a caricature. Instead, this character is undergoing profound change because of his 
experiences with the grizzlies. Peacock explains of himself in the years immediately 
following his military service, “Unlike Hayduke, the real man was not content to stay 
out in the cold; he wanted to cross back over into the human realm,” and grizzly-related 
activism enables this reintegration (105). Peacock saw the figure of Hayduke as a 
regression, but it also served as an exigence for self-revision, though he recounts that his 
life continued to be troubled by flashbacks and marital problems. 
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However, because the character is a static portrait, it does not provide a model 
for carrying out this change. In Walking it Off, Peacock mentions that he attempted to 
read Hayduke Lives!, but put it down in favor of Abbey’s notebook (169). Peacock 
includes some of these notebook entries, in which Abbey contemplates his approaching 
death and the life he has lived. The journal functions as a better method for identification 
than Hayduke Lives! because he perceives Abbey as a mentor. Whereas Hayduke is a 
representation of a past self, Abbey functions as a potential self. Abbey’s reflections on 
death make Peacock “ashamed of the way I treated the people I’ve loved, the utterly 
slothful mismanagement of the simple elements of my daily life, the squabbling” (182). 
Abbey’s notebook was addressed to himself in order to reconcile himself with death, but 
it persuades Peacock to regenerate his life because, as Chaïm Perelman and Lucie 
Olbrechts-Tyteca point out, when discussing the self-deliberating subject, even when we 
are writing to persuade ourselves, we are drawing on methods of argumentation and 
social values (41-2). Though Pennebaker guided his participants away from imagining 
an audience for whom they must “rationalize” their or others’ actions, writing intended 
for the self can still persuade other readers when this audience shares the values used in 
the writer’s self-deliberation (42). That Abbey and Peacock had a long relationship and 
similar ideals would make the notebook relatable. 
However, just as consubstantiality with another human or another animal is never 
a complete identification, so does it never quite result in a unified self. Near the 
beginning of Walking it Off, after Abbey’s death, Peacock states, “I was still confused. I 
felt that I was none of these people whose mask I had worn: grizzly man, father, earth 
 231 
 
warrior, husband, Hayduke, drunk, Green Beret medic, nature boy” (55-56). By the end 
of the text, Peacock has recounted his experiences as all of these identities. The memoir 
amalgamates them into a narrative of himself without ignoring the differences between 
them. Though each role changes him, the connecting thread the narrative establishes is a 
love for nature which, along with conservation activism, aids the process of mending.  
Consubstantiality with an Audience 
This narrative of healing has a persuasive appeal because it serves as an elaborate 
example of the power of Peacock’s environmentalist philosophy by illustrating how his 
understanding of humanity’s relationship to the wilderness, that is, humans’ material 
connection to their world and the limits of human control, “mended” him. Kopelman’s 
book also depicts recovery, for him and Lava, which is likewise persuasive because it 
shows readers that therapy can be useful.  
Kopelman persuades service members to seek counseling for symptoms of PTSD 
by building consubstantiality with reluctant readers through narrative. Kopelman 
narrates his reluctance to seek therapy for himself, his experience researching PTSD for 
the book at the behest of his publisher, and his realization that therapy is beneficial and 
military culture is wrong for discouraging people from seeking it. Kopelman uses humor 
to acknowledge and identify with readers’ fears about therapy and also to reassure them. 
He describes his paranoia that his therapist will discover he is insane and will 
permanently commit him. He records his anxious, racing thoughts on his way to his first 
appointment. Because the therapist’s office is on a floor with steel doors, Kopelman 
assumes he has been sent to “The end of the floor where the real crazies hang out . . . 
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This is when it hits me that someone, somewhere, thinks I am completely over-the-top 
stark raving mad. Why else would I be in this area with controlled access?” (141). He 
soon acknowledges that his fears of committal are completely unfounded and that 
therapy has helped him become a better husband and father, but is also honest with his 
readers that therapy is difficult.  
Kopelman critiques his previously dismissive, sexist attitude toward mental 
health services. He sees his perspective as learned from the larger negative attitude 
toward counseling in the military. He explains that “‘WTF’ is the common response to 
hearing that someone’s gone to the doctor. In fact, pilots call the logbook they have to 
sign when they go to a doctor the ‘snivel log.’ Now, what red-blooded American 
fighting man is going to voluntarily sign that thing?” (110). This rhetorical question is 
answered by the title of the following chapter, “Opening the Snivel Book.” Here, 
Kopelman describes his positive experiences with therapy and the troublingly high rate 
of symptoms of stress disorders in veterans. By “owning” the phrase snivel book, he 
critiques this derogatory term. While he does not analyze the sexism at play in the 
dismissive attitude towards mental health services, he does provide research that states 
“[f]or women, sexual harassment or not being perceived as integral to success in combat 
makes for particular susceptibility to PTSD” (129).  
Kopelman uses the second person to identify with readers in the Marines and 
branches of the Armed Forces. He explicitly criticizes the anti-therapy attitude: “You 
may think it’s a sign of weakness in character and body. It’s not. That there’s ever been a 
stigma attached to therapy or to seeking help is wrong” (146). By appealing directly to 
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these readers through the second person, Kopelman emphasizes his point that the choice 
to seek treatment is an individual one that should be removed, as much as possible, from 
concerns about negative social judgments. He also makes this point when he lists some 
of the consequences of stress-related disorders, such as divorce, suicide, and substance 
abuse, then asks “So what are you going to do about it? Therapy is one way to go, and 
it’s an important option” (150). He creates identification by speaking to these individuals 
directly, but he does not tell them they must do what he did. By presenting therapy as 
option, rather than a requirement, he creates a consubstantiality that does not presume 
therapy is the right answer for everyone.  
One way Walking it Off establishes consubstantiality with its audience is by 
paralleling Peacock’s trauma and recovery with the reader’s own experience of learning 
about the My Lai Massacre to show the similarities and differences of these experiences. 
This section of the book is not only a personal reflection, but also an appeal to collective 
memory. Peacock describes his response to Ronald L. Haeberle’s photographs of the 
massacre published in LIFE, which provides a point of identification with his audience: 
“the scale of the My Lai massacre made me literally tremble. My soul shuddered. That 
image of slaughtered babies lying bloody in the ditch was seared across my 
consciousness forever” (Walking 110). The use of the demonstrative pronoun, “that 
image,” and definite article, “the ditch,” establish this connection with the reader who, if 
they have seen this photo, may also have it etched in their memory because they 
experienced a similar horrified reaction.  
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For many Americans, the uncovering of the My Lai Massacre was analogous to 
trauma in that it was a shock that required them to reconsider their interpretation of the 
Vietnam War, American identity, and humanity in general. As Kendrick Oliver explains, 
those whose opinions were centrist and those who were indifferent to the war were 
forced to investigate their feelings more deeply and anti-war sentiment rose. According 
to Walter Capps, regardless of how individual Americans feel about the war, they agree 
that it was “a national trauma, a rupture in the nation’s collective consciousness, and a 
serious and somber challenge to the ways we wish to think about ourselves, our role in 
the world, and our place in human history” (2). The actions at My Lai and the 
pathologies behind them entered the American cultural consciousness as characteristic of 
the Vietnam experience, meaning readers from later generations would also be familiar 
with this interpretation of the war (Oliver 250). The LIFE photographs, famous images 
that have been crucial to framing the United States’ collective memory of Vietnam, also 
created a sensation of powerlessness in the face of government institutions. Just as the 
American public was incapable of preventing My Lai because of their ignorance and 
their social as well as physical distance from it, so was Peacock. He further identifies 
with the audience by explaining that on the day of the massacre, he was flying over the 
My Lai hamlet as he left Vietnam for the U.S., completely unaware of the killing and 
unable to do anything if he knew (110). 
A few pages of photographs is not the equivalent of actually witnessing such 
atrocities, and they provide a way for Peacock and the audience to identify with each 
other as witnesses to trauma without subsuming differences. LaCapra insists that a 
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listener must be empathetic in a way that “resists full identification with, and 
appropriation of, the experience of the other” and depends “on one's recognition that 
another's loss is not identical to one's own loss” (Writing History, Writing Trauma 79). 
This practice is similar to consubstantiality in that it depends on both identification and 
difference. The listener shows respect by refusing to absorb the other in a totalizing 
identification. Peacock does not collapse the differences between himself and these 
readers or himself and those who were directly affected by the massacre. While the news 
of the massacre astounded the American public, Peacock claims, “I had known such 
atrocity prowled the earth. In Vietnam, individual monstrous events, the murder and rape 
of civilians happened every day. Massacres of non-combatants, little My Lai’s, were 
common” (110). He separates himself from his readers, whose experience of the 
massacre is further removed than his, but also reminds them that he is not affected in the 
same way that Vietnamese people, who experienced such abuse themselves or had loved 
ones and community members who did, were affected.  
Kopelman also uses photography to aid persuasion by encouraging readers to 
identify with other veterans who adopted animals and to identify Kopelman as part of 
this tradition through identification. Six letters from veterans, with the photographs of 
them and the dogs they cared for during their service, are inserted throughout From 
Baghdad to America. These letters were sent to Kopelman after the publication of his 
first book. The writers tell Kopelman they were moved by From Baghdad With Love and 
describe how important their dogs were to them and their fellow service members. The 
reproduced photographs of the veterans’ dogs have been given artificially ragged edges 
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to create the illusion that they have been handled many times over the years. This digiral 
manipulation implies these men think of the dogs frequently and fondly, which helps 
civilian animal lovers identify with the men’s feelings for these dogs. Moreover, the 
letter writers explain how their dogs made them feel better during their service. The 
affection with which the writers describe their dogs creates identification with readers 
while the detailed descriptions of the dogs’ appearances and behavior help limit this 
identification by reminding readers of the individual dogs’ uniqueness as well as the 
risky circumstances under which they were adopted.  
 Though Kopelman criticizes GO-1A, his main focus in this book is not to present 
Lava as an individual example who generates sympathy for other military mascots that 
were abandoned or killed because of the regulation. Instead, Lava functions as a mirror 
that, though slightly warped into dog-form, reflects the experiences of traumatized 
service members. In contrast, Peacock makes explicit the connection between the abuse 
of the animalized Other and the abuse of the animal. In Grizzly Years, he writes, “The 
way we treat pacified Indians or Vietnamese villagers and the way we manage wildlife 
draws from the same well” (101) and in Walking it Off, “This hostility towards other 
races of humans, native animals, and the wild land are connected, born of the same 
antagonistic alienation” (129). Both quotations come well into the text, after 
consubstantiality between Peacock and grizzlies (and, by extension, humanity and all 
wild animals) is depicted and after the texts have worked to build consubstantiality with 
their audience. While these two quotations are similar, and provide a consistent point of 
identification between the two works separated approximately by a decade, what is 
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significant about the second one is that it provides a root cause: antagonistic alienation. 
This term evokes the complaints Haraway and Wolfe, among others, have made about 
humanism’s definition of “the Human,” which is predicated on uniqueness and 
superiority. The two texts by Peacock provide an example of the alternative, 
consubstantiality among species. 
However, the authors’ ability to identify with animals does not make them 
immune to racism. Like Haraway, who identifies a “discursive tie” between animals and 
dehumanized people, Wolfe identifies racism and other forms of discrimination as part 
of the “symbolic economy” generated by a mode of being human that centers on 
humanity’s transcendence over the animal body (When Species Meet 18, Animal Rites 
43). Yet, he acknowledges that texts which question speciesism can also support racism, 
colonialism, etc. in his analysis of Michael Crichton’s novel Congo. Though the novel 
seems to undermine speciesism with the character of Amy, the ape who can 
communicate with humans, Wolfe points out that it “leaves intact the category of the 
human” in a neocolonialist project (Animal Rites 186).  Amy is associated with the 
Western humans while the Kigani tribe is dehumanized by its similarities to Congolese 
gorillas, and both of these groups are manipulated by Amy and First World humans 
(186-7). Peacock engages with the discursive tie between animals and people who have 
been dehumanized by the United States with the apparent intent to generate sympathy 
for grizzly bears. As with PETA in “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the 
Slaves?,” he neglects to consider how the connections he draws may be appropriative. 
Similar to Bradshaw’s comparison of African American women to female elephants, his 
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use of the Blackfeet is meant to indicate respect, but instead indicates a lack of rhetorical 
listening. 
Kopelman’s overt racism should not overshadow Peacock’s; however, it is 
different in that Kopelman refuses to even engage with the reality that there is a 
symbolic economy that many draw on to dehumanize and therefore abuse people. 
Instead, he participates in this discourse to draw comparisons between the dog Lava and 
the human citizens of Iraq such as the one in which he contrasts Iraqis’ apparent lack of 
enthusiasm “to live in a free, democratic and secure society” to Lava’s “commitment” to 
make it the democratic haven of the United States (To America). Because Kopelman 
frames these comparisons to flatter the dog, he elevates Lava closer to realm of humans’ 
moral consideration on the shoulders of Iraqis. Such comparisons do more to re-inscribe 
racism than to undermine speciesism and neglect to get at what Haraway calls “the 
entrails of humanism” in which animals and a variety of Othered humans are lumped 
together (When Species Meet 18). 
 While Peacock’s project is more posthumanist than Kopelman’s in that the 
earlier writer does recognize the abuse of dehumanized people and nonhumans “draws 
from the same well” and attempts to critique both, the two writers have in common their 
descriptions of trauma which are used to call for social action.  They use 
consubstantiality, with animals, within themselves, and with their audience, to generate 
and limit reader sympathy. Both writers are also nonconfrontational in their attempts to 
persuade readers to take action. For example, rather than imposing Peacock’s values, as 
other possible genres for environmentalist appeals such as the manifesto would, the 
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memoir gives the audience more freedom of interpretation. Kopelman’s use of the 
memoir also emphasizes the specificity of his experience with combat-related stress. 
Though he found therapy helpful and strongly believes military culture should value it, 
he does not tell other individuals they must seek it. Therefore, though both writers reach 
out to humans as part of their own “mending,” they do not seek to control others. The act 
of writing and publishing itself is part of this mending because it forms consubstantial 
bonds with the audience to be persuasive.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has identified several examples of posthumanist rhetoric and 
common techniques these texts use to draw identifications between humans and 
nonhumans. Anthropomorphism, analogy, and narrative are often intertwined to 
establish identification, and they can also be used to draw attention to differences 
between species. The inclusion of species-specific details in texts that otherwise attempt 
to build identification encourages rhetorical listening. Ratcliffe conceptualizes rhetorical 
listening as a conscious practice of identification that considers power differences among 
groups. The listener pays attention to others’ desires for disidentifications and, instead of 
forcing a wholesale identification, respects these points to create limited identifications. 
Many of the texts analyzed in this dissertation limit identifications between humans and 
nonhumans as well as between writers and readers. 
One hallmark of posthumanist rhetoric is that it uses recent scientific discoveries 
to support its use of anthropomorphism. Therefore, these identifications depend on 
differences as well as similarity as, for example, when Bradshaw describes how the 
equipment for the Mirror Self-Recognition (MSR) test had to be adjusted for elephants at 
the Bronx Zoo. The MSR uses a subjects’ reaction to a mirror as a metric for self-
consciousness. Bradshaw explains that researchers kept the mirror covered for several 
days so that the captive elephants’ reaction to a new stimulus could be recorded and 
contrasted with their behavior during the mirror test, a precaution that is not considered 
necessary for human infants (3). That Bradshaw accounts for species differences in her 
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arguments that human and elephant minds are substantially similar means her claims are 
not easily dismissed as naïve, sentimental, or delusional by skeptical readers.  
After Bradshaw uses scientific evidence to argue that elephants have complex 
minds and social structures, she makes emotional appeals by imaginatively describing 
individual elephants’ experiences and encouraging readers to identify with them through 
narrative. In one such instance, she defines the symptoms of human and elephant PTSD, 
then shows how the orphan Ndume’s behavior qualifies him for this diagnosis while 
using anthropomorphic terms like “screaming” and “baby” to describe him (139). 
Goodall also relies heavily on anthropomorphism and narrative to create identification 
with nonhumans. Because Goodall is a public figure and Reason for Hope is her eighth 
book published for adult readers, she is not in Bradshaw’s position of needing to 
introduce herself to readers as a serious, competent scientist. Instead of reviewing 
scientific literature about the chimpanzee mind, she relies on her own research and 
presents it as anecdotal experiences with the chimps. These narratives about individual 
chimpanzees work to create identification between readers and chimps. Narrative is 
closely linked to the use of anthropomorphism because it conveys that nonhumans are, 
like humans, unique from individual to individual and therefore each life should be 
considered valuable. Every being has its own story. 
While narrative can create identification when anthropomorphic language is 
used, it can also limit this identification when the uniqueness of individual experiences is 
stressed. With Goodall’s narrative about the chimpanzee Mel who adopts the orphaned 
Spindle, the story of two unrelated individuals forming familial ties is one many readers 
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can relate to. However, this particular experience, of losing one’s mother to an epidemic 
and adopting an orphan who also lost his mother at the same time is much more specific. 
The identification with readers is further limited when Goodall adds species-specific 
details about Spindle clinging to Mel’s stomach like a frightened young chimp does with 
its mother. While readers might identify with this experience of Mel’s on an abstract 
level because human subjects also deviate from heteronormative social expectations, the 
use of detail focuses more attention on chimps’ behavior than humans’ (Butler 155).  
Analogy seems to be a form of identification that is more difficult to limit; 
however, it can be used productively. PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” is an example 
of an analogy that does not convey the creators’ intentions, at least not the intentions 
later professed by the organization’s spokespeople. Unlike Bradshaw and Goodall, who 
use narrative to establish reader sympathy for individualized animals, PETA’s campaign 
relied on visuals without narrative arrangement that instead emphasized the anonymity 
of human and nonhuman victims killed on a mass scale in the Holocaust and factory 
farming. Analogy can be used in a more limited way, as shown by PETA’s “Animal 
Liberation” campaign, which attempts to focus more on similarities between perpetrators 
of violence rather than those between human and nonhuman victims, and Eve Abe’s 
work on elephants in Uganda in which she draws attention to how a shared history has 
affected these animals and the Acholi people who live in their vicinity.  
Perhaps Doug Peacock’s brief narratives about the bears he repeatedly 
recognizes work to make his deployment of the Holocaust analogy less shocking. As the 
bears are not social, Peacock’s descriptions of them differ from Bradshaw and Goodall’s 
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ones of elephants and chimpanzees  in which the writers admire and marvel at these 
animals’ ability to create cultures and loving relationships among themselves. However, 
Peacock does create individualized personas for the bears by naming them and analyzing 
behavioral evidence to create brief backstories for them as, for example, more or less 
habituated. Therefore, while disidentification and literal distance are always important in 
his writings, readers do still come to know the bears as individuals. 
Disidentification through the use of detail is important not only for persuading an 
audience, but also for recognizing the subjectivity of the animals or humans the text is 
about. Texts that investigate the relationship between humans and animals can use 
identifications to undermine human superiority as a species but may also reify the 
importance of certain qualities of the liberal humanist subject by granting them to 
nonhumans and obscuring differences among species. It can be difficult to know which 
differences are significant to particular nonhumans, but as Francois points out, one can 
still work hard to do so (61). Peacock’s attention to the details of grizzly behavior and 
Bradshaw’s extensive research on elephant ethology are two positive examples. 
Narrative can also create and limit identification among humans as shown by Stassen’s 
and Bazambanza’s accounts of the genocide in Rwanda which generate identification 
with the victims of trauma while also stressing the uniqueness of their lives. Similarly, 
Peacock and Kopelman recount their experiences in war and with symptoms of trauma 
in ways that establish moments of identification with readers and at other times forestall 
such identification.  
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Disidentification among humans recognizes the subjectivity of others and 
therefore leaves space for agency, even though it may mean the writer is less specific 
about helpful actions humans can take. Goodall allows for disidentifications among her 
readers and between readers and herself.  Her remonstrative tone and decision to frame 
the book as a memoir instead of an explicit argument demonstrates a respect for their 
subjectivity. Kopelman’s From Baghdad to America works similarly because, like 
Goodall, he provides readers with “a reason for hope” but does not insist on it. He 
suggests mental health resources, yet does not claim that therapy or medication are 
solutions that all service members troubled by symptoms of trauma must seek. 
 In contrast, though Bazambanza’s use of narrative in Smile Through the Tears 
stresses both the specificity of the Rwanga family’s experience and the more generalized 
suffering of Tutsis, he makes a definitive, instead of remonstrative, argument about the 
causes of and culpability for the genocide. Bazamabanza’s aim is to educate readers 
about the genocide because he believes this will prevent future racial violence. Whereas 
Smile Through the Tears explains the political orchestration of the genocide, J.P. 
Stassen’s Deogratias investigates it on the micro-level of one perpetrator’s experience in 
the “gray zone.” While this text complicates subjectivity and agency, it does so in 
politically problematic ways that might diminish the culpability of individual 
perpetrators and the Rwandan government as well as Western political bodies and 
individuals.  
 Culpability, or responsibility in a more general sense, is a recurring concern in 
posthumanist theory because of its relationship to agency. A consistent theme in 
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posthumanist thought is the role of relationships in constituting the subject. Wynter 
conceptualizes an autopoietic subject that adjusts to social norms, and Wolfe describes a 
similar version of the subject whose autopoietic closure also entails openness. That is, 
because the subject’s self-troping mechanisms are complex, it is vulnerable to 
environmental influences. Haraway insists that such relationships entail responsibility 
and praises a posthumanist view of the world that draws connections, and therefore 
obligations, among humans and nonhumans (When Species Meet 5, 227). She describes 
humans who recognize such relationships as “worldly” (287). Shaping worlds through 
discourse is a recurring interest of Haraway’s ever since her discussion of “cyborg 
writing” as “the power to survive . . . on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world 
that marked them as other” in “A Cyborg Manifesto” (174). 
 Rhetorical identifications and disidentifications among readers, nonhumans, and 
the writer are constantly shifting. This shifting is an important part of posthumanist 
rhetoric because it can be read as an acknowledgement that these relationships are 
entangled and shifting themselves. To know that (dis)identification is not static is to 
know that it can be changed and this potential for change makes evaluating the political 
implications of potential identifications relevant so that we can attempt to create non-
exploitative ones. In When Species Meet, Haraway highlights the role of respect in 
world-making (19). For her, respect means “pay[ing] attention” (19). Ratcliffe’s theory 
of rhetorical listening provides a method for paying attention and creating a response 
that is limited and open to change.  
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How posthumanist rhetoric locates responsibility and how it might also convey 
respect for its audiences as well as nonhuman subjects could be an area for future 
research that helps us envision a “world-making” that does not make “discursive 
victims” of animals  or animalized humans (Haraway, When Species Meet 311). 
Rhetorical listening is particularly useful for political activism because it can decrease 
the chances of alienating audiences.  It stands in contrast to shame, a frequent tactic in 
animal rights discourse that seeks to persuade audience members to change by showing 
them their culpability. While both shame and rhetorical listening involve 
disidentifications between speaker and audience, rhetorical listening is an expression of 
respect that does not necessarily place responsibility on the other.  
In recent years, shaming has been acknowledged to be therapeutically useful for 
the disempowered when targeted at those who are smug about their privilege (Locke 
156), but also criticized as not very productive politically (Jones 157, Locke 148, and 
Nussbaum 221). Jill Locke conceptualizes shame as “a negative global self-assessment” 
(149) and Martha Nussbaum similarly describes shame as a feeling that negatively 
focuses on “the very being” of a person (208). She clarifies her definition of shame by 
contrasting it to guilt, a “self-punishing anger” one feels in response to a harmful action 
one committed (Nussbaum 208). PETA’s Holocaust on Your Plate attempted to inspire 
shame in its viewers by equating them to Nazis, a group generally painted as wholly evil 
in Western memory rather than as decent individuals who were guilty of some harmful 
acts. PETA, as an abolitionist organization, does perceive the act of eating factory-
farmed animals or animal products as more than just an action. It is, according to their 
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spokespeople, one manifestation of a speciesist mind-set that affects society on multiple 
levels beyond the industrialized production of meat.  
Nussbaum allows that shame under some circumstances might be politically 
productive, and PETA’s criticism of a speciesist mind-set might qualify as they perceive 
this attitude to have wide-ranging effects. Nussbaum uses Barbara Ehrenreich’s book 
Nickel and Dimed as a positive example of shaming (212). Ehrenreich experimented as 
living as a woman without qualifications or credentials for several months and described 
her difficulties acquiring work and making ends meet in low-paying, part-time jobs. She 
concludes her book by claiming her readers should not just feel guilt for the difficulties 
facing the working poor, but shame. Nussbaum concludes that Ehrenreich calls for 
shame because these difficulties result not from easily identifiable and rectifiable actions 
but “from deeply rooted and long-standing patterns of thought and commitment in 
American society: the love of luxury, the common resentment of redistributive taxation, 
the belief that the poor cause their poverty, and a lot more,” so readers need to 
“reexamine our habits and our national character” (212). Nussbaum concludes that this 
type of shaming can be constructive, assuming that the reader agrees with Ehrenreich’s 
preceding analysis in her book (212).  
PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” lacked detailed analysis, relying on a victim 
analogy rather than explaining a perpetrator analogy. The campaign also perhaps 
focused too heavily on the individual perpetrator. Whereas Ehrenreich shows readers 
flaws in American thought, according to Nussbaum, “Holocaust on Your Plate” did not 
thoroughly develop a critique of speciesism that showed how it is shaped by and affects 
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multiple aspects of American society. Because shame as a political tactic relies on the 
oppressor to change his or her ways (Locke 156), viewers who rejected PETA’s attempt 
at shaming also rejected its pro-vegan message.  
Locke concludes that the energy put into shaming could be perhaps more 
usefully redirected to creating spaces for the disempowered to speak (159). She calls this 
activity “world building,” a term which recalls Haraway’s work. Whereas Haraway is 
interested in redrawing the world by mapping new relationships, Locke lists concrete 
ways to provide alternative worlds that value marginalized voices when she states 
“rather than focusing on those who shame us, let’s make film, tell stories, tend parks, 
paint murals, open farmers’ markets, build schools and universities, support clinics, and 
foster misfit salons” (159).  One example of marginalized voices drawing new 
relationships is the Mercy for Animals parody of the California Milk Processor Board 
2011 advertising campaign that claimed milk reduced symptoms of PMS. The parodies 
express anger, but, because they target actions rather than make a global negative 
criticism, they do not rely on shaming. Instead, they allow audiences to draw their own 
conclusions about their responsibilities to dairy cows.  
The milk board’s campaign, with its catchphrase “everything I do is wrong,” 
addressed men befuddled by the supposed hysteria of pre-menstrual women. A series of 
print ads depicted a frightened and confused man presenting two cartons of milk and 
making an insincere apology that frames women as irrational. Examples of these 
apologies include “I’m sorry I listened to what you said and not what you meant” and 
“I’m sorry for the thing or things I did or didn’t do.” The milk board quickly pulled the 
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campaign because of negative reactions that claimed it reinforced stereotypes about both 
sexes because, in the words of a Ms. Magazine blogger, “If Milk’s women are overly 
emotional, irrational and angry, its men are oafish, dumb, submissive and insincere” 
(Berkenwald). 
Mercy for Animals’ parody ads critique both the sexism of the originals and the 
practices of the dairy industry. Two prospective print parodies were circulated online, 
with the intent to publish them in Ms. Both ads feature an angry-faced woman holding 
milk cartons that are stained with blood with the text “PMS? No, I’m livid with the milk 
industry for abusing and killing cows” (emphasis in original). The parodies express 
anger at an industry’s actions rather than shaming the individuals who buy its products. 
It is up to the audience to conclude that when they purchase dairy products, they support 
these practices. That the viewer does not receive a global negative criticism of his or her 
self may mean he or she is less likely to defensively reject the campaign’s message.  
The parody also attempts to side with the audience, rather than shame it, by 
expressing anger at the sexism of the original ads. The parody acknowledges that 
women’s expressions of anger can be legitimate and therefore need to be addressed with 
significant action, rather than dismissed as a hormonal imbalance that can be soothed 
with offerings of milk. The Mercy for Animals campaign attempts to appeal to viewers’ 
existing anger at the sexist ads and encourage them to apply that anger to the dairy 
industry itself. By having female models express frustration that their anger has been 
dismissed as PMS, the parodies imply the animal rights movement values women’s 
voices. As Drew has shown in her essay about being a black woman staff member at 
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PETA, this is not always true (63). However, Mercy for Animals’ critique of sexism in 
the milk board’s ads seems to be in good faith. The result is that the parody engages in 
world-building by drawing connections between consumers, dairy cows, industry, and 
women activists. While women’s expressions of anger often draw attempts at shaming, 
the ads recognize their anger and imply that audiences have a responsibility to act on 
these complaints rather than dismiss them. Therefore, women’s subjectivity is central to 
the success of the campaign’s message. 
 While the parody is feminist, it is less clearly posthumanist. The campaign does 
not include a verbal posthumanist statement such as PETA’s claim that “animals are not 
ours to eat, wear, experiment on, use for entertainment, or abuse in any way” (“All 
About PETA”) and no explicit identifications are made between them and humans. 
There is a small line of text at the bottom of the ad that deploys some elements of 
posthumanist rhetoric. It states that “Most cows in dairy production are painfully 
mutilated, intensively confined, and mercilessly killed,” creating a brief narrative of a 
dairy cow’s life and somewhat anthropomorphizing the cows by claiming they are 
deserving of mercy. The ad also hints at the subjectivity of cattle in its criticism of 
violence in the dairy industry. The animals are made a visible referent in the discourse 
surrounding milk. Adams describes farm animals as “absent referents”: 
Behind every meal of meat is an absence: the death of the animal whose place the 
meat takes. The “absent referent” is that which separates the meat eater from the 
animal and the animal from the end product. The function of the absent referent 
is to keep our “meat” separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal, 
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to keep the “moo” or “cluck” or “baa” away from the meat, to keep something 
from being seen as having been someone. (emphasis in original13) 
The blood on the milk cartons then draws attention to both the “someone” of the dairy 
cow and the violence from humans she experiences. Therefore, while the ad does not 
make a verbal claim that animals have an innate right to an existence apart from human 
desires or make extensive parallels between humans and cows, it does remind viewers of 
dairy cows’ existence. Though the ads express anger, they operate through 
remonstration. Rather than telling audiences to stop purchasing dairy products, the ads 
lay out Mercy For Animals’ objections to the industry and let viewers come to their own 
conclusions about what actions they should take. By illuminating the relationship 
between these cows and the people who profit from and purchase their milk, the parody 
campaign makes viewers more “worldly” and, therefore, draws their attention to their 
responsibilities.  
That Mercy For Animals suggests these responsibilities without shaming may 
also be a manifestation of posthumanist thought. As Nussbaum points out shaming is 
often tied to a narcissistic desire to control others and reinforce one’s own delusions of 
completeness and invulnerability (220-1). Bahna-James, in Sistah Vegan, and Jones, in 
Sister Species, make similar critiques of animal activists who tend to distance themselves 
from people who remind them of their past nonvegan selves (165, 45). Both women 
describe this tendency as a defense mechanism used to reinforce one’s identity as an 
ethical vegan. Nussbaum, concerned with how shame is used across a range of 
situations, describes shaming as a technique to reinforce our own ideal humanity (which 
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is impervious to vulnerability and neediness) by dehumanizing others (26, 31, 221). 
Therefore, shaming as a persuasive technique is not only limited in its effectiveness but 
also antithetical to a posthumanist perspective that values relationships and welcomes 
humans’ vulnerability to influence. 
 Encouraging audiences to first accept one’s world view, in which humans and 
nonhumans are biologically and culturally intertwined, then agree that these 
relationships entail responsibility, and finally act on that responsibility is an immense 
task. It is not surprising that groups like Mercy for Animals do not address all three tasks 
in a single campaign. Even book-length works that take human and animal relationships 
as their subject, like Bradshaw’s, may not cover all three points thoroughly as, for 
example, her concluding calls for trans-species activism seem less grounded than her 
suggestions for elephant welfare activism. This dissertation argues that a rhetorical 
analysis of posthumanist texts, focused on their use of strategies such as analogy, 
narrative, and anthropomorphism, can illuminate the implications of how human-animal 
relationships are framed. When identification is used to highlight relationships and 
encourage attitudes of responsibility and behavioral change, exploitation can occur if the 
identification is made without regard for all the parties involved. Rhetorical listening is a 
useful tactic for expressing respect by limiting identification in ways one’s audiences 
and the subjects of the text would find meaningful. Disidentification recognizes others’ 
subjectivity and agency, which in turn implies that new points of identification may arise 
or disappear as the subjects interact.  
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Concern over the agency available to posthumanist subjects is manifested in 
posthumanist texts that make claims about culpability. Where posthumanist rhetoric 
locates responsibility, such as the audience members as individuals as in PETA’s 
“Holocaust on Your Plate” or an industry much of the audience already dislikes as 
Mercy for Animals did, is worth investigating for what it might reveal about agency. 
Haraway’s interest in the cooperative act of world-building may provide a starting place 
to think about the role of discourse in not only shaping subjects, but also enabling them 
to make politically conscious efforts at shaping the world. Rhetorical analysis of these 
efforts is essential to maintaining an awareness of the types of relationships they are 
establishing.  
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